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Germany’s emerging role as a supplier of security by contributing troops to 
out-of-area operations is a significant change in post-unification German foreign and 
security policy, and yet few studies have sought to explain how the process of 
decision making also has changed in order to accommodate the external and domestic 
factors that shape policy preferences and outcomes. The dissertation addresses these 
theoretical gaps in foreign policy analysis and in German foreign and security policy 
studies by examining the decision-making process in the case of Afghanistan from 
2001–2008, emphasizing the importance of institutional structures that enable and 
constrain decision-makers and then gathering the empirical evidence to cons ru t a 
framework for analyzing German foreign policy decision making. 
The dynamics of decision-making at the state level are examined by 
hypothesizing about the role of the chancellor in the decision-making process—
  
whether there has been an expansion of chancellorial power relative to other actors—
and about the role of coalition politics and the relative influence of the junior 
coalition partner in coalition governments. Results indicate that there are fw signs 
that federal chancellors dominate or otherwise control decision-making outcomes, 
and that coalition politics remain a strong explanatory factor in the process that 
shapes the parameters of policy choices. 
The dissertation highlights the central role of the Bundestag, the German 
parliament. The German armed forces are indeed “a parliamentary army,” nd the 
decision-making process in the Afghanistan case shows how operational parameters 
can be affected by parliamentary involvement. The framework for analysis of German 
foreign policy decision making outlines the formal aspects while emphasizing the 
importance of the informal process of decision making that is characterized by 
political bargaining and consensus building among major actors, particularly between 
the government and the parliamentary party fractions. Thus any examination of 
German out-of-area missions must take into account the co-determinative nature of 
decision making between the executive and legislative actors in shaping German 
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 The acceptance of a German role in contributing troops to military operations 
around the world has been one of the most significant changes in German foreign 
policy since the end of the Cold War and the unification of the country. With such a 
substantial shift in foreign policy orientation, one would expect to have had a 
corresponding shift in patterns of decision making, and yet there has been no 
sustained research to understand how such decisions are met or to build a detailed 
framework for analyzing the foreign policy decision-making dynamics that determine 
policy outcomes. 
Prior to 1990, the German government’s position was that such contributions 
were unconstitutional. Within a span of two decades, and following a landmark ruling 
by the country’s Federal Constitutional Court in 1994, Germany has become a 
supplier of security with over 7,000 troops participating in a dozen operations around 
the globe. Most of its armed forces—nearly 5,000—serve in Afghanistan, where 
German troops have been deployed since 2001 and where it is the third largest troop 
contributor after the United States and Great Britain.  
The Afghanistan deployment is problematic, both from an allied perspective 
and the government’s perspective. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, the German government voted to send troops to Afghanistan, and over the 




more troops and materiel to the mission and with the caveats, or national restriction , 
the government imposes on its armed forces. These international pressures comp te 
with domestic political discontent with Germany’s role in Afghanistan and insiste t 
calls to withdraw its troops. The dilemma for the German government is that 
deployments like Afghanistan almost always are debated in domestic politial terms 
rather than as a foreign policy issue. Thus debates that touch on Germany’s alliance 
commitments are colored with a strong domestic political dimension that often 
displaces strategic or operational considerations. The challenge facing the 
government, as one German official put it, is maintaining support for a foreign policy
that 90 percent of lawmakers support but 80 percent of the population opposes.  
For decades one of the defining characteristics of German foreign policy has 
been a strong elite consensus on foreign policy issues. This has been the case with 
out-of-area operations—until now. The political shifts ushered in by the 2009 
election—a new conservative government and a strong (and critical) left-of-center 
opposition—have accelerated the fragmentation of the elite consensus that began to 
emerge after 2005. With waning elite support, Germany’s military commitment in 
Afghanistan will continue to weaken. Understanding how such alliance commitments 
are negotiated will provide insights into the ways in which international and domestic 
variables interact to shape policy and what the underlying mix of factors are that 
appear necessary in constructing a policy position acceptable to the actors in the 




Statement of the Problem 
At the theoretical level, very little research has been conducted on 
understanding the combination of factors that shape the German foreign policy 
decision-making process in relation to German out-of-area operations, and what 
research there has been has tended to focus on the role of actors in the decision-
making process while neglecting the institutional structures within which decision 
makers formulate their policies. This, in turn, has delayed the construction of a 
decision-making framework of analysis within which insights into the policy process 
can be integrated. 
Robert Putnam and other theorists have amply documented the dynamics of 
two-level games in which policymakers must contend with competing pressures from 
the international environment and from domestic political exigencies and the ways in 
which state interests are influenced by domestic conditions.1 This study approaches 
the issue from the opposite side by examining the interaction of international and 
domestic factors and their impact on decision making at the state level—that is, ow 
do policymakers balance international pressures with domestic constraints ins de of 
an institutionalized process of decision making? How do German policymakers 
formulate decisions regarding out-of-area operations? Which factors—actors nd 
structures, external or domestic—matter more, and why? The research conducted by 
Thomas Risse-Kappen that demonstrate the central role of domestic structures and 
                                                
1 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization, 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427–460; Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image 
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization, 32, 4 (Autumn 
1978): 881–912; Peter Gourevitch, “Domestic Politics and Interational Relations,” Handbook of 
International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage 




coalition-building processes in the decision-making process is thus more relevant to 
the aims of this study.2 
The focus on Germany and the foreign policy decision-making process is 
important for several reasons. More broadly, there is a recognized need in the 
theoretical literature for studying institutional structures and processes in foreign 
policy research. Juliet Kaarbo, for example, has argued that previous research in 
foreign policy analysis (FPA) has focused on how policy is formulated and 
implemented, but few studies have tended to focus on the policy-making process and 
the institutional structures in between.3 Foreign policy analysis identifies individual 
actors as the most important factor in decision-making dynamics. Human agency is 
certainly a key variable, but human agency also creates institutional structures—
organizations, rules, practices, and norms—within which individual actors function 
and which shape the direction and outcome of policy decisions. The study seeks to 
supplement the FPA literature by examining and highlighting the ways in which 
institutional organizations and structures—practices, procedures, rules, and norms—
also affect the decision-making process. 
 The theoretical gap is particularly pronounced in the German case. A review 
of the literature shows that few studies have sought to identify the dynamics of post-
unification German foreign policy decision-making.4 The major German language 
                                                
2 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structures, and Foreign Policy in Liberal 
Democracies,” World Politics, 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479–512; Harald Müller and Thomas Risse-
Kappen, “From the Outside in and from the inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and 
Foreign Policy,” in The Limits of State Autonomy, eds. Valerie M. Hudson and David Skidmore 
(Boulder: Westview, 1993), 25–48. 
3 Juliet Kaarbo, “Coalition Cabinet Decision Making: Institutional and Psychological Factors,” 
International Studies Review, 10 (2008): 58. 
4 Gerald Schneider, “Die bürokratische Politik der Aussenpolitikanalyse. Das Erbe Allisons im Licht 




studies on the subject, for example, were written during the Cold War and are thus of 
limited value.5 Much of the theoretical debate on post-unification German foreign 
policy has been focused at the IR level and the question of how Germany’s changed 
power position in the international system affects its interactions with other stat s, 
and whether Germany will remain a civilian power or become a “normal” power 
defined more by its national interests rather than postwar norms of multilateral sm 
and self-restraint in military matters.  
 The answer, of course, is not a choice between norms and interests but a 
question of which norms and which interests infuse the decision-making process. The 
postwar Federal Republic deliberately pursued a policy of self-constraint, merging its 
interests with those of the Euro-Atlantic community, and while the norm of 
international multilateralism is a pillar of German foreign policy today, in the early 
postwar decades it was a way for the German state to adapt itself to the constraints 
imposed on it and to seek influence via the institutions and organizations it had 
become a part of.6 Thus political necessities are transformed into normative 
convictions.  
 For much of the post–Cold War period, then, the theoretical debate on post-
unification German foreign policy has vacillated between realist expectations of 
German foreign policy behavior and social constructivist challenges to the problems 
                                                                                                                                          
107–123; Dirk Peters, “Ansätze und Methoden der Aussenpolitikanalyse,” in Handbuch zur deutschen 
Aussenpolitik, eds. Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 816–835. 
5 Helga Haftendorn, “Aussenpolitische Prioritäten und Handlungsspielraum. Ein Paradigma zur 
Analyze der Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 30, no. 1 
(1989): 32–49. 
6 Jeffrey J. Anderson and John B. Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold 
War Europe,” in After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-
1991, ed. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




evident in applying a structural analysis to post-unification German foreign and 
security policy. Because the study’s research question focuses on explaining decision-
making processes in German foreign policy—a state level analysis—the theortical 
discussion must move from a broader international relations (IR) viewpoint to the 
sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The theoretical debate within FPA itself 
has gone through a transition from the dominance of a positivist approach to 
cognitive/psychological approaches to focusing on the role of actors in the policy 
process, though this emphasis on agency has, as noted, neglected the institutional 
structures that affect foreign policy behavior. The task is to examine the actors nd 
structures within the decision-making process, focusing on the institutional structures 
that shape the context within which policies are chosen and then integrating the 
empirical observations into a framework for analysis of decision processes. 
 Thus this study will close these theoretical gaps at several levels. At the
foreign policy analysis level, the study will add to the FPA literature by examining 
the decision-making process to determine what kinds of institutional structures—
organizations, practices, rules, and norms—are evident and how such factors enable 
or constrain the parameters of foreign policy choices. The emphasis will be on 
understanding process rather than on outcomes.  Secondly, the study will propose two 
hypotheses that will look to the interaction between agency and structure in the 
decision-making process and within the institutional structures in which de isions are 
made.  
Finally, the study will begin to construct a framework for analyzing German 




policy decision making will be augmented with the study’s examination of decision 
making on out-of-area operations, arguably the most important change in post-
unification German foreign policy. The study will look at the German mission in 
Afghanistan beginning in 2001, with the establishment of the Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) mission and its counterterrorism mandate, and the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with its civilian reconstruction and development 
mandate. The study ends in 2008 with the German government’s decision to pull out 
of the OEF mission in Afghanistan.  
 
Research Question 
This study seeks to explain variations in policy preferences that can be traced 
either to agency or structure in the decision-making process—in this instance, then, 
either through the enhanced power of the chancellor, the chief executive and major 
foreign policy actor, or through the dynamics of coalition politics and, in particular, to 
the potential for the junior coalition partner to shift policy preferences closer to its 
own political objectives. Important will be the identification of institutional 
structures—formal and informal organized bodies, rules, practices, and norms—that 
are utilized to secure the desired policy preferences. 
 A few words on definitions and key conceptual views are in order. An 
examination of the decision-making process will place more of an emphasis on 
process—for example, how decisions are arrived at, what factors matter most, which 
actors are involved—than the outcome itself, that is, whether the final vote on a 




rarely declined to participate in missions for which it received an official request, and 
thus the number of comparative cases that could be applied to answer a “yes” or “no” 
assessment of policy decisions is not sufficient.7 Another reason, as noted above, is 
the need for greater understanding of the process itself in German foreign policy 
decision making. 
In terms of agency, the study focuses on the chancellor because he or she is 
the most influential foreign policy player. The chancellor is the central decision 
maker in the German government and has overall responsibility for external security 
and national defense. In terms of structure, the role of coalition politics and the link to 
their parliamentary fractions is central to an understanding of the decision-maki g 
process. As Ludger Helms concludes, “. . . the political weight of the junior partner 
within a given coalition and the relationship between the government and the 
leadership of the majority Fraktionen may be considered variables enjoying a 
particularly large amount of explanatory power.”8  
In terms of conceptualizing institutional structures, John Duffield’s discussion 
of institutions is relevant to this study. Institutions have been defined in different 
ways. Traditionally, international institutions were conceived of as formal 
                                                
7 Apparently the only case where Germany declined to participate was the EU-led mission in Chad in 
2008, which was composed primarily of French forces. Although the reason given was Germany’s 
already significant contribution of forces in Afghanistan, German officials also saw the Chad mission 
as an extension of France’s own political/military policy in Africa and thus early on signaled its refusal 
to participate. Interviews in Berlin November 2009; see also Denis M. Tull, “Tschad-Krise und die 
Operation EUFOR Tschad/ZAR,” SWP-Aktuell 15, February 2008 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik), 1–4. It is arguable whether the 2002 Iraq War can be considered as such a case, since it is not 
clear that the German government received any formal request from the Bush administration to 
participate. Furthermore, then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder officially declared Germany’s intention 
not to become involved in any military incursion in Iraq in early August 2002, before there was any 
public acknowledgement or confirmation of American intensions to invade Iraq. See Karin L. 
Johnston, “Germany,” in Public Opinion and International Intervention: Lessons from the Iraq War, 
eds. Richard Sobel, Peter Furia, and Bethany Barratt (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2010). 
8 Ludger Helms, “‘Chief Executives’ and Their Parties: The Case of Germany.” German Politics 11, 




organizations, such as the UN or OECD. Secondly, the literature on regimes 
beginning in the 1970s defined institutions as “recognized patterns of behavior or 
practice around which expectations converge,”1 but this definition, too, is limited, 
since by including behavioral traits, the definition precludes a study of whether 
institutions and rules affect the behavior of actors. An emphasis on a definition of 
institutions as a set of formal rules in which actors are utility maximizers omits the 
ways in which normative elements can be an influence on institutions (e.g., how 
actors create rules). Finally, to define institutions solely as norms and collectively 
held intersubjective ideas neglects the formal features that are a part of the 
institutional make-up within which the decision-making process resides.9  
Duffield argues that a workable definition of institutions can in fact integra 
the various aspects of institutions identified in the literature—formal organizations, 
practices, rules, and norms. Thus in his view, institutions are “relatively stableets of 
related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the 
international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as non-state 
entities) and their activities.”10  The definition covers both intersubjective and formal 
elements of institutions as well as functional elements (“rules” as rationalists use it, 
with constitutive, regulative, and procedural functions). The study will examine the 
decision process to determine the mix and the impact of these institutional structures 
on policy choices. 
Finally, the aim of the study is to gather the empirical evidence of German 
foreign policy decision making into a framework for analysis. As discussed earlier, 
                                                
9 John S. Duffield, “What are International Institutions?” International Studies Review 9, no. 1 (2007): 
3–7. 




there are very few studies that explicitly outline a decision-making framework for 
German foreign policy. The framework presented in Frederick Mayer’s study of the
decision dynamics of NAFTA in the United States is a good starting point, since the 
framework Mayer provides is an integrated approach that takes into account two 
dimensions of policy interaction: the impact of international versus domestic 
variables, and the importance of incorporating all three levels of analysis: s temic 




 To address the theoretical and empirical gaps outlined above, the study will 
set its investigation within a foreign policy analysis framework, arguably the more 
relevant theoretical approach with which to address the study’s research objetive, 
rooted as it is in determining dynamics of decision making at the state level. 
Most scholars agree that agents and structure are mutually constituted and that 
there is a need to find some integrative approach that can encompass the complexity 
of the agent–structure interaction in decision making.12 The challenge is to move 
beyond the partition between individual action and social order to examine the 
interplay between them. As such, this study introduces two hypotheses that examine 
major components in the decision-making process that characterizes the agency– 
                                                
11 Frederick Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political Analysis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), 14–23. 
12 Colin Wight, “They Shoot Dead Horses Don’t They? Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure 
Problematique,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 5, no. 1 (1999): 125; Ted Hopf, 
“The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23, no. 1 
(Summer 1998): 172–173; Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist 




structure dynamic: the role of the chancellor, the chief executive, and the role of 
coalition politics in the German political system. By following the interaction of the 
two variables over time, both their interaction and their respective impact on the 
policy-making process can be charted.  
The first hypothesis focuses on the role of the federal chancellor. The 
argument presented here is that the chancellor is the central actor in foreign policy 
decision making; that within the structural constraints on executive power, 
chancellors can expand their ability to shape policy preferences and decision 
outcomes vis-à-vis other dominant policy actors; but that whether the chancellor 
dominates policy deliberations or is forced to compromise is dependent on the 
political and institutional context within which the policy takes shape. The first 
hypothesis will test the theoretical assertion of an increasingly powerful chief 
executive and that as a consequence the chancellor is more influential in shaping t e 
trajectory of decision outcomes than other major actors. 
The second hypothesis takes up the question of structure in its focus on the 
party system and the importance of coalition politics in foreign policy deliberat ons. 
The argument presented here is that institutions matter in the foreign policy decision-
making process; that parties—particularly parliamentary parties in Germany’s 
coalition governments—are key institutions that shape policy decisions; and that 
within governing coalitions, junior coalition partners can have a disproportionate 
influence on policy outcomes. Studies of parliamentary democracies have shown that 
coalition politics is a core factor in determining policy outcomes. The second 




partner and its junior coalition partners, the junior partner can affect the course of 
decision making and/or extract concessions from the major coalition partner.  
 
Methodology 
 A case study methodology was applied to the case of Afghanistan from 2001–
2008. Afghanistan was chosen for several reasons. More generally, with much of the 
analysis of German foreign policy addressing “continuity,” this study seeks to 
illuminate the question of “change” relating to Germany’s participation in out-of-area 
operations after 1990. The shift in acceptance of this new military role creat d new 
policy networks and decision-making processes in its wake, and these will constitute 
the focus of the study’s empirical emphasis. Second, the German government’s 
position of “no use of German armed forces except for territorial defense” prior to 
1989 and its acceptance of a role after 1990 enables the study to more easily contro  
for variables and to observe the development of a policy decision-making framework 
for out-of-area decisions. Third, Afghanistan is the most controversial mission and 
one that straddles an uneasy fusion between a reconstruction/development mandate, 
represented by the ISAF mission, and a robust military engagement mandate, 
represented by the OEF mission, over the course of several years. German armed 
forces are deployed under the ISAF mandate but are no longer active in Afghanistan 
under OEF, thus affording an examination of acceptance and ultimately of withdrawal 
from part of the Afghanistan mission.  
Furthermore, the time period incorporates two different types of coalition 




2005, and a grand coalition between the SPD and the Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU) from 2005–2008. This shift in coalition type will permit comparisons 
with regard to coalition dynamics. Finally, the decision to participate in the 
Afghanistan mission was a later out-of-area case in the (only twenty-year) period of 
German participation, which arguably is more desirable for assessing institut onal 
changes as they developed over the course of the period in question. 
Primary source data included thirty interviews with government officials, 
policy experts, members of parliament, academic researchers, and journalists. A 
questionnaire was developed (in English and German) to serve as a guideline for 
conducting structured interviews in Berlin and Washington, D.C. Interviewees wer 
asked specific questions about the two hypotheses presented in the study and about 
the details of the decision-making process. Searches were conducted for public 
opinion data, government documents (speeches, statements), parliamentary 
documents (plenary records, motions, committee reports), and official government 
reports. Secondary data included data searches (Lexis-Nexis for German and English 
language newspapers), policy evaluations from U.S. and German research 
institutions, and an extensive literature review in German and English. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 Chapter Two sets the context for understanding the dynamics of the 
Afghanistan case study by reviewing Germany’s experiences in handling out-of-area 
questions prior to 2001. Germany’s role as a contributor to out-of-area operations is 




operations was deemed unconstitutional. With the end of the Cold War, and with the 
1994 Federal Constitutional Court decision that ruled Germany’s participation in out-
of-area operations permissible, Germany took on a larger international role. The rules, 
practices, and norms now embedded in the decision-making process emerged out of 
Germany’s experiences with out-of-area operations in the 1990s, particularly in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. The chapter provides the background for evaluating the course of 
events in the Afghanistan case. 
 Chapter Three examines the state of the theoretical debate on post-unification 
German foreign and security policy, following its arc from early realist predictions of 
post–Cold War German state behavior to constructivist challenges to structuralist 
explanations of post-unification German foreign policy. The chapter then turns to a 
discussion of institutions as the missing link in analyzing German foreign policy at 
the state level, moving the theoretical debate into a foreign policy analysis pproach 
in order to identify the institutional factors that influence German foreign policy 
decisions, specifically with regard to the deployment of military forces in 
Afghanistan. 
An understanding of the dynamics of decision making requires a framework 
of analysis that incorporates knowledge of both agency and structure. Chapter Four 
focuses on the interplay between actors and institutional structures in decision 
making, first by outlining the major German foreign policy actors and structures, and 
then by introducing two hypotheses that represent these two constitutive elements in 
foreign policy analysis. The first hypothesis addresses the role of the federal 




chancellor has accumulated more power over the decision-making process—or 
whether the chancellor remains constrained by the fragmentation of power in 
Germany’s federalist system of parliamentary democracy. The second hypothesis 
takes up the question of structure in its focus on political parties and the importance 
of coalition politics in foreign policy deliberations, specifically the role of the junior 
coalition partner in Germany’s coalition governments, who can have a 
disproportionate influence on policy outcomes.  
Chapter Five takes the theoretical argument of this study one step further by 
integrating the insights from the two hypotheses on the role of the chief executive and 
coalition politics into a decision-making framework for analysis of German foreign 
policy on out-of-area operations. Various models of decision making are discussed 
and a decision-making framework for analyzing German foreign policy decision 
making presented.  
The events in Afghanistan from 2001 through 2008 form the central narrative 
in Chapter Six. For the first time, German troops were engaged in a military action 
beyond Europe’s borders. The German government’s efforts to balance external 
pressure and alliance commitments against strong domestic political constraints 
become increasingly difficult as the conflict in Afghanistan intensified. The 
difference in how the two operational components in Afghanistan—the 
counterterrorism OEF and the development and reconstruction mandate of ISAF—
were perceived and handled by the German government and the German parliament 




mandates in 2001 through 2008, when the German government officially withdrew 
from the OEF mission, focusing on the decision-making process.  
Chapter Seven presents the findings and analysis from the Afghanistan case 
study. The chapter’s introduction restates the study’s methodological and theoretical 
approach. The findings section addresses the two intertwined variables in the 
decision-making process, the role of the chancellor and the role of coalition politics 
and the coalition junior partner in the decision-making process. The presentation of 
the results of the case study is then followed by an analysis of the case study’s
findings, placing the results into a larger framework for analyzing German foreign 
policy decision making that documents the process by which foreign policy decisions 
on out-of-area operations are made, playing close attention to how institutional 
structures both enable and constrain the actors who function inside the parameters of 
the decision-making environment. The framework incorporates an understanding of 
the relationship between domestic and international variables and the interact on of 
factors at several levels of analysis.  
 Chapter Eight introduces a short conclusion along with a discussion of the 








Chapter 2: Early Experiences and Emerging Practices: German Out-




German participation in out-of-area operations remains a contentious issue in 
the Federal Republic. German history and the country’s postwar identity as a civilian 
power have strongly influenced attitudes regarding the use of force. Prior to 1990, 
Germany did not participate in peacekeeping missions, though it had contributed 
troops to humanitarian assistance efforts and natural disaster responses. With the end 
of the Cold War, Germany gradually assumed a role in international peacekeeping 
operations. The context of these early deployments in the 1990s shaped the way in 
which out-of-area missions are currently debated and determined. After unification, in 
the first phase of Germany’s acceptance of an expanded peacekeeping role (1990–
1995), the Kohl government stepped up German involvement in peacekeeping 
missions even though the constitutionality of such an engagement was still being 
debated. The mission that was central to this period was Germany’s participation n 
the conflict in Bosnia. In the second phase, from 1995–2000, the crisis in Kosovo was 
the watershed for German policymakers, when German troops engaged in combat for 
the first time since the end of World War II. Afghanistan dominates the third p ase of 
German adaptation to sending military troops abroad (2001), when German soldiers 
were deployed beyond Europe’s borders for the first time since 1945. As such, a 




question of Germany’ international peacekeeping role is warranted in order to 
understand the context in which the Afghanistan mission was formed. 
 
The Context for Change: Postwar German Foreign Policy (1945–1990) 
German foreign and security policy in the postwar period was characterized 
by a unique degree of external constraints. The country’s military occupation and 
subsequent division, and the bipolar structure of the international system that emerged 
during the Cold War, significantly limited Germany’s foreign policy maneuverability. 
It was Germany’s first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who saw that integrating 
Germany into western military and economic institutions was the only way for 
Germany to become a legitimate and credible international player again and to
recapture some control and influence over its external relations.13  
The development of West German foreign and security policies in the first 
decades after World War II reflected the German state’s adaptation to the realities of 
its political environment: the renunciation of force, acceptance of limited sovereignty 
via membership in western economic and political/military institutions, and a 
commitment to continued European integration and multilateral cooperation. Though 
Germany initially had little choice but to accept limits on its sovereignty, these 
necessities became part of the core element of West German foreign policy.14 
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Three conceptualizations of German foreign policy during the Cold War era 
dominated the theoretical literature. First, early works on German foreign policy 
emphasized Germany as a penetrated state and thus focused on the dependent nature 
of the West German state and the significance of external pressures on policymaking. 
The notion of “penetration” grew out of James Rosenau’s earlier writings and was 
used to describe a system that suffered from a critical shortage of capabilities and thus 
was forced to turn to external actors to compensate for this dependency.15 The second 
conceptualization of West Germany as a semi-sovereign state emphasized the 
decentralized character of the German state and the incremental policy outcomes that 
such a system produced. Closely associated with Peter Katzenstein’s work, the term 
as originally developed focused more on the limits of domestic state power rather 
than external constraints on power, but for Katzenstein the key point was that these 
external and internal constraints were self-imposed, creating a state that had been 
“tamed rather than broken.”16 Finally, Germany was viewed as a classic trading state, 
a concept introduced by Richard Rosecrance to describe a state that rejects politi al-
military goals and pursues instead economic differentiation as a means of security.17 
By the 1970s Germany’s growing economic influence gave it more political 
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maneuverability, but while analysts recognized this, most continued to believe that 
the system level of analysis remained the dominant pattern in German foreign 
policy—Germany’s security dilemma was still operative, and so the German state 
continued to be constrained by these external structural factors.18 
Nowhere was the reality of restraints on German power as evident as in the 
country’s security and defense policy. German military power was to be harnessed to 
postwar collective security institutions and constrained by various legal and 
constitutional restrictions. These included the size and structure of its force; the 
integration of German command structures into NATO, which maintained operational 
control over the forces in peacetime; constraints on weapons production; and 
Germany’s renunciation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.19  Germany 
deliberately pursued a policy of self-constraint and, over the postwar decades, merged 
its interests with those of the Euro-Atlantic community. West Germany’s postwar 
foreign policy evolved into the following set of principles:20 
• Never again: pacifism, moralism (defend human rights), democracy 
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o  rejection of military force, as translated into its legal and military 
components: a rejection of all nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons as well as constitutional constraints on use of force (e.g., 
rejection of “aggressive war”); 
• Never Alone:  integration, multilateralism, democratization 
o acceptance of integration in western political and collective security 
institutions—for example, European Community/EU, NATO; 
emphasis on multilateral cooperation and coalition building; support 
for democratization in Eastern Europe; 
• Politics Not Force: skepticism regarding utility of force; emphasis on 
            deterrence 
o emphasis on soft tools of power—diplomacy and negotiations, 
economic initiatives, trade, development aid—and on deterrent 
strategies to bring about peaceful resolution of the East-West divide;   
• Norms Define Interests: identity and foreign policy objectives  
o importance of democratic norms and values, such as promoting 
European integration, international human rights, rule of law, and 
incorporating international law into national law (for example, under 
the German constitution—the Basic Law—norms of international law 
take precedence over German law, though not the Basic Law itself);   
• Unification: peaceful unification of a divided Germany. 
 
To summarize: analyses of West German foreign policy emphasized the 
external constraints that shaped policy options and outcomes and the intertwining of 
domestic and international variables. Since the goal of the West German goverment 
was to regain some control over its domestic and external affairs, it was clearly in 
Germany’s interests to adapt itself to the constraints imposed on it and to seek 
influence via the institutions and organizations it was now a part of.  
1969–1990: Limited Humanitarian Assistance 
 Before 1990, German forces were deployed abroad exclusively on a 
multilateral basis for humanitarian aid and disaster and emergency assistance. 
Beginning in 1960, German troops were sent to countries in Africa, the Middle East, 




Bundeswehr assisted in over one hundred humanitarian aid missions, averaging about 
four per year but running as high as thirteen missions in 1973 alone.21 Thus prior to 
unification, Germany had participated on a bilateral level but not as part of a UN 
peacekeeping mission outside its borders. Part of the reason lay in occupied 
Germany’s unique status during the Cold War (East and West Germany became 
members of the United Nations only in 1973) and in concerns that any West German 
military contribution that was not humanitarian in nature would seriously disrupt its 
relationship with the Soviet Union and East Germany, perhaps even provoking some 
kind of military retaliation.  
The question of whether or not to send German troops abroad had in fact been 
an issue prior to the 1990s. There were periodic calls by the United States for 
Germany to fully participate in military missions. President Lyndon Johnson, for 
example, pressed West Germany to send a small troop contingent to Vietnam in the 
mid-1960s, but the West Germans rejected the idea as moving “beyond the spirit of 
the German constitution.”22  In response to such expectations, the West German 
government in the late 1970s and early 1980s took steps to formalize a position: 
German armed forces could be deployed for territorial or collective self-defense 
within the framework of Germany’s multilateral defense arrangements, but no more.23 
Many constitutional law experts did not agree with the government’s argument that it 
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was unconstitutional for Germany to utilize its forces for anything other than self-
defense, and it was this issue of constitutionality regarding out-of-area missions that 
fueled the political debates on German foreign and security policy in the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless the official German government position up to 1989 was that apart from 
giving humanitarian aid or assistance when natural disasters occurred, Geman forces 
were to be used for territorial defense only.24  
Post-Unification German Foreign Policy (1990–) 
In the early 1990s, with the Gulf War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
German leaders came under increasing pressure to resolve the constitutionality of the 
out-of-area question and to define what constituted the country’s new role and 
responsibilities in a post–Cold War world and what function Germany’s military 
forces had in this new role. Two important phases of adaptation to a policy of German 
engagement in out-of-area operations in the 1990s were Bosnia (1992–1995) when 
the issue of the constitutionality of German participation was resolved; and Kosovo 
(1998–1999) when the issue of a more robust military engagement and the question 
of whether German participation required an international mandate dominated the 
political debate. 
1990–1995: Bosnia and the Constitutionality Issue 
 
The end of the Cold War, with the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 
1989 and the unification of Germany on October 3, 1990, led to a reassessment of 
Germany’s role in the new post–Cold War era. The deep-seated German skepticism 
                                                




regarding the use of military force shared by the elite and public alike was challenged 
by the structural changes in the global security environment. The first test came 
quickly. The Gulf War in 1990–1991 forced open the debate on the role of German 
military forces in Germany’s evolving foreign policy and found the Germans 
singularly unprepared.25   
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the German government faced a 
growing number of external as well as internal pressures. Externally, Germany’s 
allies, particularly the United States, expected Germany to contribute forces to fight 
Iraq. Domestically, however, the German government was focused on the needs of 
unifying the country and on the upcoming all-German elections in October 1990. 
Politically, the discussions regulating the 2+4 Treaty that were to finalize the 
unification of Germany had not been completed, and sensitive negotiations on the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from East German territory were still ongoing. The 
German government feared that any direct German contribution of troops in the Gulf 
War would antagonize the Soviets and endanger German unification. The German 
government’s position remained what it had been: Sending troops was 
unconstitutional, though there were differing views on whether or not the Basic Law 
permitted German troops to be deployed outside of NATO territory.  
Finally, the question of the use of German military forces outside Germany’s 
borders was an intensely divisive issue within Germany’s political parties. Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl believed that Germany should assume the same rights and 
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responsibilities of any “normal” state power, but the willingness of the Christian 
Democracts (CDU/CSU) for Germany to assume a greater role in international 
peacekeeping would not come without a political battle, not only from the left—the 
Social Democrats (SPD), the Green Party, and the Party of Democratic Socialism 
(PDS)—but from its own coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The 
FDP and SPD (initially the CDU as well, though it reversed itself later) refused to 
consider sending German troops without a constitutional amendment. Of the 
opposition parties, the SPD rejected the use of German military forces excpt for 
humanitarian purposes, and the Green Party rejected any military role for th
Bundeswehr outside of Germany’s borders.26 
Given these domestic political constraints, Chancellor Kohl’s CDU-led 
government refused to send troops on constitutional grounds but saw to it that 
Germany did contribute by providing substantial financial assistance.27 However, the 
government’s decision to stay out of the Gulf War was harshly criticized. Germany’s 
western allies saw the Gulf War as a test of the German commitment to assuming 
greater responsibilities commensurate with its new status, and in their eyes, Germany 
had failed the test.28 
Stung by the international criticism over its refusal to participate in the Gulf 
War, the German government began the long process of moving the country toward 
acceptance of German participation in international peacekeeping missions. 
Chancellor Kohl had concluded that attaining the two-thirds majority in the 
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Bundestag for a constitutional amendment to permit German participation in out-of-
area operations was impossible in the political climate at that time. Tactically, then, 
the way to build both political and popular support for German participation in out-
of-area missions was to begin a gradual step-by-step process of sending small 
contingents of German soldiers to serve in multinational humanitarian aid operatins 
even before the question of constitutionality was resolved. The German government 
began this process of adjustment in 1992, providing humanitarian assistance to UN 
missions in Cambodia and Somalia.29 
But the next crisis was not long in coming, and it was not long before external 
events again challenged German views on the use of its military forces. The 
disintegration of Yugoslavia had accelerated in the early 1990s, and European efforts 
to broker a settlement failed to halt the conflict. The events in Bosnia from 1992–
1995 were punctuated with periods of escalating violence, followed by failed efforts 
at brokering cease-fires, and followed again by the intensification of violence, mass 
expulsions, and ultimately, human rights violations and genocide. At every phase, the 
German government and political elite’s actions were, in effect, a reactiv  process in 
response to external events that pushed the issue of military force and the 
constitutionality of German participation in out-of-area missions to the forefront of 
the political debate.  The pattern showed the German government’s preference fo  
waiting until some movement in the international community was evident and then 
moving to construct the necessary political response, always seeking a balance 
between external events and expectations and domestic political constraints. 
                                                






The political parties were deeply divided on whether or not the Basic Law 
allowed German participation in out-of-area operations, or whether a constitutional 
amendment was required, but the government was acutely aware of the fact that it 
could not choose to stay out of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia by reverting to 
its earlier Gulf War “checkbook diplomacy,” nor could it refuse to assist in resolving 
a Europe-based conflict. The government’s decisions, made in reaction to growing 
UN and ultimately NATO involvement, were met with hostility in the Bundestag and 
led to a challenge in the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.  
As the Bosnian crisis expanded, the UN responded in September 1991 with a 
weapons embargo against the remaining Yugoslav republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro. It acted again in May 1992, imposing a trade embargo on Serbia and 
Montenegro. By July 1992 NATO and the WEU agreed to support the UN’s efforts 
by establishing naval patrols in the Adriatic to monitor the trade and weapons 
embargo. As a NATO ally, the German government had to respond, and on July 15 
the government signaled its intention to send ships to assist in monitoring the 
embargo, and by November 1992 German AWACS were actively participating in 
monitoring the embargo. The SPD objected to the government’s decision, charging 
that the mission was unconstitutional.  
 The next challenge arose in October 1992, when the UN Security Council 
issued a flight ban over Bosnia and NATO AWACS planes were dispatched to 
monitor the “no fly” zone, including German AWACS crews. This time, the issue of 
German participation split the governing coalition itself since the FDP continued to 




implied that both government decisions were unconstitutional. This was a view 
shared by the SPD. Both parties believed Article 87a of the Basic Law allo ed the 
use of German armed forces for territorial and collective self-defense only and that 
the government should not be allowed to make such far-reaching decisions without 
the consent of parliament.30   
The political process had reached an impasse, and the deep divisions among 
the parties made a resolution of this question impossible. To some party leaders, the 
only way out of this political dead end was to take the issue to the Federal 
Constitutional Court. In 1993, one more attempt to reverse the Kohl government’s 
deployment decisions was made. On March 31, 1993, the UN Security Council voted 
to enforce the “no-fly zone,” and on April 2, NATO agreed to assist in the 
enforcement of the UN resolution. Again, the CDU/CSU and FDP were on opposite 
sides of the issue, with little prospect for consensus. In a calculated tactic, CDU/CSU 
leaders agreed to bring the issue to a vote in the federal cabinet and the FDP would 
then file suit against the motion, bringing an injunction to reverse the government’s 
decisions and recall the troops. Thus, on April 2, the German federal cabinet voted for 
the enforcement mission and the FDP (joined eventually by the SPD) sued the 
government it was a part of, thus handing over to the Federal Constitutional Court the 
messy job of resolving the deployment issue. 
 On April 8, 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court denied the FDP and SPD’s 
motion for injunction on the April 2, 1993, case only, arguing that the withdrawal of 
                                                








German AWACS, which constituted a third of all AWACS reconnaissance planes, 
would seriously compromise the UN-led mission.31 The central issue of the 
constitutionality of such deployments was not addressed by this opinion—merely 
whether the fulfillment or denial of the injunction would severely compromise the 
mission.32 What remained unresolved was the question of whether the government’s 
actions were constitutional. Resolution of this question would not occur until the 
following year, when the Federal Constitutional Court ruled on the 1992 case.  
 In April 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court met to hear oral arguments on 
the earlier cases brought before the federal government.33 Finally, on July 12, 1994, 
the Court announced its ruling. In this landmark decision, the Court determined first 
of all that there were no constitutional objections for German military personnel to 
participate in military operations outside of NATO territory. The legal basis for this 
lay in Article 24(2), which allows the federal government to accept membership in a 
system of mutual collective security and provides the constitutional basis for 
accepting the duties and responsibilities such membership requires, which in the 
Court’s view included the deployment of armed forces. Importantly, the 
Constitutional Court opined that “alliances of collective self-defense can also be 
systems of mutual collective security” in the sense of Article 24(2), which for t e 
Court included the UN, NATO, and WEU (now part of the EU). Thus the Court ruled 
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that missions must be undertaken within a multilateral context and within established 
collective security arrangements, and it determined that NATO and the EU 
constituted collective security organizations.34   
Most importantly perhaps, the Federal Constitutional Court required the 
federal government to obtain the consent of the Bundestag prior to every “armed 
operation” (bewaffneter Einsatz) via a simple majority vote. In this context the term 
means that parliamentary approval is required for every deployment of German 
military forces in which an actual or potential risk exists that the forces will be 
involved in armed clashes. Thus while in principle all deployments are subject to 
parliamentary consent, not all deployments necessarily require Bundestag approval 
(e.g., humanitarian aid, disaster relief) but, rather, only those in which there is the 
potential risk that force will be used.35 In emergencies, the Court declared the federal 
government could send troops without such an approval, but it would have to seek 
that approval ex post facto. Should the Bundestag refuse to sanction the deployment, 
the federal government would be obligated to recall the troops.36 
Ten days after the decision, in which the Court also ruled the government had 
failed to meet its responsibility in seeking the approval of parliament in the 1992 
cases that had been brought to the Court, the German government formally requested 
parliamentary approval of its missions in southeastern Europe (the AWACS mission 
and naval embargo). In the special session that was called on July 22, 1994, the 
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Bundestag approved the motion on a vote of 424–48–16 (yes/no/abstentions), with 
parliamentarians from the CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD voting in its favor.37 
Despite the legal significance of the Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling, the 
decision did not decisively change the course of German security policy nor the l ng-
standing skepticism of the utility of military force in the public at large—more 
specifically, it did not create greater receptivity in the German public for out-of-area 
missions. While the Court decision had ruled on the question of “whether” troops can 
participate, it was now the government’s task to determine the other parameters, the 
“when, where, and how much” of future missions. In an interview at the time, 
Defense Minister Volker Rühe outlined the government’s initial set of criteria:  
• Size and scope: deployments should be limited to Europe and its 
periphery; 
• UN mandate: a UN mandate is a prerequisite for German participation;  
• Historical sensitivities: German participation in countries it had 
occupied during World War II must be deployed in a way that avoids 
creating further tensions; 
• Public support: German missions must have broad public support; 
• “compelling reason”: only in times of dire threat to Germany, Europe, 
or international peace would German forces be deployed beyond 
territorial or alliance defense.38 
But these criteria were only temporary in the sense that the Court’s ruling had 
also tasked the German parliament with developing “the form and extent of 
parliamentary participation,”39 though it would take ten years to fulfill this mandated 
task. The Parliamentary Participation Act (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) was passed 
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by the Bundestag in March 2005, codifying the requirements set out by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in 1994—that is, in principle any “deployment of armed forces 
abroad” required the consent of parliament, though missions in which no armed 
conflict was expected were not subject to parliamentary approval; two procedural 
formats—a standard plus a more simplified procedural process, were provided; and in 
certain circumstances parliamentary consent can be given ex post facto. The Act also 
underscored the Court’s ruling that the Bundestag could only vote up-or-down on a 
mission; it could not alter the parameters of the deployment that the government had 
established in the mandate.40 
The resolution of the constitutionality question did not make the job of 
determining the level of commitment Germany must make to resolve the Bosnian 
crisis any easier. The longer the conflict dragged on and the more human rights 
violations came to light, the greater the realization was that the issue of the 
international community’s response had been pushed beyond simple humanitarian 
aid. For the Germans, the gray area lay between the commitment to humanitarian 
relief efforts and the prospect of combat operations, which neither the elite nor the 
public would support. German participation would be more palatable if the rationale 
were couched in humanitarian terms, since public opinion data at the time showed 
that public support for a UN mission declined when the mission was posed as 
something other than humanitarian aid or if the question implied some kind of 
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military intervention.41  Not surprisingly, given the sensitivity and volatility of the 
issue of sending German troops abroad, the German political elite showed no 
willingness to launch a public debate on expanding Germany’s military engagement.  
 The German public, too, had shifted its views. It was willing to accept that 
Germany now had a larger international role to play but was reluctant to fully accept 
that this role included a military dimension. It was supportive of the Bundeswehr 
providing assistance for humanitarian and disaster situations but uneasy about 
peacekeeping operations. The public was more comfortable with a UN-led than a 
NATO-led mission, but rejected the use of German troops in any combat 
environment. Thus, public support was generally high, but contingent upon 
situational variables.42 
The reluctance to expand Germany’s military presence in Bosnia became 
evident in the way in which the government reacted to external expectations of 
Germany’s role in peacekeeping missions—a reaction that, as John Duffield 
succinctly put it, has “rarely been automatic and never unqualified.”43 On November 
30, 1994, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General George 
Joulwan requested the German government deploy six Tornado aircraft to assist in 
deterring Serb surface-to-air missile capabilities. Faced with an uncomfortable 
choice, the German government chose not to respond at all, claiming it had not 
received an official request. Soon enough, another request arrived from the North 
Atlantic Council, asking the government to declare what it might contribute in the 
event of NATO assuming responsibility of protecting UNPROFOR troops should a 
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withdrawal from Bosnia be necessary.44 The Kohl government was less comfortable 
with ignoring the request this time around, and in December 1994 the German cabinet 
signaled its willingness to provide troops and materiel should such an event 
materialize, though it rejected their use in combat operations.  
This decision was never put to the test, but events on the ground drove the 
issue of German participation even further when the question arose as to whether 
Germany would provide support for a rapid reaction force to protect UN forces in the 
event of their possible redeployment in Bosnia. Alarmed by a possible failure of th  
UN mission in Bosnia and the prospect of a real ground war, in June 1995 the 
German government and parts of the SPD joined to approve the participation of 
German troops, though again the government and Bundestag placed a wide range of 
restrictions on the mission.45 Finally, with the successful negotiations of the Dayton 
Accord bringing an end to the Bosnian war, the Bundestag approved a motion to 
contribute troops to the UN implementation force (IFOR) that was to monitor the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords.  
In sum, when the Gulf War began, the consensus among all German parties 
was that the constitution prohibited the sending of German troops abroad. From very 
early on, Chancellor Kohl and other conservatives had concluded that a unified and 
“normalizing” German state should have access to the full range of policy options any 
state had, but they realized this position was too premature, given that even their own 
coalition partner, the FDP, believed decisions on out-of-area missions required a 
constitutional amendment, which was not feasible in the political climate at the time. 
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The SPD’s position paralleled that of the FDP, though unlike the FDP, a majority of 
the SPD rank and file strongly rejected any involvement of Bundeswehr troops 
outside Germany’s borders. Within the SPD leadership, however, a small group of 
pragmatists had come to accept that Germany’s future international obligati ns 
included contributions to international peacekeeping missions and they worked 
steadfastly within the SPD to shift party sentiment in that direction.46 The Green 
Party, with its pacifist roots, condemned any use of German forces except for 
territorial defense. Over time the momentum in the political elite and in the German 
public shifted toward acceptance of the use of force for preserving peace and 
defending human rights.    
Critical was the shift in the SPD and particularly in the Green Party. The 
targeted violence against civilians and mounting human rights violations led the 
Realos (the Green party’s pragmatist wing) under Joschka Fischer to push the Green 
Party toward a position whereby using military force would be acceptable under very 
restricted conditions and circumstances, such as genocide. The former East German 
communist party, the PDS, remained adamant in its opposition to any use of military 
force. Thus, by the end of the Bosnian war in late 1995, all of the major German 
parties had revised their position on out-of-area support operations, but there were 
inter-party schisms that implied the issue had not been laid to rest.47
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1995–2000:  The Kosovo War 
            If the Bosnia conflict had been the first major step for the Bundeswehr in 
participating in a peacekeeping operation, Kosovo was the next important step—the 
first time German troops participated in military operations outside their country’s 
borders since World War II. What was remarkable was not only the wide acceptance 
of German participation within the political elite and the public at large, but that it 
was implemented under a left-of-center governing coalition and without the 
imprimatur of a UN mandate.  
The Kosovo conflict had been simmering alongside the conflict in Bosnia for 
some time, fueled by ethnic tensions between the province’s Albanian majority nd 
Serbian minority. Slobodan Milosovic’s rise to power in the 1980s saw the rise of 
Serbian nationalism at the expense of the Kosovo Albanians’ civil rights. In 1989, 
Milosovic nullified Kosovo’s autonomous status, and the Serbian government 
responded to Albanian opposition by sending troops and combat aircraft. Many 
Kosovo Albanians looked to the international community in hopes that the situation 
in Kosovo would also be addressed in the Dayton negotiations in 1995, but the 
western powers declined to do so. With little prospect for international support, the 
Kosovo Albanians shifted tactics. The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) in 1996 as a paramilitary force that targeted Serbian installations and police
initiated a long period of cyclical violence in Kosovo.48 Ultimately, some 1.4 million 
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Kosovo Albanians, about 60 percent of the Albanian population, were expelled from 
their homes.49 
In the spring of 1998, the international community finally responded. On 
March 31, 1998, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a cessation 
of violence, and by June the Kosovo Contact Group composed of France, Russia, the 
United States, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany had begun to meet. The violence, 
however, continued unabated. It was clear to many—not least Milosevic—that the 
western alliance’s warnings about the possible use of force against Serbia had no 
teeth: the politically viable options (e.g., stationing of troops in Macedonia and 
Albania) were not sufficient to stop the violence, and the militarily effective options 
were not feasible because many states refused to condone military action against
Serbia without a UN resolution—which was unattainable given Russia’s opposition.50  
On September 23, 1998, after twenty-two Albanians were massacred, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 1199 calling for an immediate cease-fire. Sinc  a 
UN resolution sanctioning military force to end hostilities was not possible, the only 
other basis on which to validate future action was the need to intervene because of 
gross human rights violations. The UN resolution, with its reference to a humanitarian 
catastrophe, reflected this reasoning.51  
This was the political backdrop into which the new German Red-Green 
coalition stepped. On September 27, 1998, only days after the passing of UNSCR 
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1199, the SPD and Green Party emerged the winners in the German federal election, 
ending the sixteen-year tenure of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the CDU/CSU-FDP 
coalition. Here, the timing of external events and the German federal election 
mattered a great deal, since the newly elected yet not seated Red-Green coalition 
government immediately faced a decision on whether or not to agree to German troop 
participation in a NATO-led operation in Kosovo. 
In early October, NATO authorized airstrikes against Serbian military 
targets—albeit without a UN-backed resolution sanctioning such actions. In the wake 
of UN Resolution 1199, NATO first issued an “activation warning” (September 24) 
and then an “activation request” (October 6), which tasked NATO members with 
declaring the capabilities they would contribute to an intervention in Kosovo—
essentially committing NATO members to military action. The final stge, the 
“activation order,” came on October 13, after UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
announced that Serbia was not in compliance with previous UN Security Council 
resolutions.52 
 In meetings before and after the German election, Gerhard Schröder had 
relayed to President Clinton Germany’s willingness to support military action in 
Kosovo should diplomacy fail, but that Germany would not commit combat troops 
for such a contingency.53 For the SPD and the Green party leadership, there was little 
choice but to support the Kosovo deployment for internal and external reasons. 
Domestically, there were doubts raised whether an SPD-Green Party coalition was 
regierungsfähig, or capable of governing. The SPD had been out of power for sixteen 
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years, the Greens had never served as a governing party, and both parties had strong 
pacifist and left-leaning factions. Faced with the realities of governance, particularly 
in foreign policy, would the new coalition be able to make the hard decisions? What 
was at stake here, as Fischer noted in a later speech, was the question of continuity 
and calculability in German foreign policy.54 Externally, this meant that the new 
government needed to show its commitment to alliance cohesion and to the goals set 
out by the international community with regard to Kosovo. 
Both Schröder and Fischer had sought to delay the German vote until after the 
new government took power, but the Clinton administration signaled that it was 
unwilling to wait. Chancellor Kohl consulted with Schröder and Fischer, who 
reluctantly agreed to support the motion. Thus on October 16, 1999, Kohl, in an 
unusual procedure, called a special session to reconvene the old Bundestag to vote on 
the NATO activation order whose goal, it was declared, was to prevent a 
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. The Bundestag passed the motion by a wide 
margin of 500–62–18.55 Although the way was now clear for German participation in 
a NATO-led campaign, it did not come to that—at least not yet. Milosevic backed 
down and agreed to a cease-fire and to allow OSCE observers to enter Kosovo to 
monitor the cease-fire.56 It was only on October 24, that a UN Security Council 
resolution on Kosovo was passed, and only on October 27, that Schröder was elected 
by the Bundestag to serve as Germany’s new chancellor. On November 19, the newly 
convened Bundestag voted in favor of German soldiers participating in the Extraction 
Force, should such an action be necessary. The question of sending German troops 
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had been side-stepped when the cease-fire was brokered, but the relief was short-lived 
since the cease-fire did not hold for very long. 
The New Year brought a resurgence of violence. Evidence of a massacre of 
forty-five civilians on January 29, in the town of Racak and the unsuccessful attempts 
to negotiate a cease-fire with Milosevic brought renewed international attempts at 
mediating the conflict, culminating in the negotiations in Rambouillet, France in 
February and March 1999. Eventually, the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the 
proposed peace agreement on March 15, but the Serbs refused to do so. The failure of 
these diplomatic efforts contributed to the NATO decision to launch air strikes 
(within the framework of ALLIED FORCE) against Serbian targets, which began on 
March 24, 1999. German pilots flew reconnaissance missions and undertook actions 
against Serb anti-aircraft positions, the first time German military forces were 
involved in combat operations since the end of World War II. On March 25, all 
German political parties except for the PDS signaled their support of the airstrikes 
against Serbia and of Germany’s participation. Chancellor Schröder argued that the 
failure of diplomacy made the attacks on Yugoslavia necessary, but he emphasized 
again that Germany would not contribute ground forces to fight in Kosovo. Germany, 
Schröder stressed, was committed to securing peace in Kosovo, not to waging war.57 
The real pressure was on Fischer and the Green Party, which was deeply 
divided on the question of German participation in the military action. During the 
Bosnia conflict, the SPD had come to support the basic re-orientation in German 
foreign policy with regard to German participation in out-of-area operations, but this 
                                                





was not quite the case with the Green Party, where a still sizeable number of 
Bundestag members had voted against the Bundeswehr deployment in Bosnia. Now, 
as a member of the governing coalition, the dynamics and political calculations were 
quite different. The longer the air strikes went on, the more the opposition within the 
party grew—and thus the more fragile the governing coalition became. With the 
prospect of a ground invasion on the table should the air strikes fail to stop Serb 
aggression, the German government intensified its efforts to find a political solution 
and avoid an action that would certainly have brought down the Red-Green coalition 
government.58 With the so-called “Fischer Plan” re-integrating the UN and Russia 
into the negotiations with the Serbs, Fischer managed to pull together the pieces of a 
peace plan that would end the war—and in doing so, secured his government’s 
survival. 
It only remained for him to convince the Green party’s rank and file to support 
him. During the rancorous and heated debate at the Bielefeld Party Congress in mid-
May 1999—a paint balloon was thrown at Fischer, hitting him on the side of the head 
and shattering his ear drum—Fischer argued that in Kosovo, two of the central 
axioms of postwar German political culture were in conflict: “never again war” and 
“never again Auschwitz,” and that the international community and the German 
people had to choose to fight to prevent mass murder and genocide in Europe. It was 
Germany’s obligation, and moral responsibility, and he asked for his party’s support. 
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Fischer continued to work hard to find a diplomatic solution. Over the course 
of the next several weeks, hard negotiations finally reaped a measure of success, but it 
was not until June 1, 1999, that Fischer received a letter from Milosevic that outlined 
the Yugoslav leader’s intention to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo and to 
accept a UN presence in the Serbian province. On June 10, NATO ended its air 
operations and the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 creating the 
foundations for the post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo. The following day, June 
11, a majority of Bundestag members approved a motion to contribute forces to the 
newly established peacekeeping mission (KFOR).59 
In sum, Kosovo signaled the next step in Germany’s political-military 
development as an active participant in international peacekeeping operations. While 
in Bosnia Germany participated in post-conflict stabilization efforts after the 
cessation of military action and the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, in 
Kosovo German armed forces were involved in military actions to bring hostilitie to 
an end. The German Bundestag had voted in October 1998 to agree “in general” to 
support NATO, but the “activation” of this pledge of support occurred only in March 
1999 when international diplomacy failed to secure a lasting peace agreement. 
By the end of the Kosovo conflict, all parties except the PDS supported 
German involvement in the conflict. The Green Party remained divided, but the pary 
leadership continued to support Fischer’s position on Kosovo. Many Greens held to 
their pacifist roots, some supported the NATO action because they personally 
                                                








believed it was the only solution, but many others supported the action because they 
held that as a governing party in the first Red-Green coalition, the Green Party could 
not act otherwise.60 
 The Kosovo case remains controversial because Germany participated in a 
NATO-led military intervention that was not sanctioned by a UN mandate. Many
observers questioned the legality of Germany’s involvement, asserting that it was 
unconstitutional and violated one of the central preconditions for German 
participation in out-of-area missions. Externally, German participation was seen by 
the United States and Germany’s other allies in Europe as a step toward the 
“normalization” of German foreign policy. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, however, 
the German government worked closely on a multilateral basis with its wes ern allies 
while capitalizing on its good relations with Russia to bring it more directly into the 
negotiating process. German diplomacy within the various multilateral contexts—the 
UN, the Contact Group, the EU, and NATO—and its term as EU president in April-
June 1999 allowed it to push initiatives that help bring an end to the conflict.61  
 
Summary 
In summary, the willingness of the German public and elite to send troops 
abroad evolved gradually, though the process by which such decisions are made is 
difficult and remains vulnerable to external pressures, internal domestic constraints, 
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and party political calculations.  Nevertheless, some patterns emerged over time. 
First, the German government will not lead on out-of-area questions; rather, from the 
outset the question of whether to support a particular mission is seen as a multilateral 
issue. The German government’s actions are in response to a request from an 
international player, rather than as an initiator. This position also highlights the 
importance of international law and international legal precedence as a support and 
validation for German action. In addition, the domestic political environment is such 
that the operational parameters will remain restricted in some way (e.g., no ground 
troops), that conflict prevention or post-conflict development and reconstruction will 
remain the sine qua non for sending German military forces abroad, and that the 
mood of the public, while not determinant in deciding to send troops, nevertheless 









For much of the post–Cold War period, the theoretical debate on post-
unification German foreign policy has vacillated between realist expectations of 
German foreign policy behavior and social constructivist challenges to the problems 
evident in applying a structural analysis to German foreign policy after the nd of the 
Cold War. Because the study’s research question focuses on explaining decision-
making processes in German foreign and security policy—a state-level analysis—the 
theoretical discussion must move from a broader international relations viewpoint to 
the sub-field of foreign policy analysis (FPA). The theoretical debate within FPA 
itself has gone through a similar transition, from the dominance of a positivist 
approach to cognitive/psychological approaches emphasizing the role of decision 
makers in the policy process while tending to neglect the institutional factors that 
affect foreign policy behavior.62 
The chapter will begin with an examination of the state of the theoretical 
debate on German foreign and security policy, following its arc from early realist 
predictions of post–Cold War German state behavior to constructivist challenges to 
structuralist explanations of post-unification German foreign policy development. 
The chapter then turns to a discussion of institutions as the missing link in analyzing 
                                                
62 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 14–33; Patrick J. Haney, “Structure and Process in the Analysis of 
Foreign Policy Crises,” in Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation, 





German foreign policy at the state level, moving the theoretical debate into a foreign 
policy analysis approach to identify the institutional factors that influence German 
foreign policy decisions, specifically with regard to the deployment of military forces 
in Afghanistan. 
 
Realism and Structural Explanations of German Foreign Policy 
The end of the Cold War brought significant structural changes in its wake, 
particularly for Germany, whose unification enhanced its geopolitical and thus its 
power position both within Europe and internationally. The scholarly debate in the 
immediate post–Cold War years tended to view implications of German unification 
through neorealist lenses: Germany would begin to display different characteristi s of 
a state maximizing its interests and re-balancing its power position in the iternational 
system. German foreign policy would be adapted to conform to Germany’s new 
geopolitical position.63 Thus, once the postwar constraints on German power were 
lifted, Germany would conform to what the anarchic nature of the international 
system would expect of it: more aggressive state action focused less on multilateral 
cooperation than on acquiring more power to enhance its international position and 
protect its national interests.   
John Mearsheimer’s writings are particularly emblematic of the realist 
position. Mearsheimer argued that the problem of German power would emerge once 
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again since a unified Germany would begin to chafe underneath the constraints of the 
international institutions of which it was a part and strike out on its own. Weaker 
neighbors would be unable to form an effective counterbalance against German 
strategic objectives.  Most worrisome to many, Mearsheimer believed the United 
States should provide Germany with nuclear weapons (in a process of “limited 
nuclear proliferation”) because in time Germany would demand them anyway. It is 
interesting to note that most of the neorealist predictions of German behavior 
originated with American political scientists, rather than with their German 
counterparts, though there were German analysts who called for a more assertive 
German foreign policy and a more power-conscious state that was not hesitant to 
pursue its own national interests.64  
Mearsheimer’s structural logic led him to make policy prescriptions that were
as alarming as they were inaccurate as a reflection of German political realities, and 
over time it became clear that realist expectations of German foreign polcy behavior 
did not materialize. Germany showed no interest in abandoning its memberships in 
international institutions and continued to emphasize its commitments to the EU and 
NATO, thus accepting continued multilateral restraint on its newly won sovereignty; 
it retained the country’s constitutional ban on possession and acquisition of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons; and it accepted the status quo on its current 
territorial boundaries. These were not the foreign policy decisions realists had 
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predicted. Indeed, the new “Berlin Republic” looked much like the old “Bonn 
Republic,” with more continuity than change in its foreign policy behavior, 
highlighting the weaknesses of realist explanations. But if not realism, then w at 
other theoretical approach best explained the absence of wholesale change in Germa
foreign policy? 
 
Constructivism and Cultural Explanations of German Foreign Policy 
Given the failure of structural theories in the wake of the end of the Cold War, 
scholars in the 1990s turned to domestic levels of analysis to explain continuity and 
change in German foreign policy in general and to constructivist theories of German 
policy behavior in particular. There is no single definition of constructivism65 and no 
single theoretical approach, although there are commonly held assumptions. While 
structural arguments begin from assumptions of rationality and fixed interests, that is, 
that norms and identity precede and thus define interests, constructivists assume that 
norms, identity, and interests are mutually constituted. Constructivists do not discount 
material power, but they hold that these material interests are set and defined within a 
normative social context. With its roots in social theory, constructivism assume that 
actors follow a logic of appropriateness (political action is a product of norms that 
suggest appropriate action in a given context), rather than a logic of consequentiality 
(political action is shaped by calculations of rational actors to maximize pref rences), 
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and that social actions among actors lead to the creation of norms and identities tha 
shape further interaction.66 Since interests develop endogenously, norms, values, and 
identities can be treated as independent variables in analyzing foreign policy.67   
The key question, as John Duffield posed it, was why a united Germany 
confounded neorealism.68 Constructivism, with its emphasis on ideational variables 
and socially constituted norms, seemed a near-perfect theoretical fit with Germany’s 
emphasis of its “civilian power” status and the power of historical memory. The 
answer, for these scholars, was the influence of deeply held norms of behavior that 
continued to determine the direction of German foreign policy. Three interrelated 
strands emerged from this research orientation. The first is a broadly based culturalist 
approach that sought to demonstrate the importance of non-materialist variables such 
as culture in the study of foreign policy. Researchers identified such explanatory 
variables as Germany’s culture of anti-militarism (Berger), historical memory 
(Banchoff), and collective memory (Markovits and Reich).69 However, the use of the 
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term culture here is over-generalized and as such is not very helpful, since it often
remains caught in descriptive inferences rather than suggesting causal inferences that 
can help build testable theories. 
A second strand takes up the more specific concept of political or strategic 
culture in German foreign policy to draw conclusions about German policy behavior. 
Many current studies apply the term using a constructivist approach that emphasizes 
the subjective aspects of security policy, the influence of collective historical 
memory, and the relevant values and norms that define interests and policies.70 
Duffield makes a case for utilizing the more general concept of “political culture” 
(the ways in which members of a society perceive the course of politics and the views 
and assumptions with which they order their political world) rather than other cultu al 
variables (e.g., organizational culture and strategic culture, which he defines as sub-
categories of political culture), arguing that the term political culture can be applied to 
a broader range of cases.71  
Peter Katzenstein’s edited volume on the impact of culture on national 
security is one of the most comprehensive arguments in favor of analyzing the impact
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of strategic culture on state behavior. International relations (IR) theory as long been 
dominated by two major theoretical approaches, neorealism and neoliberalism. The 
book, published in 1996 and thus cognizant of the failure of IR theory in predicting 
the end of the Cold War, argues that a new analytical framework is needed, one that 
takes into account the non-material factors (norms, cultures, collective identities) that 
provide the missing link in explaining foreign and national security policies.72 
The third strand, and the most influential interpretation of post-unification 
German foreign policy, has been Hanns Maull’s concept of Germany as a civilian 
power, which emerged as a reaction against the dominance of realism and its seeming 
inapplicability to the emerging post–Cold War environment. Arguing for a 
“civilizing” concept of international politics, Maull integrated Norbert Elias’ 
discussion of “civilizing processes” within societies into an argument about the need 
for a fundamentally different form of international politics—one that at its core
recognizes the impact of complex interdependence. These civilizing impulses would 
be driven by “civilian powers” whose goals were the promotion of the rule of law, 
social justice, restraints on violence, democratic participation, and the monopolization 
of force.73    
While Maull emphasizes that “civilian power” is an ideal type, over time the 
term has been closely linked to German foreign policy as a whole: German foreign 
policy is a civilian power foreign policy. The term was deemed useful both as an 
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empirical-analytical concept for scholarly descriptions and an explanation of German 
foreign policy, although it also provides a normative parameter for Germany’s foreign 
policy orientation. Maull’s earlier writings did not explicitly reject military force but 
set it within constraints (collective decision making), and viewed it as an instrument 
of last resort.74 Nevertheless, the term has come to define a certain type of state that 
eschews hard power military instruments in favor of soft power instruments in its 
foreign policy behavior. This, however, is one of the most contentious aspects within 
the debate about post-unification German foreign policy: whether or not the concept 
of civilian power can incorporate the state use of military power without 
compromising the concept’s theoretical integrity. Since Germany now partici tes in 
military operations abroad, is it still a civilian power? 
One set of scholars argues that Germany’s civilian power approach has shown 
it can adapt to the new international realities.75 They assert that the role concept never 
dismissed military power but set limits on its use, emphasizing the need to exhaust all 
other possible tools (diplomacy, aid, sanctions) before the use of force is 
considered—thus no diminution of the relevance of the civilian power concept, but a 
learning and adaptation process within it.  Others claim Germany has moved too far 
away from the civilian power ideal type to be considered a civilian power; since the 
word “civilian” is generally defined as “non-military,” the attempt to insert a military 
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component into the term renders it conceptually useless.76 The problem then becomes 
a question of definition: if civilian powers do not abstain from military force, then 
there is no distinct method for differentiating between a civilian power and a normal 
power.77 Thus, in this view, the concept has been stretched and broadened in its use 
such that it is perilously close to being all things to all analysts.78 For critics, then, 
Germany’s changed security and defense policy shows that the concept can no longer 
provide a satisfying explanation for German policy behavior.  
All three strands are linked to constructivism because of their emphasis on 
norms and ideational variables, and a growing number of studies—particularly from 
German scholars—use a constructivist framework.79 For constructivists, post-
unification Germany is a good test case because of the weak explanatory powe of 
rationalist theories and the seemingly close fit with the declaratory components of 
German foreign policy itself. Germany developed—first out of necessity, later out of 
conviction—a foreign policy that is more adapted to the post-Cold War international 
environment than other, more structuralist-driven state foreign policies. If this is the 
case, then there is no overwhelming rationale for implementing wholesale changes in 
German foreign and security policy. 
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For constructivists, German foreign policy behavior is norm-driven. German 
political culture has been imbued with strong skepticism, if not rejection, of the use of
military force in resolving conflict. Germany’s experience during the Third Reich has 
created an aversion to aggressive Realpolitik and a deep commitment to multilateral 
institutions and to European integration. However, to argue that German foreign 
policy is norm-consistent is not a sufficient explanator of German foreign policy 
behavior; no state, as is evident in Sperling’s review of seven books on post-
unification German foreign policy, has solely normative motives for action.80 
However, even Duffield, who takes a culturalist approach, admits that the variable 
“political culture” is a necessary but not sufficient explanation of German foreign and 
security policy.81 
Sperling’s review touches on some of the issues that are relevant in addressing 
a central question in this study: which conceptual approach can best explain 
developments in post-unification German foreign policy behavior? The conclusion 
shared by most researchers, including those reviewed by Sperling, is that neorelism 
fails as an explanator of German foreign policy in the “Berlin Republic,” but does this 
mean that constructivism is the better theoretical approach?  
One study that sought to test various theoretical approaches was Volker 
Rittberger’s edited volume on post-unification German foreign policy.82 The point of 
departure for Rittberger’s book was the question of which theoretical tradition could 
best explain continuity and change in German foreign policy after 1990. The study 
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aligned neorealism with two other theoretical paradigms—utilitarian liberalism and 
constructivism—to test them for their explanatory power. The overwhelming 
evidence, based on the book’s deductive analysis, was that constructivism showed the 
greatest degree of explanatory power. 
Traditional neorealism (states will conduct autonomy-seeking behavior only) 
fared poorly in the study’s analysis, but a modified neorealism appeared to at least 
partially explain events in the security policy domain, specifically the decision to 
participate in out-of-area operations. Rainer Baumann, the author of the chapter on 
security policy, outlined the argument thus: modified neorealism holds that states will 
seek to preserve their autonomy under conditions of high security risk, and are willing 
to cede some autonomy in exchange for substantive gains in influence under 
conditions of low security risk.83  Under a modified neorealism, and given that the 
German state now functions under conditions of low security pressures, modified 
neorealism would expect Germany to pursue influence-seeking policies within 
institutional settings (e.g., NATO) rather than pursue autonomy and independence 
apart from such institutions. Applying the study’s deductive approach to two cases,
the Bundeswehr’s integrated command structure in NATO and out-of-area operatins, 
Baumann sees the NATO example as exemplifying the constructivist case but finds a
mixed result in the out-of- area operations case. Baumann concluded that with regard 
to out-of area operations, while constructivism explained the restraint that the German 
government showed, it could not explain some instances of participation in the 
absence of strong societal or international norms (e.g., Kosovo in 1998), which seems 
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to indicate that at times German foreign policy is interest-driven rather than norm-
driven.84                                                                      
Though the case for constructivism is strong, at least in the Rittberger study, 
the book has not been without its critics. Maull points out that the study and cases 
themselves are too deductively drawn, which can produce findings that may not hold 
up to closer empirical scrutiny.85 Sperling outlines other drawbacks: Rittberger’s 
application of behavioral assumptions to define German foreign policy behavior 
falters with its presupposition that a neorealist state will exit international institutions 
in order to pursue more autonomy. If this behavior is the sin qua non for testing for 
the effects of a modified neorealism, then any realist proposition about German 
foreign policy will fail since Germany has made no effort to exit from any of the 
international institutions of which it is a member. Furthermore, Rittberger’s 
theoretical discussion seems to imply a zero-sum relationship between autonomy-
seeking and influence-seeking behavior when some of the case studies show that a 
state often chooses to do both.  
Some case studies show that German foreign policy behavior is not 
exclusively norm-driven. For example, the issue of NATO enlargement is dealt with 
in Baumann’s chapter in the Rittberger book as well as in two further books reviewed 
by Sperling.86 All three authors take a constructivist approach to explain German 
foreign policy behavior, but the argument that norms drove German policy behavior 
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is not conclusive. In the case of Adrian Hyde-Price’s book on Germany’s response to 
NATO and EU enlargement, German enthusiasm for NATO enlargement declined 
significantly after the first enlargement round, suggesting the weakness of norm 
compliance. Sperling notes: “German security interests, particularly the milieu goals 
of stability along Germany’s eastern borders, may be lent a normative pana, but it is 
clear to me that in this case interests preceded both norms and identity.”87 With 
regard to the out-of-area operations case in the Baumann chapter, even the author 
concludes that while his analysis cannot fully settle the question of what factors have 
led to the changed in decision to participate in out-of-area operations, “there is 
sufficient grounds to state that modified realism provides the most adequate 
explanation of post-unification German foreign policy in this case.”88   
Thus, to argue as constructivists do that German foreign policy is norm-
consistent may be useful for theory-building but tells us little about the factors that 
affect the policy decision-making process. Sperling’s take on recent scholarship on 
German foreign policy underscores this point: German foreign policy exhibits 
behavior reflective of both the logic of appropriateness and the logic of 
consequentiality, that is, German foreign policy aims are driven by interests as well as 
norms; Germany has pursued milieu goals but these goals have furthered German 
national interests as well as European interests; and in some instances German policy 
decisions have been driven by a calculation of interest not terribly different from 
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other states, as the Iraq case in 2003 shows—that is, norm compliance may give way 
if it conflicts with strong national interests.89  
Finally, there are scholars who argue that an emphasis on international or 
cognitive-psychological level factors tends to ignore state-level factors, such as the 
role of institutions. For example, it is not clear why Rittberger’s theoretically rigorous 
study does not include an institutionalist paradigm, despite studies showing that 
institutionalism can provide plausible explanations for German foreign policy 
behavior. Anderson and Goodman coined the phrase “reflexive multilateralism” to 
emphasize their assertion that Germany’s institutional memberships were both 
instrumental and normative. They were instrumental in that they served German 
interests during a time when its semi-sovereign status made a strategy of 
multilateralism to reintegrate German political and economic interests into the 
broader international community highly desirable, and normative in the sense that 
these multilateral memberships in turn shaped German interests and eventually were 
integrated into a broadly held consensus in the elite and public alike that accepts 
multilateralism as a fundamental pillar of German foreign policy. For Anderson and 
Goodman, German foreign policy always possessed an instrumentalist view of 
institutions, but over time institutions were accorded normative values in themselv s 
and became part of Germany’s new Staatsraison.90 
                                                
89 Sperling, ”Review Essay,” 28–29. 
90 Anderson and Goodman argue that western institutions gave Germany a postmodern identity (semi-
sovereignty) defined through Europe and its interests; see Jeffrey J. Anderson and John B. Goodman, 
“Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe,” in After the Cold War: 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, eds. Robert O. Keohane, Joseph 
S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 23–62; see also 





But while including institutions is a needed corrective, Anderson and 
Goodman’s analysis remains at the IR level—at a level of abstraction that does not 
shed light on how to explain foreign policy decision-making processes: What factors 
determine foreign policy decision outcomes? Why this policy, rather than another? To 
begin to construct a framework for analyzing such research questions, one must look 
to the foreign policy analysis literature, and to the role of domestic politics. 
 
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis 
The theoretical arc within IR literature has moved inexorably toward the 
acknowledgment of the need to integrate both structural and domestic political 
variables. The realist paradigm was challenged by the evidence of growing 
transnational politics and complex interdependence, but the pendulum swing toward 
liberalism and domestic- and individual-level analyses is also problematic if not 
tempered by the recognition of the continued relevance of systemic factors. 
Understanding foreign policy behavior requires understanding the impact of 
domestic politics. Several scholars’ works are relevant to the discussion at hand. In 
his “second image reversed” article, Peter Gourevitch described how the international 
system affects domestic politics, but he also stressed the degree to which domestic 
structures can influence state behavior.91  Like many others, Gourevitch pointed out 
the problems associated with the prevailing emphasis on a strong state–weak state 
argumentation as it related to explaining foreign policy: many structural arguments 
ignored the political context within which states made decisions and that structures 
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themselves affect the way in which one set of policy views can prevail over another. 
He emphasized the relevance of a “coalitional analysis” to highlight how the proc ss 
of policy formulation can affect the decision outcome.92  Later, both Gourevitch and 
Peter Katzenstein moved toward an integrative model that emphasized three factors:
political institutions and the degree of state centralization (executive versus legislative 
power); societal structure (homogeneity, organized political interests); and policy 
networks that link state and society, and where coalition-building processes are 
critical.93 
Harald Müller and Risse-Kappen advocate a domestic structure approach that 
links structure with political culture—an approach that incorporates the 
organizational structures of the state along with the decision-making practices, rules 
and procedures, and the cultural norms and values woven into the political culture. 
This integrative approach can account for variations in policy outcomes advocated by 
actors.94 In particular, Risse-Kappen emphasizes the nature of Germany’s domestic 
structure, defined as a democratic corporatist model that “is characterized by 
comparatively centralized societal organizations, strong and effective political parties, 
and a federal government that normally depends on a coalition between at least two 
parties. As a result and supported by cultural norms emphasizing societal partnership 
between ideological and class opponents, the system is geared toward compromise-
                                                
92 Ibid, 903–905. 
93 See discussion in Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structures, and Foreign Policy 
in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics 43 (July 1991), 484–486. 
94 Harald Müller andThomas Risse-Kappen, “From the Outside In and from the Inside Out: 
International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy,” Valerie M. Hudson and David 




oriented consensus-building in its policy networks.”95 These policy networks “are the 
mechanism and processes of interest representation linking the political system  to 
their societal elements, such as political parties and interest groups. This concept 
emphasizes the ability of political actors to build consensus among the relevant elite 
groups in support of their policies.”96 
In summary, the insights of these scholars are relevant to this study: domestic 
structures can affect foreign policy outcomes; coalition-building processes are central 
factors in decision outcomes; and policymakers must constantly weigh the “policy” 
and the “political” sides of the decision-making equation. A domestic politics 
approach thus incorporates “the nature of the political institutions (the ‘state’), with 
basic features of the society, and with the institutional and organizational 
arrangements linking state and society and channeling societal demands into the 
political system (the ‘policy networks’).”97  
 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), considered a sub-set of IR, lies at the 
intersection of these international and domestic political variables and focuses on how 
foreign policy decisions are made. It is an approach that is multi-leveled, 
interdisciplinary, and agent-oriented, one that “looks at the interface between 
institutions, agents, and rules with the aim of showing how these led to foreign policy 
choices made by the collective agents known as states.”98  
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In parallel to IR theory generally, the early phase of FPA, labeled 
“comparative foreign policy,” emphasized event data collection and methodological 
development in an effort to build grand theory. Influential “first generation” theorists 
such as Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin sought to develop a general, 
testable theory of what determines a state’s foreign policy behavior. Their work was 
followed by insights of scholars such as Irving Janis and his work on “groupthink” 
and Charles F. Herrmann on the dynamics of small group decision making. Graham 
Allison’s work on bureaucratic politics and organizational processes also brought the 
focus of analysis down to the level of domestic politics and demonstrated that the 
assumption of “rational” decision making is challenged by the dynamics of large
government bureaucratic institutions and group players.99  
 Efforts to build the necessary meta-theoretical and methodological 
frameworks were not very successful, however, and the study of comparative foregn
policy seemed to have hit a dead end by the 1970s and 1980s. It was not until the end 
of the Cold War and a shift from the dominance of neorealist structural theory to a 
more careful consideration of domestic-level phenomena that a “second generation” 
of foreign policy analysts began to build on the research of previous scholars and 
expand the conceptual framework of FPA. This theoretical framework emphasizes 
middle-range theory, the role of actors, the need for multi-causal explanations  all 
levels of analysis, and a focus on process as well as outcome.100 However, the needed 
re-balancing back to the level of decision makers and to individual actors in the 
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decision-making process has tended to neglect the institutional context within hich 
the decision-making process operates. An examination of the FPA literature finds 
relatively few studies that have integrated an understanding of how the institutional 
setting affects decision making in order to build a more complete picture of th
foreign policymaking process. Institutional structures shaped by policy actors can and 
do affect the process of decision-making, and decision makers cannot escape these 
institutional practices and constraints.101 
Thus the role of institutional structures in the decision-making analysis has 
been underanalyzed and both German and American researchers have argued for the 
re-introduction of such factors in foreign policy analysis. Juliet Kaarbo believes the 
emphasis on pure psychological explanations in earlier FPA scholarship must give 
way to a more inclusive and balanced approach that takes politics and institutional 
contexts into consideration.102 Foreign policy analysis may have focused on structure 
but not enough on how structure can affect process. Patrick Haney emphasizes the 
need to examine the link between structure and process that, he argues, is often 
suggested in studies but not explicitly researched. A theoretical perspective that 
incorporates institutional factors can explore the relational links between policy
structures, the policymaking processes, and policy outputs.103  
On the German side, the theoretical literature on foreign policy analysis is 
very sparse. A number of studies have identified domestic political sources of 
influence in German foreign policy, but the specific study of foreign policy analysis 
has tended either to focus on individuals and small groups, or on broader, structural 
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determinants of state behavior.104 Gerald Schneider is particularly critical of the state 
of foreign policy analysis in Germany, which he feels lacks theoretical rigor because 
the sensitivity to or outright rejection of the term “realism” in German politica  and 
academic circles (too closely linked to the term Realpolitik) has indirectly cast 
aspersion on theory-driven research. Too often, Schneider argues, German “foreign 
policy analysis” is bereft of theoretical considerations, thus reducing it to aform of 
“foreign policy advice.”105 What is needed is a theoretical framework that merges 
structure and process and highlights the institutional structures within which decision 
makers interact.    
If institutions, then, are the focus, how are they defined in this study? 
Simmons and Martin’s broad definition of “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in 
which states should cooperate and compete with one another,”106 is spare and 
streamlined, but its focus on state cooperation is not easily applied to a study of 
institutional dynamics within the state.107 John Duffield’s definition is better suited to 
an examination of foreign policy decision making. Institutions have been defined in 
different ways. Traditionally, the term “institution” implied a formal organization, 
such as the UN or OECD. Second, the literature on regimes beginning in the 1970s 
defined institutions as “recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which 
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expectations converge,”108 but this definition, too, is limited since by including 
behavioral traits the definition precludes a study of whether institutions and rules 
affect the behavior of actors. Third, an emphasis on a definition of institutions as a et 
of formal rules in which actors are utility maximizers omits the ways in which 
normative elements can be an influence on institutions (e.g., how actors create ruls). 
Finally, to define institutions solely as norms and collectively held intersubjective 
ideas neglects the formal features that are a part of the institutional make-up within 
which the decision-making process resides. 
Duffield argues that a workable definition of institutions can in fact integrat 
the various aspects of institutions identified in the literature—formal organizations, 
practices, rules, and norms. Thus in his view, institutions are “relatively stableets of 
related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the 
international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as non-state 
entities) and their activities.”109  The definition covers both intersubjective and formal 
elements of institutions as well as functional elements (“rules” as rationalists use it, 
with constitutive, regulative, and procedural functions). 
What holds the components of his definition together is the sense of an 
ongoing dynamic in which a reiterative process becomes self-perpetuating. Th s 
process is then recognized and utilized by actors to guide policy behavior in response 
to external and internal stimuli. Structures and agents shape and are in turn shaped by 
the process in which they are engaged. Thus formal institutional structures (legal, 
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constitutional) and informal structures (precedence, tradition), as well as the
constitutive (societal and international norms) and regulative/procedural components 
(federal guidelines, committee membership), are acknowledged as influential factors 
in the foreign policy decision-making process.110 
 
Summary 
The discussion thus far has been that much of the literature on post–Cold War 
German foreign policy has been at the level of IR theory, with an emphasis on realism 
and constructivism as two points of argumentation. There is no question that the 
foreign policy of a state such as Germany is shaped by its perceived interests (such as 
its power position, threat perception, alliance considerations), and by individual 
policy actors and the norms and beliefs they internalize (anti-militarism, 
multilateralism, rule of law). The task, argues Walter Carlsnaes, is to find a 
theoretical approach that can integrate the various perspectives represented in foreign 
policy analysis, since foreign policy actions incorporate “a multitude of influeces—
structural and agential, as well as international, societal and individual—that 
continually impinge on them and on their decision-makers.”111 Foreign policy action, 
he stresses, is “always a combination of purposive behavior, cognitive-psychological 
factors and the various structural phenomena characterizing societies and their 
environments, and hence explanations of actual foreign policy actions must perforce 
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be able to give accounts that do not by definition exclude or privilege any of these 
types of explanations.”112 
Ascertaining the decision-making processes that shape policy preferences 
relating to out-of-area missions requires a state-level focus, with its emphasis on 
international and domestic political variables, and a framework for analyzing the 
interaction of these variables in determining policies. The following chapter tak s up 
the question of agency and structure, outlining the major German foreign policy 
actors and structures and introducing two hypotheses that represent these two 
constitutive elements in foreign policy analysis. The discussion of agents and 
structures is then followed by an examination of the appropriate framework for 
analysis that will provide the foundation for studying the decision-making process in 
the case of Afghanistan.   
 
 
                                                




Chapter 4: Agency and Structure in German Foreign Policy: 





A great deal of attention has been given to the question of agency and 
structure in international relations and in foreign policy analysis.113 The emphasis on 
actors in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has obscured institutional variables that 
shape and are in turn shaped by individual actors. Here, as in international relations 
theory in general, researchers are faced with the problem of agency versus struct re. 
The issue is a fundamental one: how do we understand the interplay between actors 
(individualism) and the social order in which they are embedded (collectivism) in 
shaping political action?  
But while the theoretical debate on ontology, epistemology, and methodology 
continues, at least two aspects of the relationship appear to be shared by most 
scholars, namely, that agents and structure are mutually constituted, and that there is a 
need to find some integrative approach that can encompass the complexity of the 
agent–structure interaction.114 The challenge is to move beyond the partition between 
individual action and social order to examine the interplay between them. As such, 
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this study introduces two hypotheses that examine major components in the decision-
making process that characterizes the agency-structure dynamic: the role of the 
chancellor, the chief executive, and the role of coalition politics in the German 
political system. By following the interaction of the two variables over time, both 
their interaction and their respective impact on the policy-making process can be 
charted.  
The first hypothesis focuses on agency and the role of the federal chancellor. 
The argument presented here is that the chancellor is the central actor in foreig
policy decision making; that within the structural constraints on executive power, 
chancellors can expand their ability to shape policy preferences and decision 
outcomes vis-à-vis other dominant policy actors; but that whether the chancellor 
dominates policy deliberations or is forced to compromise is dependent on the 
political and institutional context within which the policy takes shape. The second 
hypothesis takes up the question of structure in its focus on the party system and the 
importance of coalition politics in foreign policy deliberations. The argument 
presented here is that institutions matter in the foreign policy decision-making 
process; that parties—particularly parliamentary parties in Germany’s coalition 
governments—are key institutions that shape policy decisions; and that within 
governing coalitions, junior coalition parties can have a disproportionate influence on 
policy outcomes.  
Agency: Foreign Policy Actors 
With regard to agency, scholars acknowledge there is no consensus on the 




about the nature of agency is better addressed by acknowledging its complexity, 
setting it in what he has termed a multi-layered concept of agency that integrates three 
levels:   
• Agency(1):  agency is composed of individuals who possess the ability 
and capacity to carry through intended actions. It is the power of 
intention that is central to this aspect of agency;  
• Agency(2): agency includes a socio-cultural system in which agents 
are embedded, i.e., individuals are set within different structures at 
different levels; 
• Agency(3): agency reflects “positioned-practices-places,” or roles, 
that agents occupy and play (e.g., soldier, banker, politician).115 
 
These three aspects of agency (agency-as-individuals, agency-as-system, 
agency-as-role) interact closely with one another; the roles individuals internaliz  and 
act out are linked to the socio-cultural environment in which they are formed. Thus 
agency deals with individual human beings who have been shaped by their social 
environment and life experiences, which feed into the roles they play within a given 
environment. As Wight concludes: “Each level of agency is necessary to account for 
the other, but none is reducible to the other.”116 Thus, an examination of an individual 
actor must take account of the individual’s biography, the social-political context i  
which he/she acts, and the various roles that the person embodies and acts through.  
In the following section, the discussion focuses on the role of the chancellor 
relative to other major foreign policy actors such as the cabinet, federal ministers, and 
parliament. The section will then explore contending theories of the role of the 
chancellor in German foreign policy: has the chancellor over time exerted incr asing 
power over the decision-making process, as is asserted in the theoretical debate, or 
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does the chancellor remain compelled by virtue of the fragmentation of power within
Germany’s federalist system to compromise with other actors in order to reach a 
consensus policy position? The answer will have a decided effect on the outcome of 
foreign policy decisions.  
Chancellor and Chancellor’s Office 
 The chancellor is the central decision maker in the German federal 
government. The chancellor, elected not by popular vote but by a majority vote in the 
Bundestag, the German Parliament, is chosen from the strongest party in the 
coalition, while the office of vice-chancellor is given to the major coalition partner. 
Articles 64 and 65 of the German Basic Law (the Grundgesetz, or GG) define the role 
and authority of the chancellor and outline three organizational principles that reflec
this authority:117 
“Chancellor Principle” (Kanzlerprinzip):  Through Article 65, the chancellor 
is given the right to determine general policy guidelines for the federal government, 
the so-called Richtlinienkompetenz. This gives the chancellor significant freedom of 
action in setting the political agenda and signaling which policy issues he/she will 
take a leading role in, though these policy guidelines usually are not formally 
articulated. The federal government’s rules of procedure (Geschäftsordnung der 
Bundesregierung) emphasize the chancellor’s responsibility for the effective 
management of the federal government (Leitungskompetenz). Finally, the authority of 
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the chancellor includes the right to appoint the federal ministers who will compose 
the government (Article 64).118 
“Minister Principle/Departmental Principle” (Ressortprinzip): Article 64 
gives the chancellor the right to appoint and dismiss federal ministers, but Article 65 
states that within the policy guidelines set by the chancellor, federal ministers retain 
complete autonomy within their departmental jurisdiction. This means, in effect, that 
much of the policy development is conducted in the ministries, not in the 
Chancellor’s Office (although there are some politically sensitive issues that reside in 
the Chancellor’s Office, such as the federal intelligence service because of its extra-
territorial reach).119 Federal ministers are thus highly influential bureaucratic players 
within their area of competence. 
“Cabinet Principle/Collegiality Principle” (Kabinettsprinzip):  Article 65 
states specifically that the federal cabinet is tasked with resolving differences of 
opinion among ministers. As a collective body, the chancellor and federal ministers 
must vote on all policy initiatives put forward by the government.120 Cabinet votes are 
thus expected to be unanimous.  
These principles are constitutionally vague and thus open to political 
interpretation.121 Within the federal executive there is a constantly shifting balance 
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between the chief executive’s dominance in the government as a whole and his/her 
power to set the policy agenda, competing pressures from individual ministers who 
retain autonomy within their ministerial competences and have their own political 
agendas, and a shared constitutional requirement to cooperate as a collective body to 
resolve policy differences. The relative weight of each component depends largely on 
the personalities and leadership styles of the dominant actors, particularly the 
chancellor. The cabinet, however, is considered the weakest link; it functions more as 
a “board of managers” than a powerful decision-making body, and because formal 
and informal rules require unanimity on policy decisions, any policy conflict is 
usually resolved before the issue is placed on the cabinet’s agenda.122 The real 
struggle for power within the federal executive lies in the interactions between th  
chancellor and the ministers, and in the ability of the chancellor to effectively 
implement his/her constitutional responsibility to set policy guidelines while 
managing ministerial interests and initiatives.123  
In addition to the formal constitutional powers, the chancellor has other 
instruments of authority. Administratively, one of the most powerful tools at the 
chancellor’s disposal is the Chancellor’s Office (Bundeskanzleramt, or Chancellery), 
whose function is to provide information and assistance to the chancellor and to 
conduct the operative planning and tactical coordination for the chancellor’s policy 
guidelines.124 Figure 1 shows the broader institutional outlines of the Chancellery. 
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Source:  Based on chart of German Federal Chancellery, available at: 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Anlagen/druckversion-organigramm-bkamt,property=publicationFile.pdf
 
Figure 1: Organizational Structure of Chancellery 
 
The six overarching Directorate-Generals, the sub-directorates, and the policy 
divisions mirror the general structure of German ministries, with Division 2 covering 
foreign, security, and development policy.125 The Chancellor’s Office also 
coordinates inter-ministerial policy initiatives as well as relations with the 
chancellor’s coalition partner and prepares policy decisions and monitors their 
implementation.126 It manages the intersecting lines between the governing parties, 
federal ministries, parliament, and external and domestic relations (e.g., foreign 
dignitaries, interest groups, public opinion and media). Thus the Chancellery is the 
nexus at which all the governing principles intersect in the person and office of 
chancellor: leadership via the Kanzlerprinzip; coordination with the ministries 
(Ressortprinzip) and federal cabinet (Kollegialprinzip); and negotiation tactics in the 
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chancellor’s relations with his party (Parteiprinzip) and coalition partner 
(Koalitionsprinzip).127  
One institutional peculiarity based within the Chancellery related to foreign 
policy is the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat), a cabinet committee. 
Institutionally, at least at first glance, the Council appears to hold some power. 
Presided over and called by the chancellor and composed of the major foreign policy 
actors, it is responsible for domestic and external security. Organizationally, it is the 
only cabinet committee that can take decisions on its own authority and that is not 
subject to parliamentary oversight.128 In reality, however, the influence of the Council 
has waned substantially after the end of the Cold War. During that time, the Federal 
Security Council handled critical issues related to nuclear weapons, arms control, and 
proliferation. Today, the Council is primarily responsible for overseeing German 
arms exports and functions as a general forum for foreign and defense policy 
discussions.129 The coalition agreement in 1998 between the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and the Green Party re-emphasized the Council’s original role of a 
coordinating body for German security matters, and there have been calls for the 
government to transform the Federal Security Council into a German National 
Security Council similar to the U.S. model—most recently in a CDU party concept 
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paper in 2008—but the suggestion has not garnered any serious political support 
because of the potential re-distribution of power in favor of the chancellor and, by 
inference, of the major coalition party.130  
In terms of foreign policy, the chancellor has overall responsibility for 
external security and national defense. Should a “state of defense” arise, the 
responsibilities of the military supreme commander are transferred from the Chief of 
Staff (Generalinspekteur) of the German Armed Forces to the chancellor (Art. 115b 
GG). In the field of foreign policy, the chancellor is considered the most influential 
player, for several reasons. As noted, the ambiguity in the wording of the relevant 
constitutional articles provides the chancellor with significant scope of acti n in his 
agenda-setting function. Secondly, Konrad Adenauer’s dominance over foreign 
policy arguably set the pattern for future chancellors, most of whom took a defining 
role in German foreign policy. Thirdly, foreign policy generally is not subject to 
intense parliamentary oversight (in terms of legislation), giving the chancellor 
expanded room for maneuver.131  
Finally, the chancellor’s ability via the Richtlinienkompetenz to set policy 
guidelines has allowed chancellors to signal their intent to take a leading role in a 
particular policy arena. This policy prerogative is particularly pronounced in foreign 
policy and European policy. The particular circumstances of the Federal Republic’s 
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establishment in 1949 have meant that the conduct of foreign policy has been a 
central focus of the federal executive, and of the chancellor in particular. 
Constitutionally the primary responsibility for foreign policy is handed to the 
chancellor and the dominant foreign policy actors (Foreign Office, Ministry of 
Defense, Ministry of Finance) who report to the executive.132 There have been times 
when the foreign minister has taken the lead on a foreign policy issue, such as 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s handling of the OSCE process in the
1980s, and times when the chancellor has taken the lead on foreign policy, such as 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s drafting of the Ten Point Program during the unification 
process in 1989–1990.133 
With the levers of authority come countervailing constraints. One such 
constraint is Germany’s federalist system of government in which power is idely 
diffused. The Kanzlerprinzip is counter-balanced by the ministers’ Ressortprinzip and 
the unanimity requirement in cabinet voting. The chancellor’s agenda-setting abilities 
may be opposed by other dominant foreign policy actors. Federal states are given a 
stake in some foreign policy areas by way of the Bundesrat, the Federal Council that 
represents the states at the federal level and in which the states participate directly in 
national policy decisions that affect their areas of competencies (though their 
influence on foreign policy is minimal save for EU-related issues).134 Furthermore, 
Germany’s system of coalition government means that the chancellor’s power to 
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achieve foreign policy objectives is dependent on the cooperation of the junior 
coalition partner, most especially because the office of foreign minister is h ld by the 
junior party in the coalition.135 Thirdly, the chancellor’s relationship with his/her own 
party often impacts decision making. Dissent within the party complicates oth r 
management imperatives, such as a smoothly functioning coalition. Finally, the 
dynamics of foreign policy issues both within the political elite and in the public at 
large can often obstruct the chancellor’s policy aims.136 
The other side of the equation, however, is the informal instruments of power 
available to the chancellor. The formalized structures of Germany’s federalist system 
of government compel actors to engage in consensus building, though consensus is 
often difficult to obtain. In response to increasing policy complexity and expanding 
numbers of bureaucratic actors, a set of informal policy networks, tools, and 
procedures have developed in response to increasing bureaucratic rigidity and 
stasis.137 Lothar Rühl lays out the advantages and disadvantages of informal decision-
making procedures: smaller group dynamics can be more effective, and informal 
procedures tend to be more flexible and can more easily respond to unfolding events. 
The disadvantages are that the pressures to make a faster decision can lead to 
important information being left out, or decisions being struck that lack the necessary 
detail or direction, complicating the implementation of the policy.138  
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 Such informal decision-making practices are highly developed in the German 
system where there is a tendency “to detach decisions at the highest leadership level 
from the formally competent institutions and from formal procedures.”139 For 
example, while the party fraction meetings are formally the central decision-making 
bodies in the Bundestag, time pressures and the growing size of the parliamentary 
fractions mean that in practice, policy objectives have been shaped in informal 
settings as issues have moved up the hierarchical bureaucratic structures. How ver, 
real decision-making power is also based in the coalition rounds (Gro se 
Koalitionsrunde) begun under Chancellor Kohl and retained by his successors 
Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel. Members are officials drawn from the 
government, parliamentary fraction, and coalition and meet prior to or in parallel with 
the formal cabinet meetings called by and presided over by the chancellor.140 Ka l-
Rudolf Korte considers these informal patterns the distinguishing characteristi  of the 
decision-making style of the German chancellor and the Chancellery.141  
To sum up, the office of chancellor retains a great deal of authority and power 
that is nevertheless subject to formal and informal constraints.  The ability of the
chancellor to successfully apply the instruments of power depends on many factors: 
the relative cohesion of the coalition government, ministerial ambitions, party 
cohesion, and the chancellor’s own managerial style.142 
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Federal Ministries: Major Foreign Policy Actors 
While the federal chancellor sets policy guidelines, and policy decisions are 
voted on by the cabinet, it is the federal ministries that conduct the day-to-day 
activities relating to policy development. Importantly, the growing complexity of 
issues has meant that competences are shared between ministries, such as in the case 
of out-of-area operations where the issue is managed with input primarily from the 
Foreign Office as well as the Ministries of Defense and Finance with the full 
participation of the Chancellery. Nearly every federal ministry is involved in some 
aspect of Germany’s external relations—at least 250 administrative units outside the 
Foreign Office and Defense Ministry.143 Nevertheless, the federal government’s rules 
of procedure state that the Foreign Office holds the authority for coordination of 
foreign policy and the right to negotiate abroad.144 Foreign policy guidelines are set 
by the chancellor, the policy developed in the relevant specialized ministries, and the 
policy recommendations voted on in the federal cabinet. In the following section, the 
primary ministerial actors—the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defense—are outlined 
in more detail.  
Foreign Office.  The Foreign Office is formally responsible for German 
foreign policy, though it is not the only actor in the foreign policy arena.145 Figure 2 
shows the general organizational structure of the Foreign Office. 
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Figure 2: Organizational Structure of Foreign Office 
 
The executive leadership of the Foreign Office includes the foreign minister, the two 
ministers of state who are members of the Bundestag and assist the foreign minister in 
his/her tasks, primarily those of a political nature, and three state secretaries who 
oversee the administrative tasks and responsibilities of the Directorate-Generals. The 
Political Directorate 2 is responsible for coordinating policy toward Europe, North 
America, and Central Asia as well as covering all aspects of European and 
transatlantic security relations. A sub-directorate handles disarmament and arms 
control issues.146 The foreign minister also appoints special representatives who 
coordinate sensitive bilateral relations (with the United States, Russia, and Poland) 
and Germany’s international human rights policy. 
                                                




Ministerial coordination occurs both vertically and horizontally and at formal 
and informal levels within the Foreign Office. There are formalized forms of 
horizontal coordination such as inter-ministerial committees, which are perman nt 
bodies with clear rules guiding membership and responsibilities. However, there is a 
great degree of informal horizontal and vertical coordination as well, both within and 
between ministries (email, informal meetings at sub-unit levels, and so on). Policy
initiatives are vetted by the minister before being passed on to the federal cabinet for 
discussion.147   
Though the Foreign Office has the authority for coordinating foreign policy, 
the Chancellery often takes the lead in coordinating policy decision making, either 
formally or informally. Highly technical issues are left to the ministrie  with 
competence in that area which, because of their specialized expertise, at tims will 
take the lead in policy discussions. The system is intended to achieve a high level of 
inter-ministerial coordination so that any potential conflicts over policy are resolved 
within the bureaucracy in order to avoid conflict at higher levels of authority (e.g.,
during a cabinet meeting). Because of the growing number of bureaucratic actors and 
the consequent multi-leveled inter-ministerial activity, coordination is a critical 
element in the policy process.148  
Ministry of Defense.  During the Bundestag’s first foreign policy debate in 
1949, the newly elected parliamentarians voted against the rearmament of the Federal
Republic, but the pressures of the Cold War and the failure of the European Defense 
                                                
147 Weller, 216–217. 
148 Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, “Academic Research and Foreign Policy-Making,” in 
Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Interdependent World, eds. Wolf-Dieter 




Community led to the establishment of NATO and the WEU and, by 1955, to the 
establishment of the German Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr. German 
lawmakers had already inserted provisions in the new constitution that set out the role 
of a German military and the consequent restrictions on the use of military force in 
the Federal Republic. What is noteworthy is that references to the German milit ry 
appear not in one single constitutional article but are scattered throughout the Basic 
Law, emphasizing the integrated nature of the German armed forces in a democratic 
constitutional order.149 Civilian control of the military is underscored by the fact that 
the Defense Minister retains control of the German armed forces except in times of 
war, when leadership of the armed forces is transferred to the federal chancellor. The 
Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr (Generalinspekteur), the highest-ranking officer in 
the German armed forces, functions as the military adviser to the defense mini t r and 
chancellor and is responsible for the development of German defense strategy.150 
The emphasis on civilian control of the military is reflected in parliamentary 
relations with the German armed forces. The Bundestag controls the defense budget, 
and the Bundestag’s Defense Committee has far-reaching rights of control as 
established in the Basic Law; it is the only parliamentary committee that has the 
authority to call its own investigations and to demand the participation of the defense 
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minister in any of its meetings.151 This legislative oversight is underscored by the 
office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, designed to protect 
basic democratic rights of military personnel and assist the Bundestag in exercising 
oversight of the Bundeswehr.152 Table 3 shows the structure of the Defense Ministry. 
Minister of Defense
General Inspector/



































Figure 3: Organizational Structure of Ministry of Defense 
 
The structure of the Defense Ministry, with its executive, the civilian directo ates, and 
the military staffs, reflects this intent to ensure civilian control of German ilitary 
forces. The executive group consists of the minister, the Special Investigation Branch, 
and five staffs: the Executive Staff, which is the main coordination point for all 
relevant agencies; Policy Planning Staff, responsible for strategic planning; Press and 
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Information Office; Organization Staff (responsible for organization-specific tasks at 
both the Ministry’s headquarters outside of Bonn and in its offices in Berlin); and a 
Operational Controlling System staff that provides the executive with quality control 
information on ongoing missions and tasks. 
 The civilian directorates encompass the Directorate-General of Armaments, 
Personnel, Social Services, and Central Affairs, Budget, Legal Affairs, and the 
Defense Administration, Infrastructure, and Environmental Protection Directorate.  
The five military directorates represent the German Armed Forces Staff, Army, Air 
Force, Navy, and the Medical Services staff.153 The Joint Operations Staff was 
established in 2008 to coordinate all mission-relevant functions of the civilian 
directorates and military divisions of the Ministry of Defense. Its responsibilities 
include planning, preparation, and analysis of out-of-area missions in order to provide 
relevant information not only to the Ministry’s Executive Group but to the Cabinet 
and the Bundestag as well.154 
 
Other Federal Ministries.   
 The general structure of a federal ministry is presented in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Structure of German Federal Ministry 
  
The minister is assisted by his/her immediate representatives: two parliamentary 
secretaries who are high-ranking civil servants (beamteter Staatssekretär) tasked with 
managing the various divisions (called Directorate-Generals); and two parliamentary 
state secretaries (parlamentarischer Staatssekretär) who are themselves members of 
parliament. These parliamentary state secretaries assist the minister in his/her 
governmental duties (primarily the political functions), and represent the minister in 
governmental bodies (Bundestag, Bundesrat, parliamentary groups). Under these 
state secretaries lie the overarching bureaucratic divisions, called Directorate-




technical entities. Below the Directorate-Generals lie the various resea ch 
departments.155  
The following section highlights other ministries that support the Foreign 
Office and Defense Ministry in decisions relating to out-of-area missions: 
Ministry of Finance.   The Ministry of Finance is a player in foreign policy 
decision-making by virtue of its veto power on matters relating to the federal budget. 
The Bundeshaushaltsordnung (the legal framework for budget procedures) states that 
the finance minister has a veto on all financial questions related to the federal budget, 
which in practice has meant that the finance minister holds a more powerful position 
in the cabinet relative to other members.156 Implied here is that the chancellor’s 
ability to follow through with his/her intended policy guidelines is dependent on the 
quality of the working relationship with the finance minister. 
Ministry of Interior.  The constitutionally directed division of responsibility 
for internal and external security is a consequence of the failures of the Weimar 
constitution and of Hitler’s use of the military externally for territorial expansion and 
internally to repress domestic political opposition. Thus, the Basic Law forbids the 
use of German armed forces in any aggressive, offensive military action and gives the 
German federal states (Länder) sovereignty in police matters within Germany’s 
borders, though the federal government does have the responsibility for international 
crime prevention and maintaining border security (e.g., railways, waterways/shipping, 
airports) (Art. 87 GG).157  These two federal law enforcement agencies—the Federal 
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Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Police—are situated in the Ministry of 
the Interior. A primary venue by which the Ministry participates in foreign policy 
decisions lies through its role in providing police trainers for the various military 
missions as part of their stability and reconstruction mandates, such as in 
Afghanistan. This requires cooperation between the Ministry of the Interior and the 
sixteen federal Länder, who must agree to provide the police officers for out-of-area-
deployments.  
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development.  The Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation and Development reflects the role development policy and 
conflict management play in Germany’s long-term security.  The issues the Ministry 
actively monitors deal with general development policy issues (poverty, economic 
development, education) as well as peace building in post-conflict situations, conflict 
prevention, conflict management, and “security sector reform,” whose aim is to 
strengthen a state’s governmental structure and bring about democratic control of the 
security sector. The argument is that supporting security sector reform in unstable 
countries is linked not just to military security but to development efforts as well, 
since a stable security environment is the prerequisite for building civil society and 
the rule of law in transitioning states.158 
German Bundestag  
 
 The core responsibility of the parliamentary branch is oversight of the federal 
government. As a parliamentary body, the Bundestag is responsible to the electorate 
and thus tasked with ensuring a governing majority; it appoints the federal chancellor 
                                                





and can unseat the government, but only if it has enough votes to vote in a new 
government. It sets the federal budget and coordinates the drafting of legislation done 
in the ministries, oversees the parliamentary debate on policy alternatives, nd votes 
on the final bills.159  
The Basic Law declares that both the executive and parliamentary branches of 
government share responsibility in foreign and security matters, though the federal 
government has the prerogative. The constitutional competence of the Bundestag in 
foreign policy matters is thus limited, though it is given the right via the Basic Law to 
ratify international treaties, preside over the federal budgetary process, and establish 
investigative committees upon the motion of one-quarter of its members (the Defense 
Committee also has this specific right).160 The Bundestag’s formal instruments of 
control are applied through its foreign policy-related committees, especially the 
Budget, Defense, and Foreign Affairs Committees, through its control over the 
defense budget, and its ability to pressure the government via major and minor 
interpellations and requests for factual information intended to compel the 
government to disclose information on its policy objectives, priorities, and costs.161 
More general trends, however, have expanded the involvement of the 
Bundestag in foreign policy issues. In particular, the lines dividing domestic and 
international issues are increasingly blurred, expanding the reach of parliamentary 
participation in foreign policy areas. Germany’s European policy is the most 
important example of this growing competence. Foreign policy decisions are no 
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longer simply “national” in character. The growing complexity of policy issues means 
that the Foreign Office by itself is unable to manage Germany’s foreign policy, as is 
seen in the expanding number of foreign policy actors in the specialized ministries 
and the Bundestag.162  
Judiciary    
The judiciary’s role in foreign policy is a limited one. The Federal 
Constitutional Court has given the German Bundestag enhanced foreign policy 
decision-making powers in two important foreign policy areas: European policy and 
out-of-area operations. This reflects the legislative branch’s growing activity in the 
foreign policy arena, with the consequent blurring of the lines between domestic and 
foreign policy.163 On the subject of out-of-area operations, the Federal Constitutional 
Court has ruled in several cases brought to the Court by political parties. The major 
decision on out-of-area missions was the Court’s “Armed Forces Decision” in July 
1994, which upheld the constitutionality of Germany’s participation in multilateral 
missions and gave responsibility to the Bundestag for voting on such deployments. 
The Federal Constitutional Court has been called on to resolve several security-
related questions, ranging from whether NATO’s 1999 New Strategic Concept 
constituted a fundamental change in the NATO Treaty (the Court ruled it was not), to 
whether the German government should have sought Bundestag approval in 
deploying German soldiers in NATO AWACS aircraft over Turkish territory in 
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March 2003, just prior to the onset of the Iraq war (the Court ruled the government 
should have sought approval).164 
Other Actors 
Studies of German foreign policy also have expounded on other actors in the 
foreign policy process, such as interest groups and the public at large. Neverthel ss, 
the view among foreign policy analysts seems to be that in the German federal
system, contrary to domestic policy, interest groups are not major actors in foreig  
policy deliberations, save for corporate business interests related to the defense 
armaments industry.165 For the purposes of this study on the issue of military 
intervention policy, it is assumed that interest group dynamics play a marginal role. 
Public opinion, on the other hand, plays an indirect role in foreign policy 
deliberations and will be followed to determine the degree to which public opinion 
surveys play any role in decision-making dynamics, though it is not the central fac or 
in this study. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Chancellor Dominance or Chancellor Constraint?  
 Of the actors outlined above, the most influential actor is seen to be the 
federal chancellor—the state’s executive. In the German case, the Basic Law provides 
no guidance to the question of the relative power balance within the executive, and 
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over the years two different leadership styles of chancellors have emerged.166 The 
first, “chancellor democracy” (Kanzlerdemokratie), is defined by a powerful chief 
executive who dominates the decision-making process relative to the federal ministers 
and the cabinet at large by controlling cabinet decision making. The term also implies 
compliant coalition parties as well as an executive-dominated parliament.167  This 
concentration of power in the chancellorship is most closely associated with 
Adenauer’s first term in office (1949–1953), when unique political circumstances and 
still weak party structures resulted in the centralization of power in the chancellorship 
(Adenauer also retained the role of foreign minister until 1955). While the term has 
been applied to subsequent chancellors, German scholars have argued that the 
Kanzlerdemokratie model is less relevant today because of the growing complexity of 
policy issues that have expanded the number of actors in the policymaking process 
and thus reduced the chancellor’s power to ensure a particular policy outcome.168 
Germany’s postwar establishment as a pluralist democracy with a feder list system of 
government means power has been diffused, requiring a process of compromise and 
consensus building among political players.  
The second approach, “coordination democracy” (Koordinationsdemokratie), 
reflects this thinking and represents a leadership style more defined by its need for 
cooperation and building consensus than a concentration of political power. The 
dominance of the chancellor democracy thesis was challenged in the 1980s by 
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research on institutional pluralism, which emphasized the transition from a dominant 
leadership style to one increasingly defined by its need to coordinate and manage the 
policy process among an increasing number of foreign policy actors and 
institutions.169 The process of globalization and increasing interdependence, 
continued integration into the European Union, and new international roles and 
responsibility heightened the need for a managerial style of governance. For these 
scholars, Adenauer’s time in office was a product of specific historical conditions that 
cannot be generalized into a current model of leadership style.   
Nevertheless, there are studies that still argue that the chancellor’s influence is 
increasing. In their study of German security policy, Catherine Kelleher and Cathleen 
Fisher allude to an expansion of chancellorial power in security policy decision-
making in the 1990s.170 Peter Wagner’s study of former chancellor Kohl documents a 
gradual process of the chancellor’s influence in foreign policy. A foreign policy 
novice when he came to power in 1982 after Helmut Schmidt’s fall from power, Kohl 
(CDU) inherited a powerful and experienced foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher (FDP). Kohl used bureaucratic instruments and the media to weaken the 
control Genscher had on foreign policy to enhance his own foreign policy credentials 
and influence in foreign policy.171 William Paterson mentions interviews conducted 
with Chancellery officials who spoke of the increased centrality of the chancellor in 
foreign policy due to factors such as the increased complexity and intractability of 
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issues, the expanded use and institutionalization of international summits, and the 
public’s expectation of a chancellor taking a strong role in foreign policy.172 Finally, 
although Klaus Goetz argues that the coordination democracy model is the prevalnt 
model rather than the chancellor democracy model, he does assert that a process of 
centralization of power occurred under former chancellor Schröder as seen in his 
ability to control cabinet decision making.173 
Presidentialization Thesis   
Other emerging approaches acknowledge the complexity argument but 
nevertheless assert that the power in parliamentary democracies is increasingly 
dominated by the chief executive in a style more reminiscent of leaders in presidential 
systems. This “presidentialization” thesis refers to a highly personalized style of 
governance in which the prime minister or chancellor is the main locus of power.174 
At its most abstract, the presidentialization thesis points to a systematic 
marginalization of collective elements in a system of government, combined with the 
eroding social foundation of party organization, that allows the chief executive to 
expand his or her power resources and personal authority in the decision-making 
process. The growth of a leader’s autonomy from his or her political party implies 
that the leader is able to bypass the party in the decision-making process, take more 
control over bureaucratic and administrative resources, and highlight his or her own 
personal attributes within government and to the public at large, in particular during
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electoral campaigns.175 Proponents of this thesis emphasize that presidentialization 
advances without any concurrent change in the regime type—that is, the 
presidentializing trend takes place in parliamentary systems that remain structurally 
intact.176  
In all these components, the weight of the exercise of power has shifted to the 
chief executive, from within the executive or from the party. Thomas Poguntke and 
Paul Webb cite four factors as causes for this shift in power resources: the 
internationalization of politics; the growth of the state (bureaucratic complexity); the 
changing structure of mass communications; and the erosion of traditional social 
cleavages in politics.177 Ludger Helms reviewed the theoretical literature and presents 
no less than thirteen indicators of presidentialization trends, though he argues that 
only a few warrant closer examination: the growing impact of the individual leader on 
parliamentary election outcomes; structural changes in the executive in favor of the 
chief executive; and the executive–legislative relationship.178 
This study will test the assertion of an empowered chancellor in foreign 
policy, hypothesizing that if there are competing policy preferences between h  
chancellor and other actors (parliament, cabinet, federal ministers), the chancellor has 
the power to override objections and prevail in the policy debate. The hypothesis will 
be applied to the case of decision making on the two missions that comprise 
Germany’s contribution in Afghanistan, the anti-terrorist Operation Enduring 
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Freedom (OEF) mission and the civilian reconstruction International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission from the initiation of the mandates in 2001 to the 
end of the OEF mandate in 2008. The study will seek to determine the degree of 
power of the chancellor in out-of-area decision making by examining two 
explanations of enhanced chancellorial power outlined in the presidentialization 
thesis: structural changes in the core executive that provided the chancellor with more 
power; and executive-legislative relations and the hypothesized growing distance 
between the chancellor and his or her party.  
These two variables are the most relevant to the Afghanistan study and can get
to the question of by what means the chancellor has gained influence while other 
actors (ministries, parliament) have lost influence. Other proposed variables are not 
applicable in any rigorous way. For example, two indicators Poguntke and Webb 
cited as causal factors in the presidentialization thesis, the internationalization of 
politics and the spread of mass communications, are almost platitudinous and thus no 
real indicators of direct power or influence. No one can deny that political 
interactions are becoming more internationalized or that the line between domestic 
and international politics is increasingly blurred; nor can one reject the assertion that 
advanced communication technology has changed the contours of social and political 
dynamics throughout the world. However, these dynamics are being felt in every 
state, regardless of regime type, and are too vague to function as power indicators. As 
such, they have no capacity to prove the presidentialization thesis of power passing 




Structure: Political Parties and Coalition Politics 
Just as with the concept of agency, the ontological debate on what constitutes 
structure reveals the absence of a consensus.179  Nevertheless, efforts have been made 
to define what structures mean for analytical purposes. Haney proposes a general
definition of structure as “organizational configurations within which foreign policy-
making takes place,”180 but the definition does not seem to take into account informal 
structures and institutions. Ikenberry is more to the point: institutional structures 
“refer both to the organizational characteristics of groups and to the rules and norms 
that guide the relationships between actors.”181 This approach fits with Duffield’s 
proposed definition, discussed earlier, to integrate the various ways in which the term 
“institution” has been utilized in IR theory: as formal organizations, practices, rules, 
and norms. This framework assumes that individuals are shaped by the institutional 
setting in which they operate. The institutional setting retains both formal elements 
(legal, constitutional) and informal elements (rules, procedures, routines, norms, 
practices) as well as constitutive (norms, beliefs) and regulative/procedural 
(bureaucratic practices, guidelines) components. Thus, institutions are organizational 
settings and rules set up by individuals that define a context for political action.  
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As political institutions, parties are at the core of Germany’s federal system of 
governance and are a major influence on policy decision making.182  Parties are the 
link between society and the state, the conduit through which the government and the 
voting public interact to address the concerns of the society at large. The centrality of 
German political parties is manifested in their constitutionally defined role and 
activities (Art. 21 GG), becoming not just political or social institutions, but legal
entities as well.183 The elevated role of the parties as reflected in the Basic Law was 
intended to prevent the development of political parties motivated by narrow self-
interest and goals rather than the desire to represent the will of the German people. 
They are thus enjoined by the constitution to actively participate in the building of the 
political will (politische Willensbildung) in society, operate within fully democratic 
principles, and publicly account for the use of public funds they receive from 
parliament. The 1967 Law on Parties, the federal statute governing party activities, 
outlined the function of German parties in even greater detail.184  
The scholarly literature on German political parties emphasizes their centrality 
in German politics and in stabilizing the party system over time.185 Gordon Smith’s 
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concept of the “politics of centrality” lays out the reasons, which have their roots in 
the country’s unique postwar history and in the lessons of the Weimar Republic. First, 
political parties have a constitutionally defined role to contribute to the welfare o  the 
state and its citizens. Second, the system of proportional representation (5 percent
hurdle) promotes coalition government and inhibits the rise of extremist parties on the
right and left, which historically has encouraged the stability and continued 
dominance of the two larger catch-all parties. Third, the constitution allows the 
government to ban extremist parties if their intentions and actions are anti-
democratic. Fourth, the constructive vote of no confidence only allows parliament to 
dissolve the government if it is capable of voting in a new one. Finally, the 
constitution establishes the primacy of the role of chancellor in government (relative 
to the federal president) and his/her role in establishing policy guidelines.186 
The early years of the Federal Republic saw competition from multiple parti s 
across the political spectrum give way to a process of party consolidation fueled by 
several factors: the constitutional “5 percent” hurdle that prevented parties with less 
than five percent of the popular vote to enter the Bundestag; the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s banning of extremist parties on the right (NPD – 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and on the left (KPD – Kommunistische 
Partei Deutschlands) under Article 23 section 2 of the Basic Law;  and the merger of 
several conservative parties under the umbrella of the Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU/CSU). In the 1960s, the dominance of the CDU/CSU was challenged by the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD), which had abandoned its socialist ideological 
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mooring in 1959 and transformed itself into a “catch-all party” (Volkspartei) to 
compete with the CDU/CSU.187 The resulting three-party structure, consisting in its 
core of the two catch-all parties along with the Free Democratic Party (FDP),188 
retained its dominance for over two decades until the entrance of the Green Paty i to 
the Bundestag in 1983. Lees called the German party system in these early years an 
oligopolistic market, with the dominance of a small handful of parties over the course 
of nearly thirty years.189 
Though the party system showed a remarkable degree of stability, political 
parties were slow to adapt to the societal changes and shift to post-materialist values 
in the 1970s. The rise of the Green Party from its origins as a social movement to its 
establishment as a political party represented in parliament was a consequence of the 
political system’s inability to address the new concerns of a changing electorate. The 
natural constituencies of the Volksparteien had weakened, and the next few years saw 
a decline in party identification, party membership, and voter participation while 
voter volatility increased.190  
This second transformation in the early 1980s to a broad “two-bloc party 
system,” with a center-right composed of the FDP and CDU/CSU on one side and the 
center-left of the SPD and Greens on the other, was further transformed with the 
unification of the Federal Republic in 1990. In its place an asymmetric five-party 
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system developed composed of the CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, Greens, and the PDS 
(Partei des demokratischen Sozializmus, or Party of Democratic Socialism, the 
former East German communist party [SED]), broadly divided between right and left 
on the political spectrum.  This is the party structure in which German political 
parties operate today.191 The system is marked by a high degree of fluidity as the 
greater number of parties changes the political calculations of the larger 
Volksparteien in search of coalition partners and raises the political stakes for all 
parties. The decline in party identity in West Germany accelerated after unification 
with the inclusion of nine million East German voters who, while accepting the West 
German political party structure, possessed little in the way of party identif cation and 
loyalty to the West German parties they were to vote for.192  
The transformation to a five-party system has had consequences for the two 
large catch-all parties, the CDU/CSU and SPD. The SPD was particularly affected by 
these shifting dynamics. In 2004 internal discord resulted in disaffected left-wing 
SPD activists founding WASG (Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit—Die 
Wahlalternative, or “Labor and Social Justice—The Electoral Alternative”) which 
formed an alliance with the PDS in 2005 to compete (successfully) in the 2005 
national elections. In 2007 it merged with the PDS to form Die Linke, or the Left 
Party.193 Nevertheless, despite a great deal of concern among German scholars about 
the impact of these structural shifts, the German party system remained remarkably 
                                                
191 Poguntke, “Eternal Crisis,” 46-47; Korte and Fröhlic , Politik und Regieren, 138–139.  
192 Braunthal, “Parties and Politics,” 184-188; Thomas S alfeld, “Political Parties,” in Governance in 
Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited, eds. Simon Green and William E. 
Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 71–77. 
193 Jonathan Olsen, “The Merger of the PDS and WASG: From East German Regional Party to 




stable.194 The current five-party system is characterized by continued voter volatility, 
a greater number of independent voters with a corresponding decline of party 
membership in the catch-all parties, and declining party identification. The greater 
number of parties also means the political calculations for coalition building are more 
complicated, though it could also offer a greater number of possible coalition 
variations for the larger parties as well. 
Parliamentary Parties 
The discussion so far reveals the complicated yet critical role of parties in the 
German political system: they are the intermediaries between the stae and its citizens 
and interact with both to address societal concerns; and they are organized insttutio s 
that mobilize voters, present and market political viewpoints, and participate in 
elections.195 The parliamentary parties represented in the Bundestag are particularly 
influential players in policy formation, not least because of the importance of 
coalition politics in the German political system.  
The parliamentary parties (Fraktionen, or parliamentary fractions) are central 
to policy decision making in the Bundestag. A parliamentary fraction is composed of 
an organized body of at least 5 percent of Bundestag members from the same party 
(the figure paralleling the 5 percent threshold in the German electorate law for parties 
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wishing to enter parliament).196 The parliamentary fraction is led by an executive 
board and is organized in working groups that mirror (in terms of number and topic) 
the parliamentary committees in the Bundestag itself. Members of parliament are 
professional politicians who have risen up a hierarchical and formalized career ladd , 
and they are not independent policy entrepreneurs. In fact there are few procedural 
rights accorded to individual members; the parliamentary fraction as a body retains 
most of the procedural rights in the Bundestag, such as introducing legislative bills or
submitting major or minor interpellations to the government.197    
Policy positions and legislative details are worked out in the various working 
groups of the parliamentary fractions. Formally, all decisions are to be taken in 
parliamentary fraction meetings, but the growing complexity of issues that demand 
more specialized knowledge and the increasing size of the parliamentary fractions 
have led to decisions being formulated prior to meetings.198 In this way, policy 
deliberations take place within the parliamentary fractions that “pre-structure” the 
policy options sent on to the Bundestag committees, which then prepare the issue for 
debate on the floor of the Bundestag. The result is that the plenary debates and 
decisions are rather pro forma, since the political calculations and outcomes of final 
votes have been worked out prior to the final stage of parliamentary decision-
making.199 These institutional factors highlight a critical point: the need for strong 
party cohesion and policy coordination within parliamentary parties.  
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Of the parliamentary committees, the Bundestag’s Committee on Foreign 
Affairs is the most important means by which parliamentary fractions influe ce the 
development of foreign policy. It is one of only four of the twenty-two Bundestag 
committees established in the Basic Law (Article 45 GG).200 The primary task of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs is to monitor and guide the government’s foreign 
policy activities, and it is the main instrument for building cross-party support for 
foreign policy issues.201 The Defense Committee, also established via a constitutional 
amendment, is a closed committee tasked with preparing defense-related decisions 
that will be taken up in the Bundestag plenary for the final vote. The Defense 
Committee reviews all international deployments on a regular basis, and there is some 
overlap with the Foreign Affairs Committee that necessitates close cooperation 
between the two committees.202 
The discussion on parliamentary party fractions raises the question of how 
influential the Bundestag is as an institutional actor in the policy process. Few studies 
have sought to measure the role of the Bundestag in foreign policy decision making, 
and the few studies that have been done tend to view the Bundestag’s influence as 
minimal—or at most, the record is mixed.203 For example, James Ryan Anderson’s 
study of parliamentary control and foreign policy in the Bundestag examines the legal 
instruments Bundestag members can apply to influence foreign policy decisions. 
Anderson observes that such instruments are rarely used or have failed in the few 
instances in which influence-seeking behavior was evident. He concludes from this 
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that the Bundestag’s influence on foreign policy is marginal. But Anderson’s 
conclusions are problematic: his analysis overlooks informal tools of influence, 
depends primarily on published secondary sources, and argues that limited 
parliamentary control is due to the poor state of debate in the Bundestag while 
providing little empirical evidence for this assertion.204  
In another study, Jäger, Oppermann, Höse, and Viehrig argue that most 
analyses take a too narrow view of parliamentary control—for example, the formal 
constitutional instruments—and leave out the ways in which Bundestag members can 
indirectly affect the policy-making process, though members do not always utilize
these informal mechanisms. The authors produced a questionnaire to explore why 
members choose or do not choose to use them. The analysis showed that the primary 
precondition for members using their institutional capabilities is the salience of th  
issue—that is, the greater the issue salience the greater the chance that m mbers will 
bring instruments to bear to derail a policy. The lower the salience, the more room for 
maneuverability the government has in setting policy direction.205 I  terms of how 
salient the issue of out-of-area operations is for Bundestag members relative to other 
foreign policy considerations, the questionnaire revealed the highest salience and thus 
influence-seeking behavior was centered on European issues and policies, with the 
issue of “securing peace/foreign missions” rating only sixth out of the nine issu s on 
which members were questioned. The low salience of military missions abroad seems 
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to imply that on deployment issues, the government may possess greater latitude on 
setting policy direction, though not, one would suspect, in all cases.206 Given the 
sensitivity in the public to Bundeswehr deployments and the fact that there is no 
strong elite consensus on the question, conflict among parliamentary members 
regarding military missions may well be greater than assumed.   
Other researchers argue that various factors have actually expanded the 
competence of the Bundestag in foreign policy. The blurred lines between domestic 
and foreign policy, the complexity of policy issues requiring greater policy expertise 
in many more policy arenas, and the rising involvement of the European Union in 
security policy have been responsible for the growing involvement of the Bundestag 
in foreign policy.207 Most importantly, however, by virtue of the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s decision on July 12, 1994 that upheld the constitutionality of 
German participation in military deployments abroad, the Bundestag is an 
indispensable actor on this central question in German foreign and security policy. 
Calling its decision the “parliamentarization of foreign policy,”208 the Court held that 
“the Federal Government is required to obtain the Bundestag’s explicit approval for 
each deployment of German armed forces” through a simple majority vote.209 The 
Committee on Foreign Affairs prepares the documents and the recommendations that 
will be made to the Bundestag as a whole. The Bundestag then decides whether to 
grant, modify, or extend the involvement of the German armed forces in operations 
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abroad. To date, the plenum has accepted every recommendation on deployment 
issues forwarded by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.210 In this regard, then, the 
Bundestag is a principal actor in the development of German policy on out-of-area 
operations and as such warrants closer analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Coalition Politics 
 
The German Basic Law divides the responsibilities of governance between the 
executive (chancellor and cabinet) and the parliament, and the cabinet further divid s
the power and decision-making responsibilities between the governing parties. 
Germany’s parliamentary system produces a coalition style cabinet gov rnment, 
where governing coalitions are almost always the rule.211 This leads to several 
important features: for one, while authority is concentrated in the chancellor, power is 
dispersed among the members of the cabinet who must vote as a collective body on 
all legislative initiatives. Second, the diffusion of power and influence between 
governing parties means that conflict is built into the process of decision making, 
given the diverging set of goals and interests in each party. Third, with the exception 
of the grand coalitions composed of the two major parties, the CDU/CSU and the 
SPD, the power-sharing structure of German coalitions is asymmetrical, w th one of 
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the two major parties and (at least up to now) one smaller party comprising the 
governing coalition.212 
The result of this coalition government structure is that the junior coalition 
partner retains a disproportionate degree of influence, with potential consequec s for 
policy outcomes.213 Coalition parties often disagree on policy direction, and a lack of 
unity at the top makes the necessary negotiations and bargaining more difficult. Thus 
the relatively greater influence of the junior coalition partner is an important and 
arguably central factor in determining which variables shape policy outcomes in a 
coalition government.214 As Helms contends in his study of chancellor–party 
relations: “As to the chancellor’s policy-leadership capacities in the core executive 
and the parliamentary arena, the political weight of the junior partner within a given
coalition government and the relationship between the government and the leadership 
of the majority Fraktionen in the Bundestag may be considered variables enjoying a 
particularly large amount of explanatory power.”215 This is especially true for German 
foreign policy, since by tradition the junior coalition partner is given control of the 
Foreign Office.  
Juliet Kaarbo’s research on the role of coalitions in foreign policy decision 
making are relevant to this study’s analysis of German foreign policy behavior. In her 
comparative study of German and Israeli coalitions, Kaarbo asks what explains the 
variance in junior party influence, that is, why were junior partners in the coalition 
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able to incorporate their position in the final decision at some times but not at other 
times? Of the six variables tested, three variables were particularly strong in 
explaining junior party influence: the locus of authority (where the decision took 
place); the degree of unanimity in the major party on a policy (division in the major
party enhanced the success of the junior partner’s influence attempt) and whether t  
junior party was treated as an equal partner in the proceedings; and what strategy w s 
applied by the junior coalition partner in the influence attempt (persuasion, 
bargaining, procedural manipulation, framing of the issue, threat to exit coalition).216  
Other ways by which the smaller coalition party wields power are through the 
negotiations over the distribution of ministries during coalition negotiations, their 
party platform and positions on policy issues, and the tactics and strategies of their 
leadership.217 Thus, the ability of the junior coalition partner to affect foreign policy 
decision making depends on a number of factors relevant to the context of the 
decision-making process.  
If the degree of consensus between coalition partners is high, the decision-
making process will be marked by less conflict, but there are any number of 
consequences that result when the decision-making process breaks down. Polarization 
can produce political stalemate and policy stasis. Intra-coalition conflict can 
immobilize decision making and lead to poor decision-making practices. The 
expectation of policy unanimity can exacerbate this political deadlock and contribute 
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to a fragmented policy process and contradictory policy recommendations—and thus 
to poor governance.218  
As a result, given that “institutional and political dynamics of coalitins 
impact the nature or character of the foreign policy,” one should expect “either hig ly 
constrained foreign policy . . . or extreme foreign policies.”219 Kaarbo and Beasley’s 
research indicated that relative to single party governments, coalition governments 
are more conflict-prone, but the data were unable to pinpoint the mechanisms for this;
junior partners could hold senior partners hostage, coalition governments may simply 
be more vulnerable in the domestic political realm, or perhaps parties within 
coalitions are more willing to take risks because the risks are dispersed among all 
coalition partners.220 
How can such tendencies toward more conflict be neutralized? Joe Hagan’s 
research suggests variables to look for in coalition government behavior:  how closely
the parties’ political philosophies parallel each other; how power is distributed 
between parties when a government is established (e.g., coalition negotiations and 
distribution of ministries); the degree of unanimity within each coalition party; nd 
how closely aligned the respective political positions are among coalition parties.221 
Junior coalition parties can apply a number of formal and informal instruments to 
apply pressure to their larger coalition partner. In the case of German foreign pol cy, 
the junior partner’s control of the Foreign Office means it can use its ministerial 
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prerogative to impact the direction of foreign policy decisions. The foreign m nister 
can use various institutional mechanisms to assist in this effort: his personal standing 
with the media and the use of framing devices relevant to the policy issue (German 
history, culture of reticence, humanitarian use of military forces); procedural 
manipulations (rule-setting, establishing working groups, calling meetings); and 
personnel decisions, to name a few. 
The argument thus far is that parties matter, and interaction between 
government coalition partners strongly affect foreign policy decision making. Ju ior 
partners within the coalition have a disproportionate share of power and thus 
influence on policy formation. The study’s second hypothesis is based on this 
observation and states that if there is a high degree of dissent between coalition 
parties, the junior coalition partner will have greater success in inserting its policy 
preferences into the final decision outcome and/or extract concessions from the major 
coalition partner.  
However, the senior coalition partner is not without its own tools for applying 
pressure. This begins with the coalition negotiations and the distribution of ministries 
among the governing coalition partners. Despite the fact that the German constitution 
recognizes the Foreign Office as the lead institution in representing Germany’s 
foreign policy, the centrality of the federal chancellor in the foreign policy process 
indicates there can be serious turf battles between the Chancellery and Foreign 
Office. The chancellor, too, has a large array of institutional mechanism at his/her 
disposal, and a large and competent staff in the Chancellery to apply the weigt of 






A foreign policy analysis approach asserts that actors form the central node of 
analysis, and yet actor preferences necessarily are shaped by institutio al structures 
that both enable and constrain them in the process of decision making. The theoretical 
challenge is to address both agency and structure in an effort to build an integrated 
approach to explain foreign policy decision-making processes. This study will look at 
the intersection of agency and structure by focusing the analysis and central 
hypotheses on the role of the federal chancellor as an actor and the influence that 
coalition politics has on the outcome of the decision-making process. 
 With the actors, structures, and hypotheses outlined in this chapter, the next 
step is to define the analytical framework on decision making within which actors and 
structures interrelate. The analytical framework will then be applied to the case study 
of Afghanistan to determine how the policy-making process works, that is, what kinds 










Chapter 5:  German Foreign Policy Decision Making: Constructing a 




The theoretical discussion thus far has been that much of the literature on 
post-unification German foreign policy has been concentrated at the international 
relations (IR) level, while few studies have dealt with German foreign policy decision 
making itself—that is, not the nature of German foreign policy (“normal” versus 
civilian power, multilateral versus unilateral) but, rather, how foreign policy decisions 
are formed and which factors are more influential in the decision-making process. As 
argued earlier, a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach is better suid to such 
inquiries. This chapter will take the theoretical analysis one step further by exploring 
various models of decision making found in the literature and laying out a decision-
making framework for analyzing German foreign policy decision-making process 
functions. The framework will then be applied to the case of decision-making in the 
case of Afghanistan. 
 
Foreign Policy and Decision-Making Models 
 Various types of approaches have been posited to study the process of foreign 
policy decision making. The approaches can be organized into three general 




cognitive-psychological models.222 Classic decision-making models reflect the 
centrality of rationality in international relations theory; policymakers weigh both 
utility and probability and make the most rational choice to maximize their utility for 
the most optimal policy.223 However, it became clear that such overarching 
assumptions of rationality were problematic. The assumption that actors are rational-
driven decision makers did not hold up to empirical scrutiny, and subsequent 
theoretical contributions—from Herbert Simon’s work on bounded rationality to 
Charles Lindblom’s study of “muddling through” and John Steinbruner’s theory of 
cybernetic decision making—made important modifications to the assumption of 
rational decision makers.224  
Nevertheless, these interest-based models of decision making remained 
problematic because they tended to ignore the domestic level factors that affect policy 
preferences. Theorists turned to state-level factors to build a more accurate picture of 
decision making. Graham Allison took the theoretical debate one step further with his 
classic work on bureaucratic and organizational processes, Th  Essence of 
Decision.225 Allison pointed out the weaknesses of the rational actor model and 
introduced two alternative frames of reference, the bureaucratic politics model and 
organizational processes model, which some theorists now call “governmental 
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politics.”226 Allison argued that policy decisions may not be based on a strict cost-
benefit analysis but by competing bureaucratic interests and internal bargaining 
processes that can result in sub-optimal outcomes. Actors respond not according to a 
set of ordered rational assumptions but to parochial concerns driven by bureaucratic 
wrangling among actors.  
Allison’s work is important in that he showed the significance of domestic 
political drivers in foreign policy decisions. A state’s bureaucratic apparatus does, in 
fact, influence policy decisions, but while the bureaucratic politics model remains 
widely in use, its basic assumptions have come in for much theoretical and 
methodological criticism. Successive studies have cited several conceptual 
weaknesses—among others, an oversimplification and over-emphasis on the U.S. 
case, a focus on crisis decision making while neglecting routine decision making, and 
inattention to the dynamics of learning and adaptation.227 
The most logical conclusion is to develop a more integrated framework of 
analysis, one that would take into account both agent as well as structural variables. 
Institutions, which are created by actors to organize political behavior and streamlin  
decision-making processes, can provide the integrative link because individual action 
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is shaped by the institutional setting in which it is embedded. Institutions are 
structures, but they possess their own dynamics that in turn shape processes.  
 
Core Elements of Decision-Making Framework 
 The need, then, is to build an integrative framework for analyzing foreign 
policy decision making that allows for the interplay of actors and structures. In his
development of a general framework for analyzing decision making, Frederick Mayer 
provides an integrated approach that takes into account two dimensions of policy 
interaction:  the impact of international versus domestic variables, and the importance 
of incorporating all three levels of analysis: systemic (interests), state (domestic 
institutions, political system), and individual (actors, societal norms).228 Mayer 
attempts to define behavioral patterns of actors as they move between the three l vels 
of analysis. Following Mayer’s discussion, the argument at the international level is 
that the higher the political stakes, the more likely actors are to act in a more rati nal, 
self-interested manner.  At the state level, where domestic political vari bles are more 
influential, the assertion is that when domestic variables come into conflict with 
external level factors, the higher level process will be more important. Finally, at the 
individual level of analysis, Mayer acknowledges that statements about “predicting” 
individual level behavior are very difficult and so directs the researcher to look at 
which stage of the process individual-driven variables (what Mayer calls “symbolic 
politics”) matter most. 229 In examining the course of the decision-making process, 
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attention must be paid to which interests prevail and which factors weigh more 
heavily than others in shaping the policy preferences. 
 In a similar vein, Risse-Kappen also argues that complex models must 
integrate external and domestic variables as well as incorporate all three levels of 
analysis.230 There are many examples of external factors influencing domestic 
political dynamics and decisions—policy leaders are often forced to change their 
political preferences when external factors intervene, for example—but it does not 
necessarily follow that such external variables are determinant. Political decisions 
cannot be explained without references to the motivation of actors and the domestic 
political context and institutional structures in which decisions are met. These policy 
networks are seen as the “mechanisms and processes of interest representation linking 
the political systems to their societal environments, such as political parties nd 
interest groups. This concept emphasizes the ability of political actors to build 
consensus among the relevant elite groups in support of their policies.”231 
Framework for Analysis: German Foreign Policy Decision Making 
 Before setting out the general framework for analyzing post-unification 
German foreign policy decision making, it is useful to ask what is known about the 
elements and the formal and informal dynamics of decision making in the German 
case. A study of the literature on German foreign policy analysis shows the paucity of 
studies that have focused on explaining the decision-making process per se. Helga 
Haftendorn, arguably one of the most influential German scholars on German foreign 
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and security policy, was the exception. Her co-edited book in 1978 aimed at 
expanding the theoretical literature on foreign policy decision making.232 
Haftendorn’s work in the 1970s and 1980s did not include an outline of a general 
model or framework of West German foreign policy decision making, presumably 
because the unique position of Germany as an occupied, semi-sovereign state did not 
lend itself to generalizable statements about its foreign policy behavior. Indeed, 
Haftendorn’s 1989 article outlining a “foreign policy priorities conflict” paradigm for 
the analysis of West German foreign policy argued that West Germany’s dependenc  
on the United States meant that it was forced to align its own security priorities w h 
those of the United States and that this compliance often led to domestic political 
conflict, which German leaders were forced to accept as a price for American se urity 
guarantees.233 Thus the defining characteristic of German foreign policy, and by 
inference the parameter shaping decision making, was the limits on its scope of action 
and stronger external pressures due to Germany’s semi-sovereign status and is 
strategic dependence on the United States. 
Catherine Kelleher, too, published studies of West German security policy 
that discussed the decision-making process, though it focused on defense policy and 
decision making in the Ministry of Defense. Kelleher’s 1982 chapter on Germany’s 
defense policy also emphasized the constrained nature of West German defense 
decision making and the centrality of the United States and external pressures in th  
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decision process.234 In essence, the structure and doctrine of Germany’s armed forces 
did not reflect German strategic concepts and choices but, rather, the kinds of 
political accommodations worked out between the United States and Germany during 
the Cold War.235  
The problem, of course, is that these studies were published prior to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and are of limited use in evaluating patterns of 
decision-making in post-unification German foreign policy. In this sense, then, 
Gerald Schneider is right to highlight the neglect of German foreign policy studies 
and to call for more research on analyzing German foreign policy decision making. In 
his view, one way to overcome this conceptual stagnation is to apply an 
institutionalist perspective into foreign policy analysis, thus acknowledging the 
contribution Allison made in showing the importance of internal domestic drivers of 
foreign policy actions, that is, emphasizing interaction between groups of actors 
involved in decision-making that can affect policy substance.236 Incorporating a study 
of institutions—structured organizations, norms, practices, rules, and regulations—
brings important insights into the analysis by addressing important questions such as 
how coordination within the foreign policy process is achieved; how, in complex 
organizations, operationally relevant practices and conventions develop; and how 
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informal communication networks contribute to the functioning of institutional 
structures.237 
 Thus, this chapter turns to the task of taking the first step in constructing an 
outline of a decision-making framework that can be applied to post-unification 
German foreign policy decision making, with an emphasis on ascertaining how 
institutional structures and practices, both formal and informal, shape the decision-
making context within which actors interact and ultimately determine policy 
preferences. Institutions can enable or constrain actors in the decision-making 
process; they can limit or expand the relative influence of actors; they can have the 
effect of channeling policy preferences in one direction or another; and they can 
determine the quality of the political outcome.238 
 
General Structure of German Decision-Making Framework 
 Karl-Rudolf Korte and Manuel Fröhlich provide a detailed examination of 
politics and governance in Germany.  In their book, on which the following 
discussion is based, the authors begin with a general discussion of explanatory 
models and then outline the central concepts necessary for an analysis of decision 
making, particularly in the German context. Normally three general models are 
offered to explain decision making: either actor decisions are determinant, structures 
are determinant, or a combination of both. Every decision, however, is dependent not 
only on the actors involved in the decision but on the institutional environment and 
the form of governance. There is, then, an active relationship between actors and 
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structures that an integrated model for analyzing decision-making acknowledges; 
both are co-determinant. Actors make decisions within institutional contexts and 
structures, and institutions create opportunities or barriers to power.239 
 Korte and Fröhlich outline four analytical tools for decision making: the 
political system, the policy cycle, policy networks, and veto players. At the most 
abstract level is the political system, understood as the totality of 
structures/institutions and practices that actors integrate via a dynamic of regularized 
interaction. This basic component must be supplemented by an understanding of 
policy cycles. Though more often than not used as a heuristic device rather than an 
empirical tool, the point is that policy cycles can show how actors within institutions 
act in the political process. Important factors can be highlighted through policy
cycles: how actors influence the process as well as in which stage of the policy cyc e 
that influence is applied (defining the problem, seeking alternatives, formulating and 
implementing a policy response); the power position of the actors (coalition party or 
opposition, executive or minister); or the constellation of actors and the context of 
their action.240  
A decision-making framework must be able to identify the policy networks 
that in turn define the policy dynamic, that is, the structure of interlocking social, 
economic, or political relationships that build a specific group of actors or coalitions 
that are anchored in the various institutions involved. Many policy networks are 
political or administrative in nature; others are defined interest groups. Identifying 
policy networks can provide relevant information: What are the opportunities and the 
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constraints the actors face, and where are the points at which policy decisions are 
finalized or forestalled? An important policy network relevant to this study is the 
relationship between the German government and the parliamentary majority in the 
Bundestag.  
Finally, specific veto players can be identified in the decision-making process. 
Based on George Tsebelis’s work, veto players are individuals or collective actors 
whose approval is necessary for a change in policy, meaning a change in the 
conditions of governance. Such players are based in institutions, parties, or other 
organizations tied to specific policy fields (e.g., unions, corporations).241 This study’s 
two hypotheses recognize important veto players in the decision-making process: the 
federal chancellor, the governing coalition, and the Bundestag by virtue of its 
constitutive right to vote on out-of-area missions. 
Formal Process 
 What do we know, then, about the formal and informal aspects of foreign 
policymaking in general and the process of decision making related to German 
military deployments in particular? In terms of the decision-making elite, the major 
actors are composed of the government (chancellor, Chancellery), the relevant 
ministries (and cabinet ministers), the party establishment (particularly the eaders of 
the fractions and working groups), and the Bundestag (relevant committees). 
Generally, the foreign policy decision-making process for out-of-area missions 
closely resembles the process by which parliamentary laws are adopted.  
                                                




The formal process, as outlined in Figure 5, begins with the government’s 
drafting of a motion that lays out the legal basis on which it is acting (e.g., UN 
Security Council resolution) and outlines the specific parameters of the mission—
purpose and aim, geographical reach, troops limits, operational resources, and 











Figure 5:  Formal Steps of Decision Making Process 
 
Motions on politically sensitive missions usually are more detailed.242 The 
Chancellery and the relevant ministries, with the Foreign Office in the lead, 
coordinate in the drafting of a motion. The Chancellery begins the process of 
evaluating the political and military options. The Chancellery is the tool of executiv  
authority and a powerful instrument that enables the chancellor to harness the 
process. The administrative/bureaucratic elite in the ministries provide the substantive 
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expertise, and there is a great deal of inter-ministerial coordination, particul rly 
between the Foreign Office and the Defense Ministry.243 The inter-ministerial 
coordination within the Chancellery runs parallel to the intra-ministerial process, 
which proceeds from the substantive divisions and bureaus up to the state secretaries 
(roughly equivalent to undersecretaries) and finally to the federal minister for his/her 
recommendation.244 The one relevant cabinet committee, the Federal Security 
Council, is largely absent in this process. Once the drafting of the motion is 
completed, the issue is placed on the federal cabinet’s agenda for discussion and a 
final vote. Cabinet meetings are highly orchestrated; a motion is placed on the agenda 
only when consensus has been reached. Votes thus tend to be pro forma.245 
 The chancellor is aided by several formal instruments of governance that 
influence the process of decision making, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 3. As the 
chief executive and head of government, the chancellor has the constitutive right to
set general policy guidelines (Richtlinienkompetenz), and he or she can apply the full 
weight of the Chancellery, which serves as the central nexus of information, inter-
ministerial coordination, and policy formulation and management.246 
Once the motion is finalized by the government and voted on in the federal 
cabinet, it is sent to the Bundestag. The motion is given its first reading in the plenary 
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and then forwarded to the relevant parliamentary committees for further evaluation. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee acts as the lead committee and clearing house for the 
parliamentary motion that is built upon the government’s proposed motion. The 
Foreign Affairs Committee works closely with the Defense Committee, while other 
committees (e.g., Defense, Finance, Interior) act in an advisory fashion. Thus, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee plays a more influential role in shaping the motion’s 
content. The Foreign Affairs Committee finalizes a recommendation and report
(Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht) in which it advises parliament on how to vote on 
the motion. The Finance Committee submits a separate report.   
Once the motion clears the committee, it is returned to the plenary for a 
second (and sometimes a third) reading and debate in the Bundestag, after which the 
motion is voted on. Every vote on an out-of-area-mission is a roll-call vote—not a 
fixed rule, but an established parliamentary practice. The final determination is an up-
or-down vote, since the 1994 Constitutional Court decision ruled that the Bundestag 
cannot change the substance of a motion. The high turnout for the out-of-area mission 
votes reflects the degree of sensitivity such votes retain.  
 The Bundestag has several formal instruments that enhance its potential for 
shaping policy preferences relating to out-of-area missions. Most importantly, he 
German military forces are a Parlamentsarmee, or parliamentary army—
constitutionally and legally more closely regulated by the Bundestag than almost any 
other national military force. The 1994 Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the 
constitutionality of German participation in out-of-area missions gave the 




provisions and legal traditions that have established the principle that the consent of 
parliament is required to send German armed forces abroad—thus making the 
Bundeswehr subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, the Parliamentary 
Participation Act regulates the Bundestag’s direct involvement in out-of-area 
decisions. The Bundestag has several other formal instruments with which it can 
apply pressure in policy debates, such as its control over the budgetary process and 
the use of minor and major interpellations in parliamentary debates. The 
interpellations are particularly useful for opposition parties as a tool to force the 
government and federal administration to provide policy-related information.247 
 In sum, the decision-making framework first involves close information 
exchange and coordination between the Chancellery and ministries and between the 
government and the political parties and parliamentary party fractions. The Bundestag 
remains a central actor by virtue of the legal/constitutional frameworks set out by the 
German Basic Law, by the Federal Constitutional Court’s rulings on out-of-area 
missions, and the Parliamentary Participation Act established in 2005. 
Informal Process  
In Germany, as in other states, there has been a growing reliance on informal 
processes in decision making.248 The problems associated with the usual dilemmas of 
coordination due to bureaucratic competition, imperfect information, and time 
pressures often lead to efforts to bypass formal institutional structures by establishing 
informal practices and networks to speed up the process or overcome bureaucratic 
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hurdles. Formal constitutional structures increasingly are bypassed in favor of 
informally constituted groups of decision makers in a triangular matrix composed of 
government (chancellor/Chancellery), ministerial bureaucracies (particul ly Defense 
Ministry and Foreign Office), and party (particularly the governing party majority in 
parliament—i.e., parliamentary factions and their executive committees).249 In 
parliamentary democracies, then, there is a symbiotic relationship between 
government and parliament, linked through the parliamentary party fractions of the 
governing majority parties.  
However, effective governance in parliamentary democracies depends not 
merely on the political fine-tuning between the government and the coalition parties, 
but with the opposition parties as well. For the consensus-driven German 
parliamentary system of government, opposition parties are often approached and 
drawn into the deliberative process, particularly on policies with significant political 
ramifications.250 It is assumed that such informal networking is well developed with 
regard to the politically precarious issue of military deployments.  
Figure 6 outlines the formal decision-making structure and the parallel 
informal communication networks active during various stages of the decision-
making process. 
                                                
249 Korte and Fröhlich, 41–42. 














Chancellery staff (Director, Department Directors)
Coalition Partner Leadership
Party Executive Committees 
Fraktion Executive Councils
Fraktion Foreign Policy and Defense Experts
Fraktion Working Groups 
Chancellery
Foreign Office: Ambassador to NATO 
Ministry of Defense: NAC representative
Foreign Affairs Committee 
Defense Committee
Other committees (Budget, Interior, Economic 
Cooperation/Development)
Chancellery and Ministry representatives
Committee and member staffs
 
Figure 6: Formal Structures and Informal Communication Channels 
 
Lothar Rühl writes that there is a growing tendency to disassociate decisions from the 
“formally competent institutions and from formal procedures.”251 It is often the case 
that coalition party leaders make decisions on policy preferences before the federal 
government lays out its formal motion.252 Membership within formal institutional 
bodies often is composed of regular members and outside representatives from these 
cross-cutting networks between government, party, and administrative bureaucracy. 
For example, the chancellor chairs the Federal Security Council and sets the 
agenda. Membership in this executive committee is composed of representatives from 
the ministries, party leaders, and parliamentary group leaders, some of whom are full 
participants while others are present only in an advisory capacity. This kind of 
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integrated decision network means that the outlines of policies often are negotiated in 
closed sessions before the final process of drafting the motion is completed. Thus, 
coalition leaders participate directly in setting the direction of policy preferences 
before the federal government submits the formal resolution. In the case of the federal 
cabinet, where a consensual and unanimous vote is expected, it follows that the 
details of the policy objectives are worked out in advance of the vote itself.  
In the Bundestag as well, committee meetings reflect this informal integrated 
communication network. Representatives from the Chancellery or federal ministries 
regularly attend and participate in parliamentary committee meetings. Also, if the 
Bundestag can only vote to accept or reject the government’s motion relating to a  
out-of-area operation, then members of parliament rely on a network of informal, ad 
hoc meetings to ensure that they are involved in the decision-making process.  
These informal structures of decision making point to the tensions inherent in 
the German political system. Coalition governments require close coordination 
between competitive parties that have their own distinct political agendas. Thus, one 
ongoing source of tension is the competition between the governing parties. Further 
tension exists between the chancellor and the ministries, where the chancellor’s right 
to set general policy guidelines is offset by ministerial autonomy. 
Finally, scholars also point to several factors that have undermined the formal 
competences of actors in the decision-making process:  the increasing complexity of 
foreign policy issues, the blurred line between domestic and foreign policy issues, and 








 Political decisions are made by actors functioning within institutional 
structures and are dependent on the interests of the actors and the institutional 
context; government action is shaped by the actors themselves (their leadership and 
decision-making styles) and the formal structures of governance that define where 
formal political authority resides. And yet, explanations of decision-making processes 
that incorporate only the formal legal/constitutional structures of governance are 
insufficient in explaining policy outcomes. It is because formalized decision-making 
structures often hinder efficient and timely decision making that actors have turned to 
informal practices and arrangements to overcome bureaucratic obstacles or political 
resistance.  
This analytical framework will be applied to the case of Germany’s 
participation in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. The analytical steps taken in 
this study will begin with the identification of actors and actor preferences, seeking to 
determine the relative weight and influence of the actors in the decision-maki g 
process and, in keeping with the study’s first hypothesis, whether the chancellor 
wields greater influence in the decision-making process. The next step will examine 
the dynamics of coalition politics to determine its relevance in the decision-making 
process and in particular whether the junior coalition partner wields any significant 
influence in terms of shaping policy preferences. The decision-making process 
                                                




itself—both informal and formal institutional structures—will be mapped in order to 
determine how foreign policy decisions are arrived at, and whether the analytical 
framework outlined stands up to empirical analysis.  The next chapter will present the 
case study of Afghanistan, from the initial decision to participate in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001 and the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in December 2001, through to the government’s abandonment of its 








Afghanistan is the most important case in the third phase of Germany’s 
adaptation to its role as a major contributor of troops to out-of-area missions. For the 
first time, German forces were deeply engaged in a military operation beyond 
Europe’s borders. While Germany’s role was presented to the public as a 
reconstruction and development aid mission, the terms of engagement began to shift 
to a more security-driven mission as the conflict intensified with no resolution in 
sight. The difference in how Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions were perceived reflects the contradictions 
in German policy in Afghanistan and the demands of finding an effective balance 
between Germany’s international commitments and domestic dissent regarding the 
use of military force. 
The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States brought a swift 
and strong statement of support from the German government. In a press conference 
on September 12, and again in an address to the Bundestag on September 19, 2001, 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder offered Germany’s “unlimited solidarity”254 and its 
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assistance in pursuing the terrorists responsible for the attacks. Schröder’s statement 
reflected the German state’s willingness to accept a greater international role as well 
as the limitations on the application of German military force:  
All allies have expressed their moral and political solidarity. This is only 
natural. We still do not know if the United States expects and will request 
support from the NATO partners, and if so, what kind of support. It could be 
military support. This option is not, and cannot be, excluded. Whatever form 
of support we are asked to provide, the Basic Law and the rulings of the 
Federal Constitutional Court will of course be respected. Naturally, every 
right has its corresponding duty. But the reverse is also true: any Alliance 
obligation corresponds to a right, in this case a right to information and 
consultation. What we as Germans and Europeans wish to achieve is 
unreserved solidarity with the US with respect to all necessary measures. 
Germany is prepared to take risks, even military ones, but it is not prepared to 
embark on any reckless adventure. Thanks to the prudent conduct of the 
American Administration, we have not been called upon to embark on any 
such adventure, and surely will not be in the future. This form of solidarity is 
what we have learnt from our history, a lesson which was bitter enough for the 
civilized world. A fixation on purely military means would be fatal.255  
 
Schröder’s statement revealed a number of things. First, Germany signaled it 
was prepared to meet its alliance obligations and assist the United States in efforts to 
fight global terrorism. Second, American expectations of some combined military 
action were acknowledged, though for the Germans such actions were to be 
channeled through a multilateral institutional setting and America’s allie  consulted 
on the matter. Third, the German government expected the request for assistance to 
include military forces, although the details were still to be worked out. Finally, 
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Germany’s contribution, whatever that proved to be, would be defined by its legal 
and constitutional obligations.  
By the end of September 2001 plans were well underway for a military 
offensive in Afghanistan. As the U.S.-led incursion (OEF) went forward on October 
7, 2001, German government officials did not rule out the possibility of German 
troops—even combat troops—being involved.256 The Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU), Social Democrats (SPD), and Free Democrats (FDP) supported the U.S. 
action, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) condemned it, and the Greens wer  
divided. Public opinion also was divided, though the percentage of Germans who felt 
the incursion was justified had risen to just slightly over half of the population (51 
percent). Within the German population, however, support for the U.S.-led offensive 
was significantly weaker among East Germans, the PDS, and the Greens.257 
Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer were firmly 
committed to German participation, motivated by concerns for alliance cohesion and 
a desire to show that Germany was prepared to take responsibility in the emerging 
fight against global terrorism. Nevertheless undercurrents within their respective 
parties threatened to undermine the government’s position. On the whole, the SPD 
was supportive, though there were some voices in the party’s left wing that spoke out 
against the attack. The real problem for the Red-Green coalition lay in the pacifist 
wing of the Green party. As in the Kosovo case in 1999, the longer the air strikes in 
Afghanistan continued and media reports of civilian casualties mounted, the more 
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support for the offensive began to decline. The Green party’s executive council called 
for a halt to the bombing attacks, but Schröder rejected these calls out of hand.258 
The growing unease within the Green party about the Afghanistan incursion 
placed pressure on the coalition itself. Schröder was clear about the path he had 
chosen: Germany would have to contribute to the fight against the terrorists, and that 
meant German soldiers might be deployed very soon. He was also clear about what 
his expectations were with regard to his coalition partner: they were to support his 
position or risk the collapse of the government if they failed to do so. In staking out a 
position, Schröder was also signaling to his own left wing that this was the SPD’s
position and that any opposition would not be tolerated.259 
 
OEF Vote November 2001: Fighting Terrorism 
The question of a German troop deployment meant that a Bundestag vote was 
necessary. Schröder met with the top leadership of the parties and the party fractions 
in the Bundestag to discuss the request that had been sent by President George W. 
Bush.  The government took care in drafting its motion. The legal basis for the 
request to contribute German troops to the antiterrorism effort in Afghanistan was 
based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, the invocation of Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, and the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 
as well as Article 24(2) of the Basic Law on which German membership in a system 
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of mutual collective security (NATO) is based.260 The motion allowed for a 
maximum of 3900 troops, including anti-biological warfare units, medical personnel, 
air and naval logistical support and personnel, and 100 Special Forces soldiers.261 
As Schröder later emphasized in a speech before the Bundestag on November 
8, specific conditions on the deployment of a maximum of 3900 soldiers would apply: 
the German government retained full control over any decisions regarding German 
armed forces, and the motion did not permit German troops to participate in any 
operations outside of Afghanistan. “This is the consequence of what we have 
proposed,” he declared.”262 Schröder also touched on the motivations for sending 
troops to Afghanistan: first and foremost, it was a question of solidarity and of 
Germany’s responsibility as a member of NATO. What he did not mention, however, 
were the Special Forces (KSK) that had been approved. 
Alliance solidarity notwithstanding, Schröder continued to wrestle with 
opposition within both government coalition parties. He rejected the SPD’s executive 
council’s own call for a cease-fire and continued to apply pressure on the Green pa ty 
leadership. For some Greens, supporting the deployment was an existential 
question—no support meant the end of the coalition. Green parliamentary fraction 
leaders supported sending German troops but wanted a cease-fire for humanitarian 
reasons, while most rank and file members were opposed to any contribution at all 
and called for an immediate halt in the U.S.-led attack.  
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Again, Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer faced the problem 
of finding a balance between external pressures and domestic political constraints. 
NATO had invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, and the UN had passed 
resolutions that set future UN actions within the parameters of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter in response to the terrorist threat. In addition, Schröder had promised 
“solidarity” with the United States and given assurances that it would be an active nd 
reliable partner in fighting terrorism. Finally, the German government wanted to 
convey the broader message that it was a reliable partner willing to play a greater 
international role and capable of shouldering its share of the responsibility. 
Domestic political dynamics strained against these factors. Both Schröder and 
Fischer faced challenges to their leadership from inside their parties. Unlike Helmut 
Kohl, Schröder’s power base was not centered within the party. Kohl’s strength—and 
authority over the CDU—lay in his ability to manage party tensions through a 
patronage system that reached deep into the party base.263 Schröder, on the other 
hand, was not reliant on the party for his political power and often circumvented 
rather than controlled the opinion-making and decision-making dynamics within the 
SPD, relying instead on outside experts and advisers.264 This style of leadership made 
Schröder more politically vulnerable to widespread internal dissent at a time when he 
still had to contend with strong opposition from the left wing of the SPD—enough, as 
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it turned out, to pose a serious problem for him. When Schröder needed 
unquestioning support, it was not forthcoming.  
As a consequence, Schröder’s ability to manage the coalition was endangered 
as well. Relations within the Red-Green coalition had been marked by growing 
tensions on several policy fronts, such as immigration, internal security measures, and 
the question of civil liberties (in the wake of September 11). The disagreements 
placed more pressure on the Greens as the coalition partner because Schröder was 
willing to cross the aisle to negotiate with the opposition parties to push through his 
agenda. More to the point, Schröder made it clear that the SPD had the option of 
choosing the FDP as a coalition partner if the Greens were unwilling to give ground 
on this issue. The Green Party’s relative weight in the coalition had been weakened 
by a string of electoral losses on the state level that threatened their survival as a 
parliamentary party. Upcoming local state elections in Berlin showed a ral danger of 
disaffected and more left-leaning Green Party members defecting to the PDS, which 
would further weaken the Green Party’s political standing.265 These problems reduced 
the Green party leadership’s ability to counter the SPD’s pressure on them and to 
direct the policy debate toward their preferred outcome.  
One question worth exploring is why the Afghanistan deployment became 
such a contentious issue for the Green Party. One could reason that the question of 
supporting peacekeeping missions had been laid to rest after a majority of Green 
Party members backed Foreign Minister Fischer’s call to support the Kosovo missi n 
in 1999, and yet the Greens appeared more divided than ever. Part of the answer is 
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that the support the rank and file gave to their political leadership to assist in 
preventing human rights violations and reducing the conflict did not necessarily alter 
or diminish the ingrained skepticism and outright opposition to the use of military 
force to solve political conflicts. Furthermore, many Greens were concerned that the 
party’s support for the United States following the September 11 attacks and the 
lengthy air campaign and rising number of civilian casualties had damaged the party’s 
identification as a Friedenspartei, or “peace party.” More importantly, the Greens 
were now a governing party, and there remained a division between those members 
who emphasized taking a principled position and those pragmatists who were 
unwilling to bring the government down on this issue. 
Macedonia Mission  
Another important factor that played into the argument over Afghanistan was 
the tense debate two months earlier, in August 2001, over the vote to contribute 
German troops to the mission in Macedonia. This was an important backdrop because 
the signs of discontent and mutiny within the party ranks were already visible. 
Tensions with the Albanian population in Kosovo had spilled over into Macedonia in 
the spring of 2001, resulting in a growing separatist revolt by Macedonia’s ethnic
Albanian minority. The EU sought unsuccessfully to broker a peace, and on June 29, 
2001, NATO resolved to send a force to Macedonia to monitor the disarmament of 
the Albanian separatists as part of the negotiations for a compromise settlement.  
By August 2001, the two sides in the conflict had finally reached agreement, 
and NATO prepared to send troops as part of its operation “Essential Harvest,” which 




fighters. Operation Essential Harvest was later replaced by “Amber Fox” on 
September 27, 2001. The new mandate was intended to protect EU and OSCE 
monitors who had been sent to Macedonia to assist in implementing the peace plan.266 
In terms of out-of-area operations, the Macedonian mission was a milestone that 
marked the beginning of closer cooperation between NATO and the EU. It was also 
the first time that the EU assumed sole command of such a mission.  
The Bundestag debate on the mission reflected the skepticism felt across the 
political spectrum.267 The conservatives opposed the Macedonian mission because 
they felt the Bundeswehr lacked the necessary resources to do the job. Members of 
Schröder’s own coalition argued against the mission for other reasons: there was no 
UN mandate; the mission itself was not adequately defined; and in their view the 
resolution of the conflict did not warrant the use of military forces. Some 
conservative members along with thirty-five members from the governing coalition 
parties announced they would vote against the NATO mission to disarm the Albanian 
separatists.268 
German government officials were committed to sending troops, though there 
were differences between the political leadership and other bureaucratic actors (e.g., 
Foreign Office, Defense Ministry) with regard to the timing of the operation and the 
balance of responsibilities between the EU and NATO. The need to support the 
fledging European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and ensure a strong Geman 
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role in it was an important though secondary concern to German policymakers. 
NATO alliance considerations remained paramount.269 
Assured by the government that the Bundeswehr’s budget would be increased, 
the CDU/CSU ultimately announced they would support the mandate. However, 
Schröder failed to secure a majority of members from within the SPD and Green
coalition, and so the motion passed only with the support of the parliamentary 
opposition parties (497–130–8).270 The mission in Macedonia was the first time that a 
German government was unable to garner a parliamentary majority from within the 
governing coalition to carry a motion on an out-of-area operation. Arguably, the 
reality of facing another parliamentary revolt two months later over an ve more 
controversial military deployment must have shaped the context in which the decision 
on the Afghanistan mission took place.  
Afghanistan Vote 
The announcement that an unexpectedly large number of Green as well as 
SPD Bundestag members would vote against the Afghanistan deployment threatened 
a repeat of the Macedonian vote; internal dissent endangered the parliamentary 
majority that Schröder needed to prevail in the Afghanistan case. If the chancellor 
could not get the rank and file under control, his position as party leader would be 
severely compromised.  
Schröder chose to resolve his dilemma by applying a tool that had been used 
only three times before in the history of the Federal Republic—that of the so-called 
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Vertrauensfrage, or motion of confidence. The motion of confidence, based on 
Article 68 of the Basic Law, is a parliamentary maneuver the chancellor can apply to 
determine whether or not he or she retains the support of a majority in parliament. 
The instrument is used when a political crisis threatens the viability and continuity of 
a sitting government to bind or obligate members in the governing parties to support 
the chancellor’s course of action on a policy issue. If the motion carries, support for 
the chancellor’s political agenda is confirmed; if the motion fails, the chancellor has 
lost the backing of parliament, and the government falls. The chancellor can then 
request that the federal president dissolve parliament and call for a new election.271 
The rarity of this instrument’s use shows that this constitutional right is used in 
extremis, as an instrument of last resort to safeguard the position of the chancellor.  
It was a big risk, but Schröder was known as a risk taker. Arguably, the 
outcome of a parliamentary vote on the Afghanistan mission was not one that 
Schröder would have lost, since the chancellor could have passed the motion by 
relying on the support of the CDU/CSU and the FDP, as had occurred with the 
Macedonia deployment. However, taking this route to securing the German mission 
to Afghanistan would have signaled that Schröder was no longer in control of his 
governing coalition, and it would have raised questions among Germany’s allies 
about its reliability as a security partner. Thus, allowing the opposition parties to cast 
the determining votes would weaken the coalition and endanger Schröder’s own 
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political future.272 The choice was getting the mission or getting control of his party 
and, by extension, the coalition. The gamble was that he could get both. On 
November 13, 2001, Schröder announced he would call for a vote of confidence in 
his government and then intensified the political pressure on the dissenters by linking 
the Vertrauensfrage to the vote on the Afghanistan mission.273 This tactical move was 
constitutionally permissible but had never been utilized before.274 
Schröder’s tactic meant that for reasons of political survival, the rebellious 
SPD and Green party members would be compelled to vote in favor of the motion.275 
Needless to say, the SPD and Green members of parliament were furious and accuse
the chancellor of political blackmail. However, the relatively weaker position of the 
Greens within the coalition mattered; their poor electoral prospects and reltive 
inexperience in governance had made them more vulnerable to SPD pressure.276 As 
the time frame narrowed down to the inevitable vote in the Bundestag, twelve 
parliamentarians—eight Green members and four Social Democrats—repeated their 
intent to vote against a German deployment. But in behind closed door sessions, 
pressure was applied and the calculations made: some of the recalcitrant members 
were permitted to vote no, while the rest were expected to vote in favor of the 
motion—thereby ensuring the necessary parliamentary majority.  
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The defiant Green party members, however, were not without some leverage. 
A compromise that was intended to address the concerns of the members still 
undecided or opposed was eventually worked out. The compromise involved the SPD 
and Green party fraction leaders supporting a Protokollnotiz, or supplemental clause 
to the proposed motion. In the declaration, the federal government assures the 
Bundestag and its parliamentary committees that it will provide regular briefings and 
written reports on all of the German forces covered under the mandate. Furthermore, 
the Bundestag will be informed beforehand regarding any changes to the mandate, 
and the mandate will not be extended beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Finally, the 
government assures the Bundestag that the deployment of armed German soldiers 
will be carried out under German command and that “the ultimate decision regarding 
the concrete deployment of armed German forces lies solely with the federal 
government.”277 The restrictions outlined in the Protokollnotiz regarding scope and 
locus of authority for deploying German armed forces were enough for many of the 
undecided SPD and Green Party members to declare their intent to vote in favor of 
the Afghanistan mission. In the end, the eight remaining Green Party objectors 
elected to split their votes so that four members could vote no—to signal that 
opposition to the motion remained—while the other four abstained.278 
Nevertheless, if the motion of confidence had failed, Schröder still retained 
some options. The government would fall, but the SPD could salvage the situation by 
allowing the Red-Green coalition to collapse and then building a coalition with the 
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FDP, or it could govern as a minority government. The third option would be to call 
for early elections, but even then political observers believed the SPD would retain 
the advantage because the CDU/CSU—caught in the throes of a leadership crisis—
would not have been a significant electoral threat. Regardless of which scenario one 
looked at, the consequences of a failed motion would leave the Greens in an even 
more vulnerable position. 
Thus on November 16, 2001, a narrow majority of the German Bundestag 
voted to send German armed forces to participate in OEF in Afghanistan for an initial 
twelve-month period. The German contribution of up to 3,900 soldiers was 
composed, as initially proposed, primarily of anti-biological warfare units, support 
personnel (medical, air, and sea transport), and, importantly, 100 Special Forces 
personnel (Kommando Spezialkräfte, or KSK).279 These Special Forces were to 
become the most controversial aspect of Germany’s contribution to the Afghanistan 
mission. 
The whole vote was, to many observers, a rank display of political cynicism 
and opportunism, particularly by the Greens.280 As one journalist described it, 
Schröder had won, but he did so by “forcing the Greens to sacrifice principle for 
power.”281 The government needed an absolute majority (Kanzlermehrheit) of 334 
votes; it received 336, only two more than was required. The opposition CDU/CSU 
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voted as a bloc against the motion because it opposed Schröder’s linkage of the two 
questions, even though the conservatives supported the Afghanistan mission.282    
The coalition had been shaken by Schröder’s strong-arm tactic and the sense 
among the rank and file Green members that the compromises they were forcd to 
make to stay in power had been too costly, but Chancellor Schröder and Foreign 
Minister Fischer both viewed the vote as a test for Germany to show that it would live 
up to its international responsibilities and alliance obligations. Because the ongoing 
air strikes in Afghanistan were placing enormous pressure on the government ad the 
coalition, and because there was discussion of opening up a ground assault should the 
air strikes prove insufficient, Fischer again turned to the task of finding a diplomatic 
solution before the government was compelled to send combat troops.283 Germany 
lobbied hard to be given the chance to host the conference that would follow the 
cessation of conflict.284 The German government placed a great deal of emphasis on 
Germany’s role as a major contributor to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. When
hostilities ceased, the donor conference intended to organize the reconstruction plan 
for post-conflict Afghanistan was set to begin in early December 2001 in Bonn.  
 
ISAF Vote December 2001: Civil Reconstruction 
 
 The international community’s efforts now turned toward stabilizing 
Afghanistan and building the necessary economic and political structures to secure a 
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lasting peace. The interim leadership of Afghanistan, led by Hamid Karzai, requested 
that the UN authorize a peacekeeping force to maintain a secure zone in and around 
Kabul as it began its task of constructing a functioning system of governance. As a 
consequence, on December 20, 2001, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
1386 establishing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan 
to assist the Afghan authorities in maintaining security and a safe environment 
conducive for the reconstruction of the country. Thus the emphasis of the mission was 
not on peacekeeping but on “security assistance.” 
In Germany, Chancellor Schröder agreed that if German assistance was 
requested, it must accept the responsibility. On December 21, the German federal 
cabinet passed the government’s motion to support the newly formed UN mission 
with a deployment of 1200 soldiers, and the motion was voted on and passed the 
following day in the Bundestag by a vote of 538–35–8.285  All political parties save 
the PDS voted in favor of the motion, which set a six-month deadline for the mission. 
The German government went to great lengths to distinguish between the earlier OEF 
mission and the ISAF mission which, with its emphasis on civilian reconstruction and 
development assistance, they considered to be the major contribution of Germany to 
the Afghanistan mission. This insistence on a firm division between the OEF mission 
to fight terrorism and the ISAF mission to build civilian infrastructure became the 
defining characteristic of Germany’s public face in Afghanistan.  
 
                                                




2002: Pressures to Expand Mission 
 By January 2002 the first German soldiers had arrived in Afghanistan. The 
German ISAF troops, together with the Dutch, were to be present in northern 
Afghanistan and central Kabul. However, apart from the initial deployment activities, 
it was not clear what to do with the ISAF mandate beyond the initial six-month 
period. The British government agreed to serve as the lead nation for this initial 
period, but it was unclear who would take over after the British troops left. The 
Afghan interim government requested Germany take over the role of lead nation, but 
the German government was reluctant to do so. It would take the greater part of the 
year before the Red-Green coalition acquiesced to this request, with the term st to 
begin in February 2003. The Germans also agreed to assume responsibility for police 
training—again at the Karzai government’s request.286  German ISAF assistance 
would thus focus on building non-military infrastructures: police training, education 
development, and organizing administrative structures. In the meantime, the six-
month mandate was nearing its end, and in mid-June 2002 the Bundestag passed 
another six-month extension for the ISAF contingent.287 By this time, Germany had 
2,000 troops in Kabul. Interestingly, it was reported that the German government had 
been willing to accept the role of lead nation as recompense for refusing to participate 
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in the war in Iraq (and, presumably, for the reluctance to send troops to assist in post-
conflict reconstruction efforts).288 
 The 2002 Federal Election. The 2002 federal election revealed the degree of 
public sensitivity to questions of military power and the ongoing discomfort with 
Germany assuming a greater role in out-of-area operations. By the summer of 2002, 
the German political establishment had turned their attention to the upcoming 
national elections scheduled for September 22. Earlier in the year, opinion polls had 
predicted heavy losses for the SPD. This apprehension dominated the discussions 
within the SPD leadership in the waning days of July as it sought to construct a 
winnable campaign strategy. One of the issues debated was whether the Red-Green 
coalition needed to take a position on Iraq.289 A series of U.S. declarations on the 
question of a possible military intervention in Iraq had been closely monitored by the 
German government and the public: President George W. Bush’s West Point speech 
on June 1, 2002 (Americans should be prepared for a preemptive action), and Vice 
President Richard Cheney’s August 26 speech in Nashville (perceived by Germans to 
be a declaration of war against Iraq). The third statement that had wide-ranging 
repercussions on German attitudes was the announcement on September 20 of the 
Bush administration’s National Security Strategy (with new emphasis on 
preemption)—only two days before the Germans went to the polls. All of these 
statements and documents had increased the salience of the topic as well as the 
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apprehensions of German officials and the public alike.290 In late July-early August, 
the decision was made to take a public position on Iraq and utilize the question of an 
Iraq invasion in the campaign.291  
By the end of the first week of August, Chancellor Schröder announced his 
position on Iraq: Germany would not participate in any military intervention agai st 
Iraq, not even if there were a UN Security Council mandate for such an action. The 
public responded strongly to the chancellor’s determined “no” to taking part in a war 
in Iraq. On the eve of the election, the polls showed the SPD trailing by only two 
percentage points.292 On September 22, election results showed that against all 
predictions, the SPD/Green coalition had won by the narrowest of margins in the 
closest election since unification.  
Many observers concluded that Schröder’s instrumentalization of the Iraq 
issue had won the election, but survey data reveal that the question of military force 
in Iraq played only a contributing role. Even large sections of the CDU/CSU opposed 
any possible German involvement in Iraq, forcing party leaders to take a position no  
much different than that of the SPD and Greens. Other dynamics were in play aswell, 
and a perceptible though gradual decline in poll numbers over time for the CDU/CSU 
showed the conservatives had not been successful in convincing the German 
electorate that they had a more compelling political and economic alternative to he 
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Red-Green coalition.293 The Iraq war was an intensely emotional issue, and public 
and elite opposition was overwhelming, but the Iraq issue was only one of several 
factors that taken together created a political dynamic that allowed the SPD to 
squeeze through at the polls. In the end, the CDU/CSU could not translate their 
(relatively modest) electoral advantage into votes, and the SPD and Greens wer  able 
to profit from short-term events and themes that surfaced in the final weeks of the 
campaign.294 
The Red-Green coalition settled into a new term and in December 2002 once 
again took up the question of extending the OEF and ISAF mandates for another 
twelve months. Public opinion at the time continued to show support for the 
Afghanistan mission. The Bundestag approved the extensions and Germany’s new 
role as lead nation—agreeing, as the government had wanted, to increase ISAF troop 
levels from 1,200 to 2,500 because of the additional responsibilities Germany would 
carry when it assumed the role of lead nation in February 2003.295   
2003: Further Constraints 
The year 2003 witnessed a growing debate on extending ISAF’s geographical 
reach that touched on a number of sensitive issues, such as the division between OEF 
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and ISAF and the development of NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). 
The Karzai government had begun to pressure the NATO allies to expand the 
geographical scope of the mandate to the rural areas beyond Kabul. The German 
government was not inclined to support this request, but growing unrest and violence 
in the countryside where the Karzai government exercised minimal authority and 
control forced this question onto the international security agenda.  
Tension mounted in February 2003 when the news media reported on the 
participation of German Special Forces in a large military action within the scope of 
the OEF mandate. The government reiterated its support for OEF, but it was clear that 
the debate was crystallizing around the “bad” OEF mandate, with its task of 
eliminating Taliban threats, and the “good” ISAF mandate that focused on building 
the structures of a democratic civil society. By mid-2003 it was clear that the 
international community had recognized the need to expand the mandate beyond 
Kabul since it was clear that the conflict was escalating in the rural are s round the 
country and that the civilian reconstruction teams that were being organized for 
deployment in the provinces needed better protection. NATO had been providing 
logistical support for ISAF troops in Kabul; eventually, in August 2003, NATO 
assumed command for all ISAF operations. 
The Schröder government had reached the conclusion that expansion was 
necessary in order to support the development of democratic structures throughout 
Afghanistan, but whether the existing mandate allowed for the geographical 




produced a great deal of disagreement among German officials and tension between 
the Germans and its NATO allies.296  
Under the signature of four ministries—Defense, Foreign Office, Economic 
Cooperation and Development, and Interior—the federal government published its 
first “Afghanistan Concept” on September 1, 2003. The document declared the 
government’s support of the PRT concept and its willingness to establish a PRT in 
Kunduz. The rationale for insisting on placing German PRTs under ISAF command 
was based on the argument that the focus on Germany’s engagement was political, 
social, and economic reconstruction and development rather than antiterrorism 
efforts.297 The document argues that the original UN ISAF mandate covering Kabul 
and its environs cannot serve as the legal foundation for extending the international 
community’s activities beyond Kabul, leading the German government to support 
supplementing the mandate to make possible the expansion of ISAF’s presence to the 
rest of Afghanistan. The major responsibility for ISAF in these provinces would be 
protecting civilians working in the PRTs and promoting stability as a key conditi  in 
preparation for the upcoming elections. The document stressed that this process must 
be preceded by a supplemental resolution from the UN Security Council followed by 
a change to the NATO operational plan subject to approval by the North Atlantic 
Council. Only then would the federal government take up the motion and the German 
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Bundestag vote on it.298 Thus for domestic political reasons the government was 
intent on signaling that Germany was focused on reconstruction and development 
efforts in Afghanistan and not on the domestically precarious subject of fighting 
terrorists and that the German government had the weight of international approval 
and international law behind it.299 
Though military considerations were a large part of the internal bureaucratic 
debate, political factors were no less important—and no less difficult—to balance. 
German Bundeswehr officials were concerned about overstretch and whether they 
would have the resources to fulfill their tasks. The Defense Ministry was focused on 
its discussions in NATO and how such decisions would affect its presence and 
capabilities in the country and its role in NATO. The Foreign Office was sensitive to 
the EU dimension and felt more European cooperation was needed. The Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, which controlled much of the 
reconstruction funding, refused to work directly with the Bundeswehr because of its 
concern that its work with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan 
would be compromised, and it feared losing its independence and control over 
resources.300  
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Parliamentary debates showed how divisive the issue continued to be. 
Criticism of the government came from the conservative right as well as the left. For 
many parliamentarians, the decision to expand ISAF’s reach beyond Kabul had not 
been adequately thought through in terms of strategic implications, funding, and 
purpose. Such a shift in the German military’s competences required a new political 
concept, something they charged that the government did not have. SPD members 
generally supported the establishment of the Kunduz PRT, though again there was 
hefty opposition from the left wing. The Greens as well as the FDP opposed the 
expansion to Kunduz. The FDP opposed the recommendation on the grounds that the 
expansion was legally questionable under the standing mandate, and it took the step 
of filing suit against the government.301 Representatives of the CDU and CSU 
criticized the government for its lack of strategic clarity with regard to the purpose of 
the PRTs. Both parties were not convinced that the expansion would stop at Kunduz 
and were fearful that German troops would get pulled into other, more intractable 
problems, such as drug interdiction efforts.  
This was the other major concern of parliamentarians—that the Bundeswehr 
forces would somehow be pulled into efforts to destroy the growing drug trade.302 
Much of the parliamentary debate in the latter half of 2003 and into early 2004 
focused on this concern. The German federal government prepared the motion for 
extending German military operations in Afghanistan, but the motion would not be 
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forwarded to the Bundestag until the UN Security Council passed a supporting 
resolution—hopefully one that would permit the expansion to be undertaken under 
the ISAF mandate rather than the OEF mandate.303 The Germans had also pushed for 
NATO to endorse placing the PRTs under ISAF command, but the Americans and 
British wished to maintain the operational flexibility that OEF gave them. Instead, the 
decision reached at the NATO summit in October 2003 was that operating PRTs 
under ISAF command would be an option.304   
Finally, on October 13, 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
1510, which extended ISAF’s reach throughout the whole country. The expansion of 
ISAF was accompanied by the gradual shift in command of PRTs from under U.S.-
led military command to the NATO ISAF command.305 Closely following that vote, 
on October 15, the Schröder government submitted the motion to the Bundestag to 
extend the ISAF mandate for twelve months and the northern perimeter of the 
German contingent. 
The government’s efforts to pass the extension hit a snag when its motion was 
forwarded to the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee. The document contained a 
sentence apparently taken verbatim from correspondence between NATO General 
Secretary Lord Robertson and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which spoke of the 
ISAF mandate being broadened to cover all of Afghanistan, although the referenc 
was to assisting with the upcoming elections. Nevertheless, the wording was unclear 
enough that it prompted accusations that the motion was in fact a veiled “Kunduz 
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plus” request that would permit the deployment of German troops beyond the 
northern boundaries. The CDU fraction leaders and committee members called a 
meeting with the Chancellery’s state secretary and a representative from the Ministry 
of Economic Cooperation and Development to discuss the motion. The message: they 
were prepared to accept the government’s motion under the condition that the 
government accept two changes: first, that it must keep the Defense and Foreign 
Affairs committees regularly informed of any deployment taken beyond its current 
geographical mandate for the purpose of assisting with the election, and that the 
government put in writing that the Bundeswehr would not be involved in any anti-
drug activities, military or otherwise.  
The government agreed to provide this written clarification, which would be 
attached to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report in the form of a Protokollnotiz. 
Once the SPD Defense Minister Peter Struck agreed to the supplemental clause, the 
CDU/CSU signaled its willingness to support the Red-Green government’s motion 
for extension. The FDP, PDS, and several Green members remained opposed to it.306 
Thus the Protokollnotiz clarified that any possible military actions outside of 
Kunduz and Kabul would remain the exception and then only for the purpose of 
supporting the upcoming national election, and that “the federal government assures 
that drug interdiction efforts are not included in the mandate of the mission.”307 The 
final paragraph concluded by affirming that should the question of deploying German 
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soldiers outside of Kabul or Kunduz for the specific purposes spelled out in the 
protocol to the resolution be raised, that the defense minister will first seek the 
approval of the appointed party representatives (Obleute) from the relevant 
committees, and that he would not approve the deployment were there to be 
considerable misgivings raised by the appointed representatives and chairs of the 
committees.308 Despite the opposition and the harsh tones of the final plenary debate, 
a majority of Bundestag members voted to extend the ISAF mission (531–57 –5), 
with most of the “no votes” coming from the FDP because of its concerns regarding 
the constitutionality of expanding the mandate. Less than a month later, the extension 
for the OEF mission came up for vote and was passed by a comfortable majority, 
although the FDP again voted against the mandate because of the party’s objection to 
the extension of its mandate.309  
 
2004: Growing Skepticism  
 The growing dissatisfaction with the outlines of the OEF and ISAF mandates 
continued into 2004, as reflected in the parliamentary votes on the extension in 
September and November. The political wrangling in the coalition government and 
the Bundestag parliamentary fraction parties remained focused on concerns related to 
anti-drug efforts and the disintegration of the strategic situation on the ground and 
NATO pressure to commit more resources to establish additional PRTs in 
Afghanistan. The consequence was that the allied presence and engagement—and 
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conceivably Germany’s contribution—would expand, much to the consternation of 
German officials. Growing instability meant less emphasis on reconstruction and 
more prominence given to security stabilization efforts. 
By April 2004 there was talk in the German Defense Ministry of assuming 
responsibility for a second PRT, this time in Feyzabad. This generated a great deal of 
opposition again from the FDP and the CDU/CSU, which announced that it would 
demand the government submit a new mandate if Germany were to take on another 
PRT. But the Schröder government declared this was unnecessary since there would 
be no change in the structure of the mandate, in terms of personnel and materiel, as 
set by the Bundestag in 2003. Thus the decision was made for German and Dutch 
soldiers to assume command of a new PRT in Feyzabad, and by July 2004 German 
soldiers had begun to arrive there.310   
 On September 17, the UN Security Council passed its resolution supporting 
ongoing operations in Afghanistan, and by September 22, the coalition government 
had submitted its motion for extending the German mission for an additional year and 
expanding the Bundeswehr’s military presence to Kunduz and Feyzabad. The FDP 
responded by submitting a minor interpellation (Kleine Anfrage)311 based on the two 
PRTs, arguing that the government did not have the authority to expand the 
geographical reach of the Bundeswehr. The FDP then submitted its own motion 
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requiring separate mandates for Kunduz and Feyzabad, though the motion was 
defeated.312 The government’s request for extension was passed by the Bundestag on 
September 30 on a vote of 509–48–3. Regarding the OEF vote, the Red-Green 
coalition leaders maintained enough discipline in their parliamentary fractions to 
deflect the growing criticism within party ranks, and the Bundestag approved the 
motion by a vote of 550–10–0.313   
 
 2005: A New Coalition Government 
By 2005 the United States was mired deeply in Iraq. Because of the need to 
shift more resources to stabilize the security environment in Iraq, the United States 
was keen to hand over more of its responsibilities in Afghanistan to its European 
allies. Thus the Bush administration pushed the question of merging the OEF and 
ISAF missions, which had been placed on the agenda for the NATO summit in 
February 2005. NATO’s own difficulties in Afghanistan were placing a great d l of 
pressure on the German government, which again sought to deflect the topic. The 
government had built a fragile balancing act by insisting on keeping the U.S.-led 
counterterrorism OEF mission separate from the more palatable ISAF mission of 
civilian reconstruction. To merge the two missions would, it was feared, throw the 
coalition into another existential crisis. In the end, German officials managed to keep 
the OEF and ISAF mandates separate. However, along with other NATO allies, they 
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were driven by circumstances to agree to take on a greater commitment on the 
ground. For the German troops, this meant taking responsibility for the whole of 
northern Afghanistan as well as the base in Mazar-i-Sharif—albeit without an 
increase in troop levels. That would have required submitting a new mandate to the 
Bundestag, which the Schröder government was reluctant to take on. 
But the question of an increase in German troops would not go away so easily, 
and it was a top concern in the Bundeswehr’s own evaluation of what would be 
needed to fulfill Germany’s obligations in Afghanistan. A confidential Defense 
Ministry report sent to the parliamentary fractions in July 2005 stated plainly that the 
expanded ISAF mandate would require more troops.314 Since the vote on the ISAF 
mission’s extension would have to take place by October 2005, the coalition 
government set out to make the case for submitting a motion to extend German 
participation in ISAF another year and to increase German troop levels to 3000. 
But domestic politics intervened via a dramatic turn of events in the spring 
that led to the federal president dissolving parliament and opening the way for early 
elections in September 2005, which resulted in the formation of a SPD/CDU grand 
coalition for only the second time in the history of the Federal Republic. The 2005 
national election was notable for other reasons as well.  First, Chancellor Schröder 
utilized another vote of confidence, this time not to enforce parliamentary discipline 
as he had in 2001, but to force an early election. Second, the election outcome 
produced a situation where the traditional pattern of government formation, with one 
of the two major parties forming a coalition with one of the smaller parties (FDP or 
Greens), was numerically unworkable because of the poor electoral showing of the 
                                                




large parties and the realities of a parliamentary system that now included five 
political parties. Changes in the party landscape that had to do with continued voter 
volatility, prolonged decline of party identification, and the rising numbers of 
independent voters all contributed to the development of a party system characterized 
by more uncertainty in its electoral outcomes than ever before.315  
The impetus that led Schröder to engineer the fall of his government in order 
to call early elections was the SPD’s electoral losses in eleven state elections and the 
defection of a group of left-wing members and trade unionists—first by establishing 
their own party and then merging with the PDS to form the Left Party (die Linke)—
that had taken a serious toll inside and outside the party.316 Schröder and the SPD 
leader Franz Münterfering announced the Chancellor would utilize the vote of 
confidence to call for an early election on the grounds that he no longer retained the 
support of a majority within parliament to continue governing.317 On July 1, 2005, 
Schröder introduced the vote of confidence and, having urged SPD members to 
abstain, lost the vote by 296 to 151. Schröder’s political maneuver survived a court 
challenge, and the election was set for September 15, 2005.318  
Shockingly the initial twenty-point lead held by Angela Merkel, the CDU’s 
chancellor candidate, had almost dissipated by election night, in part because 
Schröder was able to deflect attention from the government’s highly unpopular 
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economic reforms by focusing on social issues and the SPD’s role as defender of 
Germany’s social welfare system.319 It was another closely contested race; the 
CDU/CSU received 35.2 percent of the vote and the SPD 34.2 percent, which meant 
that German voters had rejected the Red-Green coalition but had not given the 
CDU/CSU a clear mandate and enough votes to form a new government with their 
desired partner, the FDP. The performance of the smaller parties—the Greens stayed 
relatively stable, the FDP and PDS registering gains—meant that numerically, neither 
of the two large parties were capable of forming a traditional coalition consisting of 
one major party (CDU/CSU, SPD) and one smaller party (FDP or Greens).320 The 
eventual outcome was a reluctant agreement between the CDU/CSU and SPD to form 
a grand coalition. Negotiations began in October and by November there was a sitting 
government led by the CDU’s Angela Merkel, with Frank-Walter Steinmeier, th  
former director of the Chancellery, as the vice-chancellor and new foreign minister. 
 While the reality of a new grand coalition government had a decided impact 
on party political dynamics, it did not greatly affect the outcome of the votesf r 
extending the ISAF and OEF missions. At this point the elite consensus on 
Afghanistan still held, and the grand coalition’s comfortable majority in parliament 
meant the vote in favor of extending the ISAF mission and expanding the troop levels 
easily passed on September 28, 2005, on a vote of 535–14 –4. However, the vote to 
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extend the OEF mission (by a vote of 519–67–3) reflected the beginning of a decline 
in parliamentary support for OEF.321  
 One other event in 2005 was of particular note.  The 1994 German Federal 
Constitutional Court decision on out-of-area operations had ruled on the 
constitutionality of German participation but added that it was incumbent on the 
Bundestag to create a statute to codify the practice that was shaped by the Court 
decision on out-of-area missions.322 The process of constructing this set of guidelines 
had taken more than ten years, and there were still disagreements between the various 
parties with regard to its draft. However, by 2005 it was the view of most Bundestag 
members that the draft before them was one that most members could live with, and 
so on March 24, 2005, the Parliamentary Participation Act became law.323  
The Act reiterated the principle requirement that the federal government must 
obtain prior consent from parliament for “the deployment of armed forces abroad.” 
The Bundestag was particularly concerned with preserving its parliament ry 
prerogatives and with clarifying its right to recall troops.324 The Act thus regulates the 
form and extent of Germany’s participation in missions abroad. Extensions of 
mandates for missions like Afghanistan, when the use of armed force is anticipated, 
are usually limited to twelve months, although this rule evolved out of parliamentary 
practice and is not a legal requirement. The parliamentary procedure calls for the 
government to submit the motion to the Bundestag when, after the first reading, it is 
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sent to the appropriate committees for evaluation and then returned to the Plenary for 
the second reading and the final vote. The Act also provides a more simplified 
procedure if the essentials of the mandate have not changed. Approval is 
automatically extended for one year unless a parliamentary fraction or a minimum of 
5 percent of all members of the Bundestag request a formal adoption of the 
resolution. Since the Left Party has been in the Bundestag, it has demanded the more 
formal adoption procedure for every out-of-area mission and extension.  
Finally, the Act outlines the mission specifications that the government-
drafted motion must contain: the mission’s mandate and its legal foundation, its 
territorial boundaries, number of troops and their operational capabilities, the 
mission’s duration, and the expected cost and source of funding.325 The government is 
expected to submit a motion that is sufficiently detailed and precise in order for the
Bundestag to give its “informed consent.” The Bundestag’s power is restrained by the 
fact that it cannot initiate its own draft motions, nor can it alter the details laid out in 
the government’s motion. Thus it is incumbent on the government to draft the details 
and operational parameters of the mission and on parliament to approve or reject. 
 
2006: External Pressure Mounts 
Debates surrounding the extension of the ISAF mandate were accompanied by 
increasing apprehension about the deteriorating situation on the ground, concerns 
about “overstretch” in the Bundeswehr, and a leaked government report detailing the 
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increasingly precarious state of security in the country that only intensified the 
lawmakers’ scrutiny of the government’s actions.  
Again, external events were pressing down on the German government and 
endangering the fragile consensus on Germany’s out-of-area missions in Afghanistan. 
This time it was a discussion of whether Germans would send troops to assist the 
NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, by far the most unstable and dangerous part of 
Afghanistan. A defense report, leaked two days before the final vote on the ISAF 
mission in the Bundestag, held that the government was considering sending troops to 
the south, but Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung strongly denied this was the case.326 
Despite the fact that every political party (again, with the exception of the Left Party, 
which has opposed every Bundeswehr deployment) had expressed its doubts about 
the mission’s viability, and despite a growing feeling both in the public and the elite 
that Germany should reduce its out-of-area commitments, the ISAF extension was 
passed on September 28, 2006, with a vote of 492–71 –9.327 Support for the OEF, 
however, was more precarious. Already in October the opposition Green party had 
signaled its intent, for the first time, not to vote for the extension because it viewed 
American actions in Afghanistan endangering the success of the ISAF mission in 
northern Afghanistan.328 Again, the final vote in the Bundestag—436 in favor and 
101 against, with 26 abstentions—showed the accelerating decline in support of the 
OEF deployment.329 
                                                
326 “Germany Approves Afghanistan Mandate Despite Concer s,” Deutsche Welle, September 28, 
2006. 
327 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/54, September 28, 2006, 5226; “Germany Starts 
Rethinking its Foreign Deployments, Deutsche Welle, October 31, 2006. 
328 Eckart Lohse and Markus Wehner, “Auslandseinsätze; Risse in die Heimatfront,” FAZ-net, October 
29, 2006.  




By this time, German recalcitrance in terms of its contributions and 
willingness to move outside of its narrowly defined confines in northern Afghanistan 
were straining its relationship with its NATO allies. Reports surfaced that the German 
government had refused allied requests for military assistance on two occasions.  
Whether or not these reports were true, Germany was under pressure to resolve thi  
question. At the November 28–29, NATO summit in Riga, Canada, which had taken 
a far greater and disproportionate share of the risks and casualties than most NATO 
allies, was angered by the German reluctance to assist other allied forc s and 
threatened to pull out of Afghanistan if other members did not do their fair share.330 
In the end, the German government did agree to deploy forces outside of their 
northern zone to come to the aid of allied forces, but only in emergency situations. 
 
2007: Political Battles 
In early February 2007, arguably in response to the pressures in NATO to escalate 
their efforts in Afghanistan, the German government agreed to deploy for a six-month 
period an additional five hundred support personnel and six Tornado aircraft to 
conduct air reconnaissance and surveillance/monitoring for the ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan.331 The aircraft would be responsible for monitoring the entire country 
for ISAF, though not for OEF. The motion outlined several parameters: ISAF 
operational plans do not include an exchange of reconnaissance information to OEF; 
information would be exchanged only if the information is critical to an ISAF mission 
or to protect ISAF forces; and most importantly, the Tornado aircraft would not be 
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used for “close air support.”332 The aircraft were being tasked only to support ISAF 
operations and help prevent civilian casualties. 
Not surprisingly, the debate in the Bundestag on the Tornado deployment was 
heated. The SPD-CDU coalition’s motion received majority support and was 
approved on March 9, 2007 by a vote of 408:169:4. It was one of the most divided 
votes in the Bundestag on a German military mission abroad, with more than one-
third of the SPD parliamentary fraction members voting against the mandate.333  The 
Left Party promptly filed a legal complaint against the government. On July 3, 
however, the German Federal Constitutional Court rejected the Left Party’s l wsuit, 
ruling that the government’s decision to send Tornado aircraft did not in fact violate 
any constitutive rights held by the Bundestag.334 
The lawsuit was just one external manifestation of the opposition to the 
Afghanistan missions both among the political parties and the public at large. Public 
acceptance of Germany’s military engagement in Afghanistan continued to decline, 
with a poll in the spring of 2007 revealing that 57 percent of those surveyed wanted a 
complete withdrawal of all German armed forces in Afghanistan, while only 36 
percent favored some form of continued engagement.335 At this stage, elite opinion 
was catching up to public opinion. While no other party would support the Left 
Party’s call for an immediate withdrawal from all deployments, the consensus on 
Afghanistan had fractured. Though the CDU made clear that it wanted to stay the 
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course, opposition in the SPD to the OEF mission was rising. The continuing 
difficulties in Afghanistan were beginning to shift support among the SPD rank and 
file, and eventually, in the party leadership. Though the Afghanistan operations still 
found support among many members, close to one third of all SPD parliamentarians 
had voted against the Tornado motion. By mid-summer the leadership of the SPD 
parliamentary fraction announced its decision to begin drafting a motion to withdraw 
from the OEF mandate.336 
Discontent was fueled by several factors. In May, three German soldiers had 
been killed in Afghanistan in the first targeted suicide bombing against the German 
military forces. Germans everywhere were deeply shaken, and the incident moved the 
SPD to demand an end to Germany’s involvement in OEF. Germans had begun to see 
the growing number of attacks on German soldiers in Afghanistan as the consequence 
of being too closely associated with the overly aggressive counterterrorism operations 
of the United States.337 
Furthermore, intra-party dissent was driven by the feeling that the SPD had 
drifted too far from its self-identity as a party of peace and non-violence. The further 
partitioning of the left of the German political spectrum brought about by the 
establishment of the PDS, WASG, and their merger into the Left Party had made the 
SPD more vulnerable to defections from its left wing. Continued electoral losses had 
shown the party’s weakened ability to draw and retain voters.  
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Disagreements within the SPD also made coalition dynamics more 
complicated as well, and CDU leaders looked on uneasily, interpreting the Tornado 
debate as a sign of the SPD’s shift to the left which could have a very detrimental 
impact on the effectiveness and even longevity of the grand coalition.338 However, 
whatever the concerns of the party leadership, the primary source of opposition to 
OEF was the growing conviction that the American anti-terrorist strategy undermined 
ISAF and its attempts to gain the trust of the local population. The conclusion: 
Germany must end its participation in OEF.339 
As an opposition party, the Green party’s views on out-of-area operations had 
already shifted with the party’s decision to vote against the OEF mission in 2006. Not 
surprisingly, members of the party fraction opposed the Tornado decision and 
demanded a full review of the government’s recommendation. The Green party also 
continued to call for a withdrawal from the OEF mission, though it remained 
committed to the ISAF mission because of its reconstruction and development work. 
Thus, many Bundestag members had come to believe that Germany should get 
out of the business of prosecuting the Afghanistan part of the war on terrorism and 
stick to its reconstruction efforts, but they still faced the question of what to do with 
the extensions of all three Afghanistan mandates in the fall. The coalition government 
was committed to all three missions but the votes would be complicated, especially if 
the SPD leadership did not hold its parliamentary fraction together to get the support 
that the grand coalition government required.  
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The process of extending the mandates began, as usual, with the passing of a 
UN Security Council resolution on September 19, “on the situation in 
Afghanistan.”340 On the same day the German government took the next step by 
submitting a motion to renew ISAF, though Chancellor Merkel was clear that the 
German government rejected the NATO General Secretary’s request to send 
additional German troops to participate in operations in southern Afghanistan.341 
Importantly, the government had also decided to merge the Tornado 
deployment into the ISAF mandate, rather than keeping them separate. This had the 
effect of pulling in some SPD members who had voted against the Tornado mandate 
in the spring but who felt obligated to vote for the combined mandate because of the 
ISAF component, while at the same time leading a sizeable number of Greens to 
consider voting against the combined mandate because of the inclusion of the 
Tornado contingent.342 In fact, the Green Party rank and file had defied the party 
leadership by voting to either vote no or abstain, in large part because of the linkage 
in the mandate to the Tornado deployment. 
Despite the strong criticism in the debate leading up to the vote, the mandate 
was approved by a comfortable majority (454–79–48), with the CDU/CSU and SPD 
coalition parties and the FDP voting in favor of the mandate, with most of the Greens 
abstaining. As usual, the Left Party voted against the extension. The vote was 
important to the German government because it sent a message to its allies that the 
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grand coalition was still able to garner support for the Afghanistan mission despite 
opposition in parliament and in the public.343 There was enough momentum still to 
pass the motion on OEF in November, though the vote distribution (413–145–15) 
showed the effects of the intra-party debates over the past few months. 
2008: Abandoning OEF 
By 2008, it was clear from the political dynamics in the previous months that 
support for OEF had evaporated. Continued pressure by Germany’s NATO allies 
made the discussions on Germany’s contributions to the efforts in Afghanistan 
difficult and strained. Again, in February 2008, the government had rejected a formal 
U.S. request to send German troops to assist other forces in the turbulent south.344 
This was closely followed by an announcement that the government had agreed to a 
NATO request to send 200 soldiers to replace the Norwegian Quick Reaction Force 
that was scheduled to leave in the summer. On the surface, this appeared to be 
somewhat contradictory, but the German soldiers—the first combat unit sent to 
Afghanistan—were to be involved only in reconstruction projects around Kabul and 
would leave its northern perimeter only if it was requested that German troops come 
to the aid of other ISAF troops elsewhere. Defense Minister Jung was at pains to add 
that in the two years the Norwegians were stationed there, this had happened only 
once.345  
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As the top government and party fraction leaders in the coalition met to begin 
outlining the extension of the ISAF mandate that was scheduled for the fall, the key 
issues the coalition government faced revolved around raising the troop limit, how to 
handle potential fallout dealing with Germany’s refusal to bend to NATO pressur s to 
move German troops to the south, and the question of extending the OEF mission. 
For the Defense Ministry, the simple fact that Germany had agreed to deploy an 
additional Quick Reaction Force argued for increasing Germany’s troop presence in 
Afghanistan.346 With the government’s comfortable parliamentary majority, this issue 
could be managed, but sending troops to southern Afghanistan remained a “non-
starter” for the German leadership. Media reports that the Merkel government was 
discussing a plan to request an additional 1,000 troops prompted SPD party leader 
Kurt Beck to claim such stories were “premature.”347 Germany’s level of contribution 
to the Afghanistan forces was broached at the NATO summit in early April 2008. 
Again, the Canadian government threatened to withdraw its troops by 2009 if it did 
not see a renewed commitment by other NATO members in terms of troops and 
materiel. The United States, France, and Germany responded with pledges to increase 
their troop levels, with Germany pledging an additional 1,000 soldiers, which would 
require changes in the structure of the mandate and thus approval from the Bundestag 
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since the 2007 ISAF mandated an upper limit of 3,000 soldiers. This meant that the 
number of German armed forces in Afghanistan would be set at 3,500.348 
At this point, German officials had concluded that the government would no 
longer support the German contribution to the OEF in Afghanistan, though it had 
committed itself to contributing maritime forces to support ATALANTA, the OEF 
mission on the Horn of Africa. The Merkel government successfully steered the ISAF 
mission through its extension but finally withheld its support of the OEF mandate, 
ending the participation of German forces in NATO-led counterterrorism efforts in 
Afghanistan. After the UN Security Council passed its resolution renewing its support 
of ISAF on September 22, 2008, the German government submitted its motion to 
renew ISAF but with a request that the mandate be extended fourteen months in order 
to prevent the vote in 2009 from falling within the time frame of the 2009 federal 
election campaign. The Bundestag passed the extension on October 16, 2008, on a 
vote of 442–96–32.349  
The motion submitted to the Bundestag stated that in the future, the Federal 
Republic would no longer participate in the OEF mission on Afghan territory because 
of the shift in emphasis of the government’s efforts there to ISAF. This ended the 
activities of the German Special Forces in Afghanistan. Thus, on November 13, 2008, 
the Bundestag approved of the abbreviated OEF mission by a vote of 428–130–18.350  
The decision eliminated one of the major sources of contention within the governing 
and party elite and between the German government and its international allies. 
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Vote Distribution 2001–2008 
 
A summary of the vote distribution reveals the diverging support between the 
OEF and ISAF missions. Table 1 lays out the Bundestag’s vote distribution by party 




















Table 1: Vote Distribution in Bundestag for OEF Mission 2001-2008 
 
Source: Table based on German parliamentary records, which are listed in Appendix C. 
 
OEF was the more controversial of the two Afghanistan missions because of its 
mandate to aggressively pursue suspected terrorists and because the German 
contribution included a small contingent of Special Forces. The transition from a 
VOTE 
DATE 




FDP PDS LINKE NON-
AFFIL  
2001-11-16 336:326:0 Y: 293    
N: 0  
A: 0 
Y: 0      
N: 242 
A: 0 
Y: 43      
N: 4  
A: 0 
Y: 0      
N: 43  
A: 0 
Y: 0    
N: 36  
A: 0 
  
2002-11-15  573:11:5  Y: 249  
N: 0  
A: 0  
Y: 233  
N: 4  
A: 4  
Y: 52  
N: 2  
A: 1  
Y: 39  
N: 3  
A: 0  
  N: 2  
2003-11-14  540:41:5  Y: 246  
N: 0  
A: 0  
Y: 238  
N: 2  
A: 1  
Y: 52  
N: 2  
A: 1  
Y: 3  
N: 35  
A:3  
  Y: 1  
N: 2  
2004-11-12  550:10:0  Y: 235  
N: 0  
A: 0  
Y: 225  
N: 4  
A: 0  
Y: 51  
N: 2  
A: 0  
Y: 39  
N: 2  
A: 0  
  N: 2  
2005-11-08  519:67:3  Y: 209  
N: 1  
A: 1  
Y: 214  
N: 3  
A: 1  
Y: 41  
N: 6  
A: 1  
Y: 55  
N: 3  
A: 0  
 Y: 0  
N: 54  
A: 0  
 
2006-11-10  436:101:26  Y: 187  
N: 13  
A: 3  
Y: 203  
N: 8  
A: 2  
Y: 0  
N: 30  
A: 17  
Y: 46  
N: 4  
A: 4  
 Y: 0  
N: 45  
A: 0  
N: 1  
2007-11-15  413:145:15  Y: 160  
N: 42  
A: 5  
Y: 202  
N: 3  
A: 4  
Y: 0  
N: 47  
A: 0  
Y: 51  
N: 2  
A: 6  
 Y: 0  
N: 49  
A: 0  
N:2  
2008-11-13  428:130:8  Y: 173  
N: 25  
A: 4  
Y: 205  
N: 3  
A: 2  
Y: 0  
N: 51  
A: 0  
Y: 50  
N: 2  
A: 2  
 Y: 0  
N: 47  
A: 0  




commitment to assist in fighting insurgents in the emotional aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks to growing opposition as the mission and violence dragged on  
is seen in the vote distribution in the German Bundestag from 2001–2008. The table 
reflects shifting political assessments about the efficacy of the aggr ssive tactics of 
the U.S.-led OEF troops as the conflict lengthened and the violence and numbers of 
civilian casualties continued to climb. In October 2008, the German federal cabinet 
declined to extend the mandate for participation in OEF in Afghanistan, essentially 
ending Germany’s role in OEF in that country.351 
The most important vote was the initial vote on the SPD-Green government’s 
motion to participate in OEF in 2001. Although Table 1 shows the vote of SPD 
parliamentarians was unanimous, the vote conceals the party’s internal challenge to 
Schröder’s authority and his use of the vote of confidence as a plebiscite on the future 
of his government. Subsequent votes on the mandate’s extension show that the SPD 
leadership managed to retain a fairly high degree of support for the mission, but it is 
evident that by 2006, when the violence in Afghanistan intensified, the support of 
SPD parliamentary members began to decline. By 2007, nearly a quarter (23 percent) 
of members either voted against or abstained on the vote for a further extension of the 
mandate.352  
As the SPD’s coalition partner, the Greens maintained strong majority support 
for the OEF mission, with no more than 5 to 8 percent voting against or abstaining. 
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Once the Greens become an opposition party in 2005, however, the voting pattern 
begins to shift. The dramatic reversal of the vote distribution in 2006 and through 
2007–2008, when no Green parliamentarian voted in favor of the OEF mission 
(though there were abstentions), must be at least partly linked to the fact that Green 
party members no longer were under coalition pressure to continue to support the 
mission.  
 The 2001 vote also posed a dilemma for the conservative CDU/CSU party. 
Ultimately, even though it favored sending troops to Afghanistan, party members 
voted against the government’s motion because of the vote of confidence. From 2002 
on, support for the Afghanistan mission remained strong, averaging about 95 percent 
support of CDU/CSU members. The voting pattern of the FDP was more variable 
than other parliamentary fraction parties. It, too, opposed Schröder’s linking the vote 
of confidence to Afghanistan in November 2001 and voted against the motion. In 
2002, a majority of FDP Bundestag members voted in favor of extending the OEF 
mission extension yet reversed its vote in 2003 and then returned to a position of 
support in 2004. From 2005 onward, parliamentary fraction support remained 
constant. The variance appears to reflect FDP opposition to various attempts at 
expanding some aspect of the OEF mission, such as the pressure in 2003 to expand 
the German mandate beyond the initial geographical confines of the city of Kabul 
without first determining the constitutionality of such an action. From 2005–2008, 
however, the FDP showed more stable support for the OEF mission, albeit with a 




The parties of the far left—the PDS from 2001–2002 and the Left Party from 
2005–2008—consistently voted as a block against all out-of-area missions since both 
parties viewed growing German participation in such missions as a militarization of 
German foreign policy. The voting distribution in Table 2 shows different patterns of 








FDP PDS LINKE NON-
AFFIL 
2001-12-22  538:35:8  Y: 257     
N: 1  
A: 2  
Y:210   
N: 2  
A: 1  
Y: 39      
N: 0  
A: 4  
Y: 32  
N: 1  
A: 0  
Y: 0  
N: 30  
A: 1  
 N: 1  
2002-06-14  496:38:5  Y: 266  
N: 0  
A: 1  
Y:169  
N: 2  
A: 4  
Y:  34  
N: 3  
A: 0  
Y: 27  
N: 2  
A: 0  
Y: 0  
N: 30  
A: 0  
 N: 1  
2002-12-20  565:9:2  Y: 248  
N: 0  
A: 0  
Y: 223  
N: 6  
A: 2  
Y: 54  
N: 0  
A: 0  
Y: 40  
N: 1  
A: 0  
   
n/a  
 N: 2  
2003-10-24  531:57:5  Y: 248  
N: 0  
A: 0  
Y: 230  
N:10  
A: 3  
Y: 52  
N: 0  
A: 2  
Y: 1  
N: 45  
A: 0  
n/a   N: 2  
2004-09-30  509:48:3  Y: 240  
N: 0  
A: 0  
Y: 214  
N: 8  
A: 1  
Y: 52  
N: 0  
A: 2  
Y: 3  
N: 38  
A: 0  
n/a   N: 2  
2005-09-28  535:14:4  Y: 230  
N: 1  
A: 1  
Y: 219  
N: 3  
A: 0  
Y: 47  
N: 2  
A: 2  
Y: 39  
N: 5  
A: 1  
n/a   N: 3  
2006-09-28  492:71:9  Y: 199  
N: 7  
A: 4  
Y: 199  
N: 4  
A: 1  
Y: 42  
N: 7  
A: 1  
Y: 52  
N: 3  
A: 3  
 Y: 0  
N: 49  
A: 0  
N: 1  
2007-10-12  454:79:48  Y: 202  
N: 13  
A: 13  
Y: 187  
N: 4  
A: 3  
Y: 15  
N: 7  
A: 28  
Y: 50  
N: 3  
A: 4  
 Y: 0  
N: 51  
A: 0  
N: 1  
2008-10-16  442:96:32  Y: 180  
N: 20  
A: 5  
Y: 201  
N: 5  
A: 4  
Y: 15  
N: 11  
A: 23  
Y: 46  
N: 6  
A: 0  
 Y: 0  
N: 52  
A: 0  
N: 2  
 
Table 2: Vote Distribution in Bundestag for ISAF Mission 2001-2008 
 
Source: Table based on German parliamentary records, which are listed in Appendix C. 
 
 
The ISAF mission was designed to assist the nascent Afghan government in its efforts 
to build a stable and secure environment in the country and to provide reconstruction 




the decision to contribute troops to the international force politically more palatable to 
many German policymakers.  
Contrary to the OEF mission, SPD support for ISAF was quite strong.  During 
the time when the SPD was a coalition party, support was nearly unanimous. Support 
declined slightly in 2007, to about 88 percent of voting members, but it remained at 
very high levels. During the Green Party’s tenure as a coalition party from 2001–
2005, support for ISAF remained high, but in 2006 the voting pattern began to shift, 
with a slightly greater number voting no or abstaining. Again, the situation on the 
ground in Afghanistan—the growing violence and civilian casualties and the 
intensification of the military-combat dimensions of the conflict—led to decline in 
support for the mission. In 2007 and 2008, less than a third (30–31 percent) of all 
Green Bundestag members voted to extend the ISAF mission, with “no” votes 
increasing from 14 to 22 percent of members.353 
 As with the OEF mission, the CDU/CSU remained a strong and consistent 
supporter of the ISAF mission throughout the period in question.  With regard to the 
FDP, the voting pattern is again more variable because of the parliamentary fraction’s 
opposition to extending the geographical footprint of the German troops beyond the 
city of Kabul. Finally, members of the PDS and its successor, the Left Party, voted 
unanimously against the ISAF mission.  
In part the overall pattern of the vote distribution for the OEF and ISAF 
missions in Afghanistan reflects the foreign policy consensus that has existed w th 
regard to the acceptance of Germany’s expanded international security role. However, 
                                                
353 By 2009, only 8 of the 64 Green Bundestag members—12 percent—voted in favor of the extension. 




by 2008 there were signs that the consensus had begun to fray. The growing 
instability and violence on the ground as a consequence of a resurgent Taliban led the 
international troops to shift more weight to counterinsurgency tactics. This change to 
a more security-driven focus to the Afghanistan missions, and pressures for the 
German government to increase its military commitments, particularly in southern 
Afghanistan where the fighting was most intense, heightened the political opposition 
back home. The difficulty for the German political elite was not just a skeptical 
public. The emphasis on offensive operations ran up against some of the fundamental 
norms and principles that have shaped the foreign and security policy since the 
establishment of the Federal Republic. The German government thus attempted to 
downplay the OEF mission, with its emphasis on counterterrorism, while supporting 
the civilian reconstruction mandate of the ISAF mission. The vote distribution 
between OEF and ISAF reflects this difference in support among members of the 
Bundestag.    
 
Summary 
 The Afghanistan case reveals a number of broad patterns. Above all, the study 
highlights the interaction between international and domestic political varibles in 
shaping the dynamics of the decision-making process and the parameters of 
deployment policies. The German government never actively pursued a course of 
action unless it had been initiated at the international level first. This reflects the 
views at the elite level (and, indeed, the Constitutional Court’s judgment) that 




have the approval of the international community and be consistent with international 
legal norms. Nevertheless, the case study also shows the extent to which external
events and the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan placed incr asi g 
demands on NATO and, of course, on Germany’s operational commitments. The 
German government’s response throughout the period of study was designed to 
calibrate the balance between these alliance obligations and the growing domestic 
opposition to German involvement in Afghanistan.  
No German government is immune to public opinion on questions of military 
force, but the case study also illustrates that while the “culture of restraint” regarding 
the use of military forces remains firmly in place, the overriding concerns of the 
governing coalitions were focused on German interests at the international level and 
the potential impact out-of-area decisions might have on its role and status within 
NATO and the international community. In a larger sense, then, the Afghanistan cae 
study demonstrates that German government officials are less driven by public 
opinion as they are driven by their perception of where Germany’s interests lie. The 
growing rejection of the OEF mission and the emphasis placed on the ISAF mission 
of reconstruction and development—for example, the application of soft power rather 
than hard power—reflects the development of a set of principles of security and 
conflict resolution markedly different than the security doctrine introduced in 2002 by 
the Bush administration. The statements of government officials—going back to 
Chancellor Schröder’s statements after September 11—and the language of the 
various government motions and conceptual papers on the Afghanistan conflict 




More specifically, however, the Afghanistan case highlights the degree to 
which actors in the decision-making process utilize formal and informal instruments 
to shape policy preferences. It is this interaction between actors and institutional 
structures and practices that will be the focus of the next chapter, as the Afghanistan 
case is described and analyzed in reference to the stated hypotheses and the decision-










 The scholarly debate on the development of post-unification German foreign 
policy has emphasized its continuity rather than its change in the post–Cold War era. 
Nevertheless, one of the most significant changes in German foreign policy has been 
the participation of German armed forces in out-of-area operations across the globe, 
which prior to 1990 was considered unconstitutional. Within two decades, Germany 
has become a major troop contributor. A central goal of this study has been the 
examination of how decisions regarding out-of-area operations are made, what factors 
influence those decisions, and which factors are determinant in shaping policy 
preferences and outcomes. Such an examination is all the more relevant since a study 
of the theoretical literature reveals the absence of any sustained research on Germany 
foreign policy decision making since the unification of the country in 1990.  
 To address this theoretical and empirical gap, the study began its investigation 
by setting the research question within a foreign policy analysis framework, arguably 
the more relevant theoretical approach with which to address the study’s research 
objective, rooted as it is in determining dynamics of decision making at the state 
level. Two hypotheses were advanced, an agency-driven hypothesis designed to 
examine whether or not the power of the chancellor as chief executive is more 




hypothesis focused on determining the level of influence of coalition politics and, 
specifically, the role of the junior partner in affecting policy preferences.   
In terms of methodology, a case study analysis was applied to the Afghanistan 
out-of-area mission, which was chosen for several reasons. Since the initial decision 
in 2001 to deploy German armed forces in Afghanistan, the government continues to 
extend the mandate. For the purposes of analysis, then, there is not a single decision
but, rather, a series of decisions over a longer period of time in which patterns of 
influence would be more detectable. The period 2001–2008 was chosen because it 
incorporated important elements; it begins in 2001 with Germany accepting a role in 
both Afghanistan missions—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—and ends in 2008, when the German 
government withdrew its participation from OEF, thus affording an examination of 
acceptance and ultimately of withdrawal from part of the Afghanistan operation.  
Furthermore, the time period encapsulates two different types of governing 
coalitions: the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party coalition, and the 
grand coalition between the Social Democrats and the conservative Christian 
Democrats (CDU/CSU). This would permit observations about what kind of 
coalitional dynamics played a role in shifting policy preferences. Finally, the decision 
to participate in the Afghanistan mission was a later case in the (only twenty-year) 
period of German participation in out-of-area operations, which arguably would be 
more desirable in order to assess institutional changes as they developed over the




Primary source data included: interviews with government officials, policy 
experts, members of parliament, academic researchers, and journalists; and 
government and parliamentary speeches and documents. A questionnaire was 
developed and utilized in the structured interviews to gather data on the hypotheses 
and the decision-making framework. This chapter makes extensive use of the data 
collected in the interviews in order to confirm, disconfirm, or otherwise add to our 
understanding of what is known about the decision-making process and the 
Afghanistan case study (presented in earlier chapters) in order to begin outlining a 
general framework of analysis for German foreign policy decision making. Secondary 
data included data searches (e.g., Lexis-Nexis, German newspapers), policy 
evaluations from U.S. and German research institutions, and an extensive literature 
review in German and English.  
The chapter’s findings and discussion sections address a key element in the 
study. A foreign policy analysis approach identifies individual actors as the core 
factor in decision-making dynamics. Human agency is certainly a key factor, but 
human agency also creates institutional structures—organizations, rules, practices, 
and norms—within which individual actors function and which shape the direction 
and outcome of policy decisions. The study seeks to supplement the FPA literature by 
examining and highlighting the ways in which institutional organizations and 
structures—practices, procedures, rules, and norms—also affect the decision-mak ng 
process. 
The “Findings” section will address the two intertwined variables in the 




the validity of the presidentialization thesis and the chancellor’s power relationship 
relative to other major foreign policy actors in the decision-making process. The 
chapter will then turn to the structure side of the foreign policy analysis equation to 
determine the validity of the second hypothesis relating to coalition politics and the 
relative weight of the coalition junior partner in the decision-making process. To 
maintain the flow of the argument, the “Findings” section of each variable will be 
followed by a short discussion segment that will analyze the findings for the variable 
in question. This evaluation section will be followed by a larger “Discussion” section 
that will set the analysis of the two hypotheses within the context of the decision-
making process, integrating the theoretical implications of the findings from the case 
study and interviews and beginning the process of building a framework for analyzing 
German foreign policy decision making regarding out-of-area operations.  
        
Hypothesis 1: Chancellorial Power 
Findings 
At its core the presidentialization thesis argues that structural factors in 
modern democracies have eroded the more “collective” forms of politics, such as 
those found in parliamentary democracies. The effects of this process can be seen in 
the growth of executive power with a concurrent decline in parliamentary control 
over the executive, the growing importance of leaders in the electoral process, and the
ability of the executive to bypass party constraints and, using more plebiscitary 
techniques, appeal directly to the mass public. According to the thesis, these 




without, however, an accompanying change in the formal institutional structures of 
governance (regime type).354                          
The study’s first hypothesis is based on this expectation of growing executive 
power at the expense of other major political actors in foreign policy decision 
making, that is, that the federal chancellor exhibits greater capacity to determine 
policy direction or outcome and increasing independence from other actors or his or 
her own party. The hypothesis was applied to decision making regarding the 
deployment of German armed forces to Afghanistan by examining two explanatory 
variables outlined in the presidentialization thesis: the presence of structural changes 
in the executive that favored the chancellor; and the accumulated power of the chief 
executive over the legislative—and by inference over his or her party. This enhanc d 
decision-making role would be observable via such factors as the use of formal and 
informal instruments, establishment of rules, practices, and precedence, timing of 
decisions, or the framing of the policy issue.  
Based on the examination of foreign policy decision making in the 
Afghanistan case and interviews with German officials, there was little evidence to 
support the presidential thesis. The chancellor has not escaped the constraints of party 
control or the influence of other major policy actors, nor are structural changes to the 
decision-making process that shift the balance of power to the chancellor’s side 
apparent.  
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Variable 1: Structural Changes 
With regard to the first variable, that of structural changes in the core 
executive, findings showed that while at several points in time structural reforms had 
been debated and presented, they were not implemented. The reasons for this touch 
on precisely the issue of the balance of power within the executive and between the 
executive and parliament. Officials and experts recognized the need for a more 
efficient and flexible decision-making apparatus, but so far there has been littl  
movement in addressing the problems inherent in the present decision-making 
process.  
Reform efforts in the executive have focused on two recommendations: 
building a German “National Security Council” or reviving the existing Federal 
Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat, or BSR) which was established as a 
permanent executive committee in 1955 to oversee all military and international 
security matters referred to it, particularly arms control and nuclear policy. The BSR 
meets at the behest of the chancellor. It can forward recommendations to the full 
cabinet, but it cannot make binding decisions in areas where the constitution or 
existing laws gives that competence to another constitutional body—such as in the 
case of the  in out-of-area operations. 355 The BSR gradually lost its function as a 
collective decision-making body on security policy as nuclear issues receded in 
importance after the end of the Cold War, though it is still the central deliberative 
body for issues relating to arms exports.   
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The reform issue emerged more publicly in 1998 in the coalition agreement of 
the newly elected SPD-Green coalition, which stated that the new government 
intended to revive the BSR’s role as the coordinating body for German security 
issues.356 The argument at the time was that German decision making on security 
matters needed a stronger and more centrally organized body in the Chancellery that 
could coordinate all aspects of security policy—strategic, economic, political—and 
that the BSR as an executive committee in the Chancellery could be expanded to met 
this need.357 
Nevertheless very little reform actually occurred, although the BSR met in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks and in December 2001 to discuss the Afghanistan 
ISAF mandate. The issue continued to percolate below the surface within the parties 
and in parliament, as seen in the November 13, 2002 parliamentary record. In 
response to an official request for information from a member as to whether the 
government intended to reform the BSR, the state minister in the Foreign Office 
stated that “[T]he federal government sees no need for action in this regard.”358  
In 2002 a more detailed paper was published under the auspices of the 
government-funded Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs) arguing again for the need for sweeping reform of 
German security decision-making institutions because the new “normality” of 
Germany contributing to crisis intervention missions was no longer in sync with 
                                                
356 SPD-Green coalition agreement, 1998, foreign policy excerpts reprinted at: 
http://www.friedenskooperative.de/themen/lobby-02.htm   
357 Lothar Rühl, “Sicherheitspolitik: Nationale Struktren und Multilaterale Verflechtung,” in 
Deutschland’s neue Aussenpolitik. Institutionen undRessourcen, eds. Karl Kaiser and Hanns Maull 
(München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), 99. 




existing institutional procedures. In Goldilocks-style fashion, the paper argued that an 
American-styled National Security Council was the “too large” solution for 
Germany’s reform needs and ran up against too many constitutional impediments, 
and the suggestion of reforming an existing ministerial department (though whic
ministry was never clearly stated) was “too small” a solution and would run up 
against the principle of ministerial autonomy. The “just right” solution was a reform 
of the BSR, though this solution also was susceptible to the pitfalls of bureaucratic 
tugs of war between the Chancellery and Foreign Office. The solution lay not in 
establishing a “supra-ministerial coordinating body,” but a BSR that functioned as an 
“inter-ministerial networking body.”359  
 This argument for a German-style National Security Council or reform of the 
BSR remained in play, though again there appeared to be no political support for 
reform. In a speech on January 13, 2006, the president of the Federal Academy for 
Security Policy, Rudolf Georg Adam, laid out the reasons why such calls for 
structural reform remained unanswered. For one, the strength of ministerial autonomy 
and the corresponding weakness of the chancellor to dictate policy to his ministers 
meant that in practice, government policy decisions are “pre-configured” in informal 
decision-making bodies where the chancellor can apply more authority and thus 
influence in his or her role as party leader. 360 Since it appears that the informal 
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decision making via such bodies favors the chancellor and not other actors, the 
chancellery has little incentive to agree to reforms.361 
Another issue cited was the fact that since 1961, the office of chancellor has 
been held by the larger coalition party and the office of foreign minister by the junior 
coalition partner. This traditional distribution within the federal cabinet results in 
foreign and security matters—and decision making—being constantly infused with 
party political competition and personal ambitions.362 For Adam, there were three 
reform options: the establishment of a new coordinating body in the Chancellery (the 
“National Security Council” option); the reconstruction of the BSR; or the 
“revolutionary” option of amending the German constitution.363 Implementing any 
reform would depend on whether the major actors in the decision-making process 
would accept the reallocation to and concentration of power in the executive, which 
seemed unlikely. 
 Adam implied in his paper that reform might only be possible in a political 
environment where power is more evenly distributed in a government coalition—such 
as in a grand coalition, but reform was just as unobtainable under the SPD-CDU/CSU 
grand coalition (2005–2009) as it was with the SPD-Green coalition government 
between 1998 and 2005. With the publication of a policy paper in 2008, the 
CDU/CSU tried once again to push for reform of Germany’s foreign and security 
decision-making apparatus, and again the issue was rejected out of hand, this time by 
their coalition partner, the SPD. The proposal to transform the BSR into a German 
National Security Council was seen by the SPD leadership as a ploy by the Merkel
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government to take power away from the Foreign Office, which the SPD 
controlled.364 Furthermore, the CDU/CSU’s recommendation would require the 
establishment of a “national security advisor” based in the chancellery who would
assume responsibility for critical policy areas previously held by the foreign m nister. 
In fact, this was suggested in the 1990s under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had 
wanted to give his close advisor, Horst Teltschik, a security portfolio, but Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher made sure the reform went nowhere. 365 
 Thus, competition between the Chancellery and Foreign Office lies at the 
heart of the tension inside the executive. The competition, however, need not be zero-
sum; in one example, Chancellor Schröder simply added a European department to 
the Chancellery that mirrored the EU-based competences housed in the Foreign 
Office.366  The problems related to personal rivalries was addressed in a more recent 
reform proposal that argued for breaking this postwar tradition by keeping the 
Chancellery and the Foreign Office under one political party, in part because the 
foreign minister’s influence is already diluted by the chancellor’s ability to co-opt 
issues by declaring them a top policy priority on his or her agenda (Chefsache) and 
because of the growing number of veto players in the foreign policymaking 
establishment. Not surprisingly, this reform also has not met with much support.367  
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Worth mentioning here are the proposals that examined reform prospects 
relating to out-of-area operations from the legislative angle. The concerns raised were 
related to worries that more foreign policy decisions are being decided at the 
international level and thus diluting the Bundestag’s Parlamentsvorbehalt, or 
parliamentary prerogatives, and to concerns related to the need for speedy decision 
making should a crisis arise. The most frequently discussed proposal was to establish 
a new “mission committee” tasked with deciding on all out-of-area missions. The 
new committee would concentrate in one body the hitherto decentralized work in 
various other Bundestag committees and would prepare, monitor, and evaluate every 
deployment.368  
Most government officials acknowledged the current process is cumbersome, 
inefficient, and slow, but the proposal to centralize all decision making on military 
missions—that is, a committee that would decide for the Bundestag—was considered 
“ridiculous” and as one official bluntly put it, “pure theory.”369 For one, the 
concentration of decision making in a parliamentary committee would not be 
tolerated by other major veto players. Furthermore, from the perspective of the 
parliamentarians themselves, the notion was unworkable because it would shift the 
responsibility for such “life and death” decisions away from each individual member 
of parliament onto the shoulders of a small group of members. As one official 
explained, no Bundestag member would want to be a member of a committee that 
would force him or her to take responsibility for a decision that went terribly wrong 
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and where the political repercussions were high; either the whole Bundestag decides 
whether German troops are sent, or no one decides. To change the current process 
would be seen as a decline of parliamentarism. Other critics see the issue from a 
different angle and argue that reforms should not expand the control of the Bundestag 
because this system already has deleterious effects on Germany’s alliance relations; 
NATO decisions often are held up because the German government must wait for the 
Bundestag’s input or decision on a mission.370 Finally, proposals to change the 
Parliamentary Participation Act or relinquish the twelve-month mandate period also 
were unworkable for similar reasons that went to the heart of the parliament’s 
constitutive right to monitor out-of-area deployments.371  
Thus, while there is a recognized need for institutional reform of the decision-
making process relating to Germany’s military deployments, there has been little 
success in implementing reforms because they would strike directly at the power 
arrangements among major foreign policy actors and within the coalition itself. Th  
fear that reforms will dilute one’s influence in the decision-making process is a 
powerful disincentive. 
Variable 2: Executive-Legislative Relations 
With regard to the second variable dealing with the power balance in 
executive–legislative relations, there is no clear evidence that in the case of 
Afghanistan, chancellorial decisions have come at the expense of parliament, nor is it
clear that the chancellor’s exercise of power has been based on growing independence 
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from his or her own party. The key test would have been the initial November 2001 
decision to contribute troops to the anti-terrorism efforts (OEF) immediately af r 
September 11. However, Chancellor Schröder was not capable of drawing together a 
parliamentary majority from within his coalition, given the narrow margin the 
government held and the dissent within his own party and in the Green Party on the 
question of sending German troops to Afghanistan.  
Schröder got the outcome he desired, but his use of the vote of confidence to 
pass the mandate was not an act taken from a position of strength. Rather, it was the 
weakness of his hold on the SPD that forced him to tie the Afghanistan mandate to 
the vote of confidence in order to reassert party discipline and thus his control over 
the SPD. Furthermore, the chancellor agreed to some concessions, such as the 
inclusion of the supplemental protocol that attached national restrictions, or caveats, 
to the mandate, and signaled his willingness to meet the Greens half way on other 
domestic policies that the Greens were keen to adapt.372   
This series of events can be contrasted with the vote on the ISAF mandate a 
month later, in December 2001, when Germany threw its political and diplomatic 
weight behind the mission (e.g., hosting the Bonn Conference), which was to support 
the nascent Afghan government and ensure a stable and secure environment for the 
reconstruction of the country. There was broad consensus and support for this “soft 
power” approach and reflected a core political choice to cordon off the “bad” OEF 
mission, with its counterterrorism mandate and use of special forces to seek out and 
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destroy targets, from the “good” ISAF mission that was more politically p latable and 
“sellable” to the public as a humanitarian and reconstruction mission.373 
Further examination reveals other cases of compromise between the 
government and parliament that show how institutional structures define the 
parameters of decision making. The Schröder government’s efforts to extend the 
ISAF mandate in 2003 ran into trouble once it reached the Bundestag’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee. Whether this was an instance of an oversight or lack of judgment 
by the executive, or an attempt to build into the language of the mandate a degree of 
flexibility to respond to future events on the ground, the result was the refusal by 
committee members to accept the government’s motion. The government acquiesced 
in drafting a Protokollnotiz as the condition for the committee’s acceptance of the 
mandate extension. 
The third instance occurred in early 2007 under the SPD and CDU/CSU grand 
coalition government—again, another effort to keep a balance between alliance 
concerns and domestic political constraints on the use of military forces. Pres ed by 
its NATO allies to do more in Afghanistan, the government submitted a new motion 
to send an additional number of forces and Tornado aircraft to Afghanistan. The 
chancellor got what he wanted, but in the context of growing violence and civilian 
deaths on the ground, the Bundestag pressured the government to agree to restrictions 
on the use of the Tornado aircraft.374   
Furthermore, in the interviews conducted with government officials, policy 
experts, and parliamentarians, respondents consistently supported the case study’  
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findings regarding the constraints placed on the chancellor in foreign policy decision 
making. An overwhelming number of those subjects who took a position on the 
presidentialization thesis rejected it. Most officials did not accept the notion that the 
chancellor now has fewer constraints on his or her power. Many were troubled by the 
term itself because to them the use of the word “presidentialization” implied a shift in 
the structure of the German political system toward a more Americanized syst m, an 
inference they were unwilling to accept. The following statements were made by 
subjects interviewed in Berlin—government officials, policy experts, and aca emic 
researchers in November 2009: 
• “I see no structural changes that would indicate an increase in chancellorial 
power . . . the chancellor doesn’t need these structural changes, he has the 
power to set policy direction (Richtlinienkompetenz).” 
• There is “no real change in the system.” 
• “There is no presidentialization and increase in chancellorial power, except 
perhaps in the sense of a ‘bully pulpit’ . . . plus, he has the 
Richtlinienkompetenz. Ministries cannot agitate against the chancellor, and 
both ministries and chancellor must defer to the Bundestag because it votes 
for the missions. . . .” 
• “Our federalist system cannot produce a true presidentialized system, 
especially not in a coalition system. Efforts at presidentialization won’t 
succeed because they challenge the political balance between coalition 
partners. . . .” 
• “The chancellor always had an influential role in foreign policy” 
•  “We have a strong central government but without ‘presidential’ 
characteristics, because Germany has a parliamentary army. Thus the 
parliamentary prerogative (Parlamentsvorbehalt) is very strong.” 375 
 
 
The reaction of the German officials and policy experts shows that the term 
itself is problematic. Despite Webb and Poguntke’s argument that the term 
“presidentialization” is different than “presidentialism” and that no structu al changes 
in regime type have occurred, the respondents took the term to mean that the German
                                                




federalist system was becoming more like the American system of government. This 
presents a problem for theorists. The reaction of respondents was so consistent that it 
raises questions about the use of the term itself—apart from the issue of its empirical 
robustness—since it detracts from asking legitimate questions of what precisely can 
be said about chancellorial power and decision making in the German system of 
government. 
 
Discussion: Hypothesis 1 
The above findings show no significant support for the presidentialization 
thesis. There was little evidence of structural changes that reinforced and expanded 
chancellorial power, and while the chancellor has constitutional and procedural 
instruments that give the chancellor a dominant role to play in the foreign policy
arena, there are other constitutional and institutional factors that continue to constrain 
chancellorial power and shape the parameters of policy choices. 376 One study that 
questions the relevance of the presidentialization thesis to Germany is Ludger Helms’ 
survey of twelve indicators that other analyses have linked to presidentializi g trends. 
Helms determined that only three indicators were robust enough to be used to 
compare presidential and parliamentary systems: presidentialization in executive 
leadership (chancellors affected outcomes of elections), structural changes within the 
core executive, and executive–legislative relations (growing gap between ex cutive 
and parliamentary party fractions). Applying these variables to the German political 
system showed no evidence of presidentialization—that is, no growing concentration 
                                                




of power in the person of the chancellor. With regard to the last two variables, those 
of structural changes within the core executive and changes in executive-legislative 
relations, the present study confirms the findings in Helms’ analysis.  
With regard to the third variable Helms tested, that of whether the chancellor 
affects electoral outcomes, Clemens and Saalfeld’s study of the 2005 federal election 
concluded that while the “alleged personalization and individualization of campaigns 
may have begun to alter the nature of election competition, . . . these changes seem to 
happen within and through the parties rather than in opposition to them.”377 Thus, the 
chancellor’s room for maneuver remains limited because of factors inherent in the 
German political system: the reality of coalition governments, the need for good 
relations with the parliamentary parties, and the diffusion of political power in the 
German federalist system of government.378 
Finally, Torben Lütjen and Franz Walter point to what other scholars have 
emphasized as the critical variables that shape chancellorial power:  the strength of 
the German party system. They describe Chancellor Schröder as having give  his 
tenure in office a “quasi-presidential veneer”—for example, cultivating himself as the 
“media chancellor” and public distancing himself from his own party—but high 
popularity ratings do not necessarily secure parliamentary majorities. Schröder’s 
attempts to circumvent the party by shifting some of the decision making into ad hoc 
bodies and commissions with outside experts shut out parliamentary input and 
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isolated him from the party. 379 Since poor policymaking would more directly affect 
their own prospects for reelection, parliamentarians were less willing to go along with 
policies that carried high political risks, such as deploying German military forces. 
When Schröder needed parliamentary support for the November 2001 Afghanistan 
vote, it was not forthcoming—hence his use of the vote of confidence. 
Where does this lead the chancellor? Existing studies, supported by interviews 
undertaken for this study, emphasize that the chancellor has an array of formal and 
informal tools that obviate any serious need for structural reform aimed at enh ncing 
the power of the chancellor. The chief executive’s room for maneuver and ultimate 
success in policymaking depends on the chancellor’s ability to utilize the instruments 
of authority and the institutional organizations (Chancellery) and structures (r l , 
procedures, norms) available within this larger federalist system of governance.380 As 
Stephen Padgett writes:  “The authority of the chancellor depends upon his capacity 
to operationalise his constitutional responsibility for ‘general policy guidelines,’ 
coordinating ministerial interests and activities, prioritizing, and fashioning a sense of 
collective purpose.”381 
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Hypothesis 2:  Coalition Politics 
Findings 
 
The considerations outlined above lead directly to the study’s findings related 
to the second hypothesis: the role of coalition politics in the decision-making process. 
Germany’s parliamentary system of government produces a coalition-style cabinet 
government, where governing coalitions are almost always the rule. This means that 
while authority is concentrated in the chancellor, power is dispersed among many 
actors, producing a high number of veto players active in the decision-making process 
who possess diverging goals and interests. The result of this coalition government 
structure is that the junior coalition partner can at times retain a disproportional 
degree of influence, with potential consequences for policy outcomes. The second 
hypothesis sought to determine the conditions under which the junior partner can 
affect policy preferences—that is, if there is a high degree of dissent on a policy issue 
in the coalition, how successful can the junior coalition partner be in shaping policy 
direction and outcome and/or extract concessions from the major coalition partner? 
The conditions under which the junior partner was able to affect policy preferences 
depended on several factors: the distribution of power within the coalition (degree of 
equality in coalition, allocation of ministries); divergence of ideological positions of 
the parties; types of strategies applied to influence outcomes; and the degree of 
internal division.382 
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 Generally, the examination of foreign policy decision making regarding the 
Afghanistan deployments shows the importance of coalition politics in shaping 
policy. In the critical decision stage on the first Afghanistan vote in November 2001, 
where the degree of dissent between the junior partner, the Green Party, and the major 
coalition partner, the SPD, was high, the Green Party leadership did not show great 
success in shaping policy preferences vis-à-vis their larger coalition partner.  For one, 
there were deep internal party divisions on the issue of German participation in out-
of-area operations, both in the Green party and in the SPD, particularly within the 
rank and file. Secondly, the Greens were not an equal partner in the coalition. They 
were inexperienced in governing, which may have contributed to the fact that the 
Green Party failed to secure its share of important ministries during the coalition 
negotiations.383 More importantly, the Greens were a liability at the polls—that is, 
their position within the coalition had been seriously weakened by a long string of 
electoral losses since 1998. This asymmetry of power was especially evident during 
the decision-making process on the first Afghanistan mandate for OEF in November 
2001.  The Green Party’s weakness had placed it at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis 
the Social Democrats; that the SPD was willing and capable of building an alternativ  
coalition government with the liberal FDP should the Greens refuse to support the 
motion further emphasized the asymmetrical power relationship within the coalition. 
This meant that in terms of strategy, for example, the Greens could not apply pressure 
by threatening to pull out of the coalition since the threat carried little weight, and so 
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the leadership chose for the most part to accept the SPD’s position on supporting the 
Afghanistan deployment.  
In this situation the size of the government’s parliamentary majority was 
critical: the SPD-Green coalition possessed only a sixteen vote majority, and thirty-
five SPD and Green members had announced their intent to vote against the motion. 
Part of the reason why the use of the vote of confidence was so precarious in light of 
the government’s very narrow parliamentary majority is that the motion must be 
carried by a qualified majority of all members entitled to vote, which means that any 
abstentions automatically count against the chancellor.384 Schröder thus had to secure 
an affirmative vote from almost every member of his coalition. 
Both Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer understood 
the need for Germany to contribute to the international response to the September 11 
attacks; gambling that the dissidents in both parties would not risk bringing down the 
government on this issue, Schröder was able to enforce party discipline and coalition 
unity and pass the motion at the expense of his junior coalition partner. The vote on 
the first Afghanistan mission shows there are circumstances in which having a formal
parliamentary majority may not be enough, if the vote margin is narrow and the 
opposition deep. 385 
Despite the fact that the Green Party was not able to sway the ultimate 
outcome of the vote, the leadership was able to extract some concessions in the form 
of a supplemental protocol that Schröder was willing to accept. The Protokollnotiz set 
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up parameters that conferred at least some measure of parliamentary control over the 
mission’s operational profile, which placated most of the dissenters but failed to 
satisfy other rank and file Green supporters who accused the party leadership of 
selling out and damaging the party’s reputation as a “peace party.” Thus internal party 
dissent was attenuated through a bargaining process with the SPD and by allowing 
four of the eight remaining Green Party dissenters to vote no on the motion as a 
symbolic signal of continued opposition—all carefully calibrated to secure the 
parliamentary majority the coalition required, as it did with two votes to spare. 
Support for the Afghanistan mission was maintained by both party leaderships while 
the Red-Green coalition was in power. However, once the Greens were in the 
opposition and freed of their coalitional obligations, the rank and file defied their 
party leadership and voted against the extension of the mandates. 
 Results from the interviews held with government officials and foreign policy 
experts closely paralleled these observations.  For a government, the key to eff ctive 
policymaking in a parliamentary democracy is the maintenance of its parliamentary 
majority.386 This requires building a consensus both within and between the coalition 
parties. The importance of a parliamentary majority is underscored in the November 
2001 OEF vote; as one respondent described it, Schröder knew he didn’t have a 
parliamentary majority to pass the mission mandate, but he knew he had a majority if 
he used the vote of confidence as the vehicle to secure its passage.387 
To summarize, every chancellor requires the cooperation of his or her 
coalition partner, particularly on such a sensitive policy issue as military 
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deployments. Consensus is endangered when policy positions and policy agendas 
diverge too much. The degree to which junior partners can push against the major 
partner’s policy preferences depends not only on “foreign policy realities,” such as 
alliance commitments, but on the size of the coalition government’s parliamentary 
majority and such variables as party and coalition unity and the power distribution 
within the coalition.388 Thus, junior coalition partners are important because “every 
consensus decision ties everyone to the lowest common denominator.”389 This is the 
cost of a coalition government, but while building consensus contributes to the 
legitimacy of the process, it does not necessarily make the process more efficient.390 
 
Discussion: Hypothesis 2 
Helms, in his work on executive–party relations, summarizes the conclusions 
in this study on the role of the junior coalition partners quite well:  
 
As to the chancellor’s policy-leadership capacities in the core executive and 
the parliamentary arena, the political weight of the junior partner within a 
given coalition government and the relationship between the government and 
the leadership of the majority Fraktionen in the Bundestag may be considered 
variables enjoying a particularly large amount of explanatory power. 391   
 
The examination of the Afghanistan case study and interviews with 
government officials and policy experts confirmed, as Kaarbo’s research showed, that 
the junior coalition partner can be an important influence on the shape of policy 
decisions, but that the ability of the junior coalition partner to affect decisions on out-
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of-area operations depended on a number of factors relevant to the context of the 
decision-making process: whether the junior partner was treated as an equal partner in 
the proceedings; the distribution of ministries; the ideological position of the parti s; 
internal party cohesion; and what strategy was attempted by the junior coalition 
partner to influence decision outcomes (bargaining, procedural manipulation, threat to 
exit coalition).392 The study revealed important contextual factors that shaped the 
Greens’ policy choices: alliance obligations that committed Germany to sending 
German armed forces to Afghanistan in the wake of September 11; the relatively 
weak standing of the Greens in the coalition; the ability (and apparent willingness) of 
the SPD to dissolve the Red-Green coalition and replace the Greens with the FDP as
the new junior coalition partner; the ability of the chancellor to apply a procedural 
tool (vote of confidence) to enforce compliance; and, finally, the Green Party’s own 
political ambitions. 
 Perhaps the most important observation to emerge from an examination of the 
Afghanistan out-of-area case is the need to highlight the role of the Bundestag in the 
decision-making process. Generally, the Bundestag is seen as having little influence 
in foreign policy, and so the role of the Bundestag in foreign policy is rarely 
addressed. While the formal aspects of parliament’s involvement are in fact quite 
limited, there are two foreign policy areas in which the Bundestag is a centrl player: 
in decisions concerning out-of-area operations and all matters relating to European 
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policy.393 Arguably, these are critical policy arenas that feed into Germany’s role in 
NATO, its security relationship with the United States, and its role in the EU. Thus,
an evaluation of the decision-making process regarding German military missions 
must focus on how the Bundestag affects the deliberative process on these policies.   
In particular, the case study underscored the need to emphasize informal 
processes of decision making, rather than formal institutional structures. For example, 
one of the few studies to take up the question of the Bundestag’s role in foreign 
policy focused on the legal instruments Bundestag members can apply to influence 
foreign policy decisions. The study argued that parliamentarians rarely used these 
instruments to seek influence in decision outcomes and thus concluded that the 
Bundestag’s influence on foreign policy was marginal. The study is marred by several 
methodological problems, not least of which is its failure to mention the issue of 
informal decision making and the Bundestag’s role in determining Germany’s 
participation in out-of-area operations.394 
Case study interviews with government officials underscored the importance 
of these informal decision-making dynamics. One interview respondent agreed that 
the Bundestag does not utilize many of the formal instruments it possesses but argued 
that it was not necessary for Bundestag members to use such tools except as a las
resort. Institutional and normative factors commit the government and parliamentary 
parties to a process of bargaining, cooperation, information-sharing, and compromise.  
Bundestag members expect cooperation from the government and so do not invoke 
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procedural rules or other pressures if they can get what they want through informal 
bargaining. In the end, the Bundestag is an important actor because on the question of 
out-of-area operations it is co-determinant, and this co-determination is reflected in 
the informal process of decision-making.395 
The Afghanistan case showed that the Bundestag possesses a number of 
institutional structures—rules, practices, and procedures—that allow it to influence 
policy outcomes. Thus just as the chancellor has factors that enable and constrain his 
or her ability to shape policy so, too, does the institutional setting reveal a set of 
variables that enable and constrain parliamentary action. Some of these instrume ts, 
such as the extension period for mandates, are not a legal prescription but established 
practice; others, such as the Protokollnotiz, are more formalized tools that are applied 
in the course of the bargaining process between government and parliament in 
determining the parameters of out-of-area missions.   
The variable of ideological positions of the party cited by Kaarbo was not as 
relevant in the case of the Red-Green coalition, since the two parties were quit  close 
(both identify themselves as “peace parties,” for example), but this did not guarantee 
that policymaking on sending German troops abroad would remain free of conflict, 
particularly because both parties faced left-wing opposition to sending troops to 
Afghanistan. Greater ideological differences between the SPD and CDU/CSU 
generally mattered more in the grand coalition, but the elite consensus on foreig
policy and on German out-of-area missions was maintained throughout its tenure, 
albeit with increasing difficulty. It is instructive to note that when the Grens went 
                                                




into opposition in 2005 and the SPD followed in 2009, both parties abandoned the 
guise of consensus on German out-of-area operations. 
Based on the Afghanistan study, two variables appear particularly relevant: 
the degree of internal party conflict—for example, whether there is a significant gap 
between the party leadership and its rank and file; and the size of the parliamentary 
majority the coalition government possesses. Securing a parliamentary majo ity, s 
Stephen Padgett pointed out, is the sine qua non of a parliamentary government.396 
This, more than anything, seems to shape the parameters of policy deliberations. “Do 
we have a majority?” is one of the first questions raised in the decision-makig 
process on deploying German armed forces abroad, and it is one of the questions 
party and government leaders continue to raise as they work to ensure passage of the 
motion.   
In summary, the Afghanistan case supports previous studies that emphasize 
the importance of internal dynamics of coalition politics. The Green Party leadership 
could not significantly affect the SPD’s decision to send troops to Afghanistan, but 
the narrow size of the parliamentary majority gave it the possibility of bargainin  
around the edges of the mandate to assert a degree of control over German forces. 
 
Discussion: Constructing a Framework for Analysis 
The findings from the two hypotheses reveal important information about the 
role of actors and structures in foreign policy decision making. Historical and 
constitutional factors as well as a broad array of bureaucratic and institut onal 
instruments enable the chancellor to move policy toward a defined objective, while 
                                                




the diffusion of political power in the German political system constrains the 
chancellor from dominating the decision-making process. The central constraints on 
chancellorial power are embedded within the structures of Germany’s parliament ry 
democracy: the dependence of the chief executive on his or her own party; the 
importance of political parties as mediators between the executive and legislative 
branches; the central role of parliamentary party fractions in the decision-maki g 
process; and the constraints of coalition politics on a chancellor’s room for 
maneuverability. 397 
The question to which the study now turns is how these results fit into a larger 
framework for analyzing German foreign policy decision making.  As noted, very few 
studies of German foreign policy address the question of how such important 
decisions as sending German armed forces abroad are formulated. Therefore, th  next 
step in this study is to place the findings from Afghanistan case into a broader 
framework of analysis that documents the process by which foreign policy decision 
making on out-of-area operations are made, paying close attention to how 
institutional structures both enable and constrain the actors who function inside the 
parameters of the decision-making process: how does the chancellor utilize his or her 
position to push desired policies? What is the impact of party competition, 
particularly between coalition partners? What are the consequences of the 
constitutional and legally defined division of power between actors (executive, 
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legislative, bureaucratic)? And where are the points in the decision-making process at 
which decision outcomes are most affected? 
 The framework for analyzing out-of-area decisions incorporates an 
understanding of the relationship between domestic and international variables and 
the interaction of factors at several levels of analysis. Most particularly, the case 
study reveals two important dimensions of the process: the relationship between 
formal and informal institutional structures, and at which stage of the process the 
decision outcome can be most influenced by actors and events. 
A close examination of the process reveals that there are two major phases of 
decision making in which policy can be shaped. The first phase is the phase prior to 
the formal vote in the federal cabinet in which the chancellor and the chancellery play 
the pivotal role. The second important phase of decision-making occurs once the 
government’s motion has been sent to the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee. 
Although committee members cannot alter the government’s motion, they can 
redefine certain parameters of the mission through the application of various 
institutional structures—rules, procedures, and parliamentary practices. Gv n the 
relatively few studies on the topic, the following section is based to a large extent on 
information extracted from the case study and interviews of government officials, 
policy experts, and policy practitioners. 
Phase One: External Pressures and Executive Action 
Most studies of German policymaking tend to begin their exploration of the 
decision-making process at the point at which a formal request for assistance arrives 




and drafting a motion to support the deployment of German armed forces. The motion 
is taken up and voted on by the federal cabinet and then forwarded to the president of 
the Bundestag. After the first reading in the plenary the motion is passed on to the 
Foreign Affairs committee. With other parliamentary committees advising (e.g., 
Defense, Finance, Development, Interior), the Foreign Affairs Committee produces a 
report and returns it to the plenary with the committee’s recommendation on the 
government’s motion. After the parliamentary debate in the second reading, the 
motion is brought to a vote.  
However, German officials and experts with knowledge of the foreign policy 
process on out-of-area operations almost always began their discussion by observing 
that the formal process matters much less than the informal decision-making process, 
which is set in motion at the international level prior to any official governmnt 
determination or action on out-of-area missions. Some international event or impulse 
occurs and is serious enough to warrant the attention and ultimately the engagement 
of an international institution, such as the UN or NATO, which determines that some 
response requiring the deployment of military forces is required. In the case of 
NATO, the security institution sends an official request to the German government 
asking for contributions to the mission.  Figure 7 shows the interaction between the 


























Figure 7: German Government Coordination of Missions 
 
Source: based on House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, “Waging war: Parliament’s role and 
responsibility,” 15th Report of Session 2005-2006, Volume II: Evidence, HL Paper 236-II, published by the 
Authority of the House of Lords, London, 27 July 2006, 226.  
 
The initial impulse is external, and the formal request to the German government is 
preceded by intense informal diplomacy in these external security institutions in an 
effort to balance alliance concerns with domestic political constraints. The 
maneuvering becomes a game of setting markers to negotiate Germany’s level of 
contribution until it becomes clear that what will be requested of the German 
government is precisely what the government has agreed to commit. According to 
government officials, the worst outcome would be a situation in which a publicly 
stated request for contributions must be publicly denied, since the political 
repercussions are then difficult to control.398 
                                                




 Once the request is officially received by the Chancellery, the phase of 
developing the contours of the mandate expands under the supervision of the 
Chancellery and in close coordination with the relevant ministries and coalition and 
parliamentary party leaders. The thread that runs through this phase, and the 
subsequent phase in which the Bundestag’s parliamentary committees process the 
government’s motion, hinges on the question of the government’s parliamentary 
majority. But as interview respondents stressed, what is important is not simply
whether the coalition government has a parliamentary majority, but the size of the 
parliamentary majority.399 The smaller the number of votes that constitutes the 
majority, the more difficult it can be to reach consensus, particularly if thereis a great 
deal of internal party dissent and intra-coalition conflict.  
In this phase of informal decision making, when the executive and the 
administrative/bureaucratic actors determine the operational contours of the mandate, 
the most critical interaction is between the executive and the parliamentary party 
fractions, which support the cabinet members.400 The Chancellery works closely with 
party officials—party fraction leaders, the party executive committee, foreign policy 
experts—and it is the fraction leaders who must deliver the votes. “Do we have a 
majority?” is the question that drives the dynamics in these informal meetings.  
One interview respondent argued that those observers who believe the 
Bundestag is not influential tend to focus on the formal aspects of decision making 
while ignoring important feedback loops and informal-level contacts. The informal 
decision-making process is composed of a dense network of feedback loops, of 
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formal and informal mechanisms of information exchange and coordination: a 
Foreign Office representative sits in on parliamentary working groups; state ministers 
are in close contact with party leaders; and a Chancellery representative participates 
in ministerial meetings and in fraction discussions. Finally, often overlooked are the 
informal working meetings (Arbeitssitzungen) that function at all levels. 
Feedback loops are important because the development of the mandate must 
be constantly reviewed to gauge whether it is politically defensible. The chancellor 
and Chancellery work closely with federal ministers and their respective staff— tate 
ministers, state secretaries, heads of divisions, and directors of departments in a 
bottom-up process. The Ministry of Defense is the lead ministry in discussions with 
NATO and the EU (the Foreign Office liaises with the UN) and is primarily 
responsible for defining the operational parameters of the mission. The political 
parameters are decided by the Chancellery in close coordination with the Foreign 
Ministry, which is the lead ministry and coordinates the inter-ministerial p ocess. 
Drafts of the motion are distributed widely in order to assure that the motion has the 
level of detail to fulfill the government’s obligation to provide parliament with 
detailed information and to avoid any legal challenges to the mission.401  
The need for consensus drives the informal decision-making process. The 
motion on an out-of-area mission will not be placed onto the federal cabinet’s agenda 
for a vote until there is consensus within the coalition government. Importantly, the 
chancellor speaks to the chairs of all of the parliamentary party fractions, including 
the parties in opposition. This is perhaps unusual, but some interview respondents 
also spoke of a “normative commitment” to seek as broad a consensus as possible on 
                                                




military issues, which means the active engagement and, whenever possible, the 
approval of the opposition parties.402 This could be seen merely as a means to co-opt 
other political actors in order to minimize political opposition, but government 
officials also argued that it is tied to the need for consensus-building in German 
politics and in particular to sensitivities relating to Germany’s past military 
aggression. The process must be transparent and, at least for the government, produce 
a motion whose language is sufficiently detailed that it can prove unassailable, both in 
terms of parliamentary pressure to produce a Protokollnotiz or a legal challenge in the 
Federal Constitutional Court.403 Thus, everything must be taken into account in the 
informal process in determining the government’s position: parliamentary majority, 
internal party cohesion, public opinion, and normative considerations (culture of 
restraint, humanitarian issues). 
Phase Two: Parliamentary Deliberation and Party Action 
 In the decision-making process, phase two is dominated by dynamics within 
the Bundestag and begins once the government’s motion is forwarded to the 
parliamentary committees. The Foreign Affairs Committee, as the lead committee, is 
responsible for the drafting of the final report and recommendation on the proposed 
government motion on the out-of-area mission (Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht), 
while other committees function in an advisory capacity and submit their 
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recommendations to the Foreign Affairs Committee. The government’s motion is 
rarely altered and it is carried almost verbatim into the committee’s final document.404 
It is in this evaluative committee process where the Bundestag can alter the 
conditions around the government motion. The 1994 Constitutional Court decision 
placed the German parliament as the final arbiter concerning the deployment of 
German armed forces, but there are other instruments that provide the Bundestag with 
a great deal of influence on shaping out-of-area decisions:  
 Parliamentary Participation Act. The Parliamentary Participation Act of 
March 2005 (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) is the vehicle by which the Bundestag 
defines the form and dimensions of out-of-area missions and codifies the 
requirements set out by the 1994 Constitutional Court ruling. The Act states that any 
“deployment of armed forces abroad,” regardless of the type of deployment, requires 
the consent of parliament and provides for two types of consent procedures: a 
standard procedure by which the government submits a motion which then must be 
voted on by the full plenary in a simple majority vote; and a simplified procedure by 
which consent is granted if there is no parliamentary move to activate a full debate 
within seven days after notification.405 Importantly, the Parliamentary Participation 
Act also requires the government to provide information on a number of mission 
parameters: the international legal foundation for the mandate; the defined territorial 
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limits; the operational mandate; operational details (troop limits, capabilities to be 
deployed, duration), and the cost and source of funds for the mission.406 
Twelve-month extension period. As one respondent explained, the twelve-
month period by which missions are normally extended is a “self-constraint,” 407 not a 
legal requirement. In the 1990s, when German officials struggled with how to manage 
out-of-area missions, the concern was focused on setting up a system to maintain 
ongoing reviews and reappraisals of operations, with the Bundestag providing some 
kind of counterweight to the government. Setting a time limit on the mandate, rather 
than leaving the mandate open-ended, was a way to assure active parliamentary 
involvement at regular intervals. Setting up an annual evaluation of the mandates was 
a political decision that has become standard practice, and it is the norm with 
Afghanistan.408 
Given that some missions are not as controversial as others, there have been a 
number of proposals to streamline the process, but this has been difficult if not 
impossible to achieve in the current political environment. One suggestion has been 
to bundle the non-controversial missions (e.g., humanitarian assistance) and pass 
several at one time. The Parliamentary Participation Act, as noted, allowsfor a 
simplified consent procedure. However, every parliamentary party fraction has the 
right to debate each mission individually, and the Left party has taken advantage of 
its parliamentary prerogatives by demanding a full plenary debate on every mission 
and extension. Thus, in terms of the decision-making process in parliament, a mission 
                                                
406 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, “Waging war: Parliament’s role and 
responsibility,” Volume II: Evidence, HL-236-II, July 27, 2006, 31–32, with an English translation of 
the Parliamentary Participation Act found on pages 44–46. 
407 Interview on November 9, 2009. 




to send five military advisors or a small medical unit must be taken through the same 
formal standard procedure as the Afghanistan mission. Proposals to change the 
Parliamentary Participation Act to permit a more streamlined decision-making 
process have been rejected, and there appears to be no interest in pursuing such 
reforms, at least in the near future.  
 Protokollnotizen. Another institutional tool applied in the out-of-area 
decision-making process is the use of Protokollnotizen—supplemental protocols 
attached to the mandates that appear in the final report of the Foreign Affairs
Committee. The supplemental clause is utilized in the Foreign Affairs Committee to 
rectify the shortcomings of a government-submitted motion and defines certain 
parameters or requirements of the mandate. The “take it or leave it” aspect of 
parliamentary consent on out-of-area operations has been criticized as watering down 
parliamentary prerogatives in the decision-making process, but the use of the 
supplemental protocol is seen as a way to counteract the restricted nature of the “take 
it or leave it” vote and keeps the parliament directly involved in the decision-making 
process.409 The use of Protokollnotizen in the Afghanistan case shows this:  the 
Protokollnotizen laid out conditions under which the Bundestag would review the 
extension or mandate; they committed the government to submit regular reportson 
the status of the missions; and they obligated the Defense Minister to refrain from 
acting in a given situation if strong misgivings were voiced by the leadership of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee. 
                                                
409 House of Lords, 34–35; see also the legal/constitutional argument about the use of Protokollnotizen, 
which was introduced because some believed that the “ ak  it or leave it” prohibition was an 




 Caveats. One of the most controversial aspects of Germany’s participation in 
military missions abroad is the subject of caveats, or national restrictions. Each 
national contingent in Afghanistan has an officer that holds the “red cards” or 
instructions that the national government has provided that restrict that nation’s 
troops from participating in certain kinds of missions. Every NATO member has 
caveats; there are approximately 50–80 caveats that constrain NATO commanders in 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, to the puzzlement of German officials, Germany ofte  is 
singled out for its use of caveats.410  
To complicate matters further, there are also written as well as unwritten 
caveats. In any NATO deployment, each member state defines the scope of its 
contributions, and it is standard procedure for member states to provide notice of 
official restrictions it places on a deployment. It is also common for member stat s to 
withhold information on other caveats that they do not wish to provide to the 
multilateral organization in command of the mission. Commanders only become 
aware of these unofficial caveats when events occur that force member states to 
acknowledge them.411 
In the German decision-making process, the need for consensus on out-of-area 
operations drives the issue of caveats. In the decision-making process there are two
different kinds of caveats: those set by parliament and those set by the government. 
                                                
410 In fact, Auerswald and Saideman preface their discus ion of German caveats with the title, 
“Germany: the Poster Child of Caveats.” See David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, “NATO 
at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan,” paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association n Toronto, Canada, September 2-5, 2009, 1, 
21–26. See also Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding 
the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mision in Afghanistan,” International Studies 
Quarterly Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2012): TBA. 




For the Bundestag, the caveats are embedded in the Protokollnotizen. 412 In the 
Afghanistan case, several caveats were placed in the Protokollnotiz that placed 
restrictions on the mission: one in the OEF mission mandate in November 2001 
(regular reports and consultation required; soldiers remain under German command), 
and another in the ISAF mission in October 2003 (e.g., prohibition on participation in 
drug interdiction). Other caveats were integrated into the text of the motions duri g
the informal preparatory phase at the executive-ministerial level (e.g., the Ministry of 
Defense): caveats that restricted German troop movements to northern Afghanistan, 
which was later amended (because of allied pressures) to allow German soldiers t  
deploy anywhere in the country to help NATO allies in emergency situations; and the 
caveats relating to the Tornado deployments in 2007 that prohibited any exchange of 
information between OEF and ISAF and the use of German Tornado aircraft for any 
“close air support” operations. Nevertheless, the strongest caveat that still holds is 
that German troops will not engage in offensive combat operations.413 
The Chancellery is concerned with drafting a motion that will fulfill a number 
of criteria. It must retain enough flexibility to conduct efficient operations but yet be 
able to respond to changes on the ground; it must be detailed and transparent enough 
to avoid any efforts by the Foreign Affairs Committee to attach a supplemental 
protocol; and it must be acceptable enough to reduce the possibility of a party fraction 
challenging the motion by filing suit in the Constitutional Court. The Chancellery is 
also concerned that any motion or extension be defined in a way that minimizes 
                                                
412 Interviews on November 9, 10, 12, 2009. 
413 Auerswald and Saideman, 22–23; interviews on November 9, 12, 2009; Paul Belkin and Vince 
Morelli, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatl ntic Alliance,” CRS Report for Congress, 




potential public opposition—for example, reducing the “military” aspects of a 
mandate and emphasizing the reconstruction and development role of the German 
forces.414 The government assesses the political mood in the Bundestag first; if there 
is reason to believe the vote will be problematic, then the Ministry of Defense, in 
close coordination with the Chancellery and Foreign Office, may insert caveats into 
the motion because at times it is precisely the inclusion of a caveat that can be the 
decisive political criterion determining whether or not a parliamentary p ty fraction 
will vote for the motion.415  
In terms of the actual impact of these institutional tools of decision making, 
several points can be made. First, while the simplified procedure exists, it i  rarely 
invoked because the opposition Left party continues to insist on a full debate for 
every extension.  Thus, the Bundestag is almost permanently engaged in debating out 
of area operations. Every year the mandates have to be re-negotiated, which means 
the decisions are always vulnerable to election cycles, political maneuverings, and to 
the politics of the moment. As one official put it, the question most often asked in the 
decision-making process is not what is operationally necessary but what is politically 
feasible. Other officials argued that the slow and cumbersome process of a full 
procedural vote means that Germany’s NATO allies are held hostage to the dynamics 
of German domestic politics.416 
Secondly, the Protokollnotizen and caveats have a direct impact on the ability 
of the Bundeswehr and ultimately NATO to successfully implement its mandate on 
                                                
414 Paul Belkin, “German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications,” CRS 
Report for Congress, RL34199, October 3, 2007, 16. 
415 Interviews on November 11, 18, 2009. 




the ground in Afghanistan. Caveats have been a great source of conflict because the 
restrictions make it difficult for NATO commanders who need flexibility in 
deploying the troops at their command.417  The problems associated with 
implementing some kind of structural reform in the decision-making process ar  
difficult to resolve. Tightly centralized decision making can lead to ineffici ncies and 
delays; for example, Foreign Office representatives have restricted decision-making 
authority on the ground in Afghanistan, so their requests must be sent to Berlin and 
then up the bureaucratic chain of command.418  
 
Summary 
The Afghanistan case study has shown the weakness of the presidentialization 
thesis, particularly in the German case. It has reinforced conclusions in stud es that 
emphasize the relevance of coalition politics and the role of the junior coalition 
partner in the decision-making process. It highlights the importance of the Bundestag 
as an actor in the foreign policy decision-making process related to out-of-area 
missions. Finally, it begins the process of constructing a framework for analyzing 
foreign policy decision making by highlighting an array of institutional structures—
bureaucratic organizations, rules, practices, and procedures—that shape the policy 
outcome. Sometimes these outcomes reflect political compromises that make the 
implementation of policy difficult, but the ad hoc, incremental approach to sending 
German troops abroad appears to be the pattern that will hold for the foreseeable 
future. 
                                                
417 Belkin and Morelli, 10–11. 




Limitations of Study 
Several limitations must be noted. First of all, the study focuses on middle-
range theory and thus cannot contribute directly to the larger discussion of the nature 
of German foreign policy or the continued relevance of Germany as a civilian power. 
Nevertheless it sheds light on the reasons why German policymakers and diplomats 
negotiate one set of parameters rather than another. 
 Second, this study focused on institutional structures in which actors are 
embedded, so while it does not delve deeply into patterns of actor behavior, it does 
help illuminate the institutional structures that shaped the decision-making 
environment in which actors make decisions. Thus, the study should be seen as a 
supplement to FPA studies that focus on individual decision making and 
constructivist analyses of the constitutive nature of policy environments. 
 Third, to properly construct a more robust framework for analyzing the 
patterns of German foreign policy decision making, more case studies are need d. 
Does it matter, for example, whether the mission is NATO-led rather than UN or EU-
led? In addition, a more longitudinal study of decision making over time would 
provide insights into the development of the institutional structures that have shaped 
the decision-making process. A decision-making study of the first out-of-area mission 
in Bosnia in the early 1990s—prior to the Constitutional Court’s decision in 1994—
and the Kosovo mission in the late 1990s—when Germany sent troops without a UN 
mandate—would be important earlier case studies.  
 Because of the specific role of the Bundestag in the decision-making process 




not applicable to the entire spectrum of foreign policy decisions. The other policy 
arena in which the Bundestag plays a significant role is European policy, which 
increasingly covers a vast array of policy issues.419 Such observations as arise from 
this case study of the formal and informal mechanisms of decision making would be 
germane to those issues in which the Bundestag does have constitutive powers. 
Nevertheless, the case study provides insights about the German foreign policy 
decision-making process that contribute to a greater understanding of the general
course of decision making regardless of the issue area. 
 
Significance of Study  
Thus the study’s significance lies in its effort to begin the process of 
constructing a general framework for analysis of post-unification German foreign 
policy decision making.  The study contributes insights relevant to the ongoing debate 
on structure and process in foreign policy analysis and to the institutional structures 
that shape the context within which decisions are made. It provides a much-needed 
update to our current understanding of the German foreign policy decision-making 
process and the interaction of actors and structures within it. In addition, the case 
study of out-of-area operations touches on one of the most significant changes in 
German foreign policy—a policy that remains controversial and that exemplifi s the 
countervailing pressures between external demands and domestic political 
constraints.  
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One important contribution is the explanation of the role the German 
Parliament plays in out-of-area operations, which is rarely included in discussions 
about decisions relating to German military contributions. Many studies have sought
to understand the political tensions and requirements of security operations on the 
demand side, but there are political pressures and constraints that shape the outcom
of political processes at the supply end as well. The context of the decisions that 
determine the contours of out-of-area contributions at that level are equally important 
in terms of providing a more complete picture of policy outcomes, and they can shed 
light on at least some of the reasons why decisions do not necessarily translate into 










Prior to the unification of the country in 1990, the government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany held that sending German armed forces to participate in 
peacekeeping operations was unconstitutional. Within a span of two decades, and 
following a landmark ruling by the country’s Federal Constitutional Court in 1994, 
Germany has become a supplier of security with over 7,000 troops participating in a 
dozen operations around the globe. Most of its armed forces—nearly 5,000—serve in 
Afghanistan, where German troops have been deployed since 2001.420  
Germany’s role in out-of-area operations has not been without its critics 
outside of and within Germany, as the case study of Afghanistan shows. 
Domestically, the Afghanistan mission has generated controversy and opposition. A 
“culture of restraint” that in German society engenders a deep skepticism about the 
use of military force as a political instrument and the gradual worsening of the
security environment in Afghanistan—increasing violence with escalating civilian 
casualties—has led to strong public opposition and calls to end Germany’s military 
engagement there. German leaders of most political parties have accepted a greater 
role for Germany in the international system and in peacekeeping operations, but they 
                                                








remain unwilling to commit German troops to participate in operations in which 
armed force is actively projected against an enemy.  
The German government’s attempts to balance rising allied expectations of 
Germany’s role in Afghanistan and domestic political limitations on what is 
politically feasible have had consequences for the NATO mission on the ground. 
German critics charge that the NATO decision-making process itself is held hostage 
to the Bundestag’s cumbersome and lengthy process of consent. The political 
necessity of restricting certain components of Germany’s military role in 
Afghanistan, as this case study revealed, has had negative consequences in NATO 
and in the prosecution of Germany’s mandate in northern Afghanistan. Germany’s 
NATO allies have been extremely critical of the caveats placed on German forces by 
the German government because the flexibility NATO commanders need to respond 
to events on the ground is reduced by such restrictions. Furthermore, that German 
officials in Afghanistan must often wait until Berlin authorizes requests can create 
problems when quick action is required. Finally, inter-ministerial coordination 
remains problematic and thus implementation correspondingly poor. And yet, as 
many officials interviewed for this study pointed out, the German government 
remains committed to the county’s role as a contributor to military missions abroad.  
The German foreign policy elite’s continued support of a German contribution 
to out-of-area operations in the face of public opposition reveals a number of things. 
First of all, Germany remains committed to the NATO alliance and to its international 
obligations despite the unease that Germany’s new security role creates among 




rather than a determining variable in foreign policy decision making, though German 
politicians and officials remain sensitive to public opinion and are constantly 
assessing the political environment to anticipate how the public might react.  
Even so, the hesitation of the German elite to expand Germany’s security role 
in Afghanistan is not just about the elite’s sensitivity to public opinion, but about 
characteristic principles that guide German foreign and security policy—its 
commitment to multilateralism and to “never going it alone,” and its emphasis on the 
non-military aspects of security and defense policy. The emphasis placed on the 
civilian reconstruction and development mandate of the International Security 
Assiatance Force (ISAF) rather than the robust counterterrorism mandate of 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) reflects this distinct emphasis in Germany’s 
security approach. While NATO officials, particularly U.S. officials, criti ize 
Germany for the restrictions it imposes on its troops, German officials have criticized 
U.S. officials for focusing too much on the military aspects of conflict reduction in 
Afghanistan.  
More than anything else, perhaps, the study shows that the Bundeswehr is a 
“parliamentary army.”  The German parliament’s role in foreign policy is not 
significant—except for out-of-area operations. Thus, any observations of German 
military missions must acknowledge that the executive and legislative branches of the 
German political system are co-determinants of out-of-area policies, and both can 
place restrictions or caveats on operational details. The decision-making process 
outlined in the Afghanistan case also shows how the operational parameters can be 




mandates for missions like Afghanistan for only twelve months, for example, means 
such decisions are constantly vulnerable to political maneuvering, electoral cycles, or 
to events on the ground that may have a negative impact on the shape of the mandate 
itself.  
This leads us to ask new questions about the nature of the overall decision-
making process itself regarding out of area operations. What shapes the outer 
parameters within which actors operate and make decisions? Arguably, in the area in
which German foreign and security policy changed the most—that is, in Germany’s 
decision to participate in out-of-area operations—one would expect to find some 
changes in the way in which the decision-making process had to adjust to the changed 
circumstances. However, a review of the literature on German foreign policy decision 
making revealed a startling lack of information regarding the nature of post-
unification German policy decision making. Indeed, as was shown, much of the 
literature of Germany in the post–Cold War era has been concerned with IR-level 
studies that vacillated between neo-realist expectations of a resurgent German 
nationalist state propelled by a renewed sense of power and interests to constructivist 
rejoinders of the continuity of Germany as a civilian power and of its norm-driven 
foreign policy. 
As relevant as these structurally-based analyses are, a state level, for ign 
policy analysis approach is more effective in addressing questions about the factors 
that determine the course of foreign policy decision making on out-of-area operations. 
Given the absence of a sustained research effort on this topic, this study stepped in to 




factors influence the course of decision making and then to place these factors in a 
decision-making framework of analysis to gain a better understanding of foreign 
policy decision making in the German context. 
Furthermore, the study argued that while FPA emphasizes the centrality of 
actors in the decision-making process, too little attention has been given to the 
institutional structures—organizations, procedures, norms, and practices—within 
which individual actors function and which shape the direction and outcome of policy 
decisions. Thus, the study has contributed to the literature on foreign policy analysis 
by examining the ways in which actors utilize institutional structures to influe ce the 
course of policy decision making. Hypotheses that tested both agency—whether or 
not the chancellor has expanded power to influence policy decisions—and structure—
in what ways coalitional dynamics between the major and junior coalition parters 
affect policy decisions—were applied to the case of Germany’s military operation in 
Afghanistan. Results from the case study were placed within a larger framework of 
analysis for foreign policy decision making.  
The study produced a number of insights. The interaction between internal 
and external pressures is important, since the impact of international pressures on th  
decision-making process is felt through informal communications and negotiations t 
the international level before the formal decision-making process involving the 
chancellor and the Bundestag begins. Thus, a discussion of German policy 
deliberations must emphasize the informal dynamics of decision making both at the 
international level as well as the informal bargaining and consensus-building that 




shaping the decision-making process. Within these decision dynamics, one of the 
most important drivers is whether or not the coalition government has a parliamentary 
majority to pass the mission mandate in the Bundestag, but that possession of a 
numerical majority may not be enough if a situation arises in which internal coalition 
dissent is great and the size of the parliamentary majority is small. 
Secondly, contrary to some theoretical arguments, the German chancellor has 
a great deal of influence over setting the foreign policy agenda, but chancellorial 
powers remain restrained by a number of constitutional/legal and institutional 
constraints. How effective the chancellor can be in the policymaking process depends 
primarily on the chancellor’s ability to utilize the instruments available to 
successfully drive the process, the relationship to his or her own party, and the 
leadership qualities the chancellor possesses. 
Thirdly, political parties also hold a central role in Germany’s parliamentary 
democracy, and coalition politics are an important influence in policy decision 
making. The chancellor relies heavily on the parliamentary party fraction in the
Bundestag to push through his or her policy agenda, particularly when the issue is so 
divisive—as in the case of out-of-area operations. When the degree of policy 
disagreement between coalition partners is great, policy resolution is difficult, even 
when the overall nature of party political philosophies are not that different, as was 
the case between the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens.  
The study showed that the resolution of differences on the deployment of 
German troops can occur in the decision dynamics in the Bundestag—that is, that the 




armed forces abroad. The needs of Staatsraison and Germany’s alliance 
commitments carried by the federal government into the decision-making process are 
not necessarily in alignment with the political views represented in the Bundestag, but 
actors at the governmental and parliamentary levels do possess institutional 
mechanisms that can be applied in order to formulate a policy consensus that can 
forge a parliamentary majority that will support the continued participation of 
Germany troops in out-of-area operations. 
 
Future Research 
The study’s findings suggest several avenues for future research. First of all, it 
is clear that the construction of a framework for analyzing foreign policy deision 
making requires additional case studies in order to more fully examine the process in 
which decisions are made. The value of examining out-of-area operations lies in th  
opportunity the issue provides for assessing a discrete “before and after” case, since it 
was only after the country united that it took up the role of contributing armed forces
to out-of-area operations. Before the 1994 Constitutional Court decision the executive 
prerogative was more pronounced; afterwards the balance shifted to a co-
determination between the chief executive and the parliament. Bosnia and Kosovo are 
important cases in the 1990s. Other cases deserving mention would be Macedonia in 
2001 and the Congo in 2006, both of which are missions led by the EU, rather than 
the UN or NATO. It would be worth examining whether any differences in the 
decision-making process emerge, depending on which institutional actor holds the 




security and defense policy (ESDP) would require more institutional reform in order 
to protect the Bundestag’s decision-making authority in out-of-area questions and 
insisted that it must be involved at the very early stages of deliberation.421    
Secondly, the current study focused on the chancellor as an important foreign 
policy actor, but more research on the decision-making dynamics within the executive 
is needed, particularly the relationship between various federal ministries. Interviews 
with German officials brought out the problems associated with inter-ministerial 
rivalries and differences in approaches. Bureaucratic entities develop their own 
institutional and bureaucratic cultures, and there is no doubt, for example, that given 
the militarily-defined role of the Ministry of Defense and the reconstruction-oriented 
role of the Ministry of Development, these two ministries would not necessarily hare 
the same views about defining the parameters of Germany’s out-of-area operations. 
Learning more about how these differences may affect the course of foreign pol cy 
decision making would shed more light about the process itself. 
Thirdly, there is the role of the Bundestag in out-of-area decision making. One 
issue that emerged in the case study was the interaction between international and 
domestic variables in decision making as they related to the question of parliament’s 
consent prerogative in out-of-area missions—the internationalization of foreign 
policy decision-making processes set against parliamentary rights. On he one hand, 
an argument can be made that decisions that increasingly are being made in 
international bodies reduce the Bundestag’s constitutional prerogatives to decide
whether or not Germany will participate in an out-of-area mission. Proponents of 
institutional reform of the decision-making process see this danger, but other officials 
                                                




do not share this view of declining parliamentary control. Nevertheless, to place the 
theoretical discussion as a question of “national decision making” versus 
“international decision making” is too much of a simplification of what is a very 
complex interplay of forces that lies at the heart of the decision-making process.422  
This issue raises a highly relevant policy question of how the inefficiencies i 
the decision-making can be addressed. Recognizing the need to reform the decision-
making process, can reforms actually gain enough political support to be 
implemented? Short of structural reforms, what changes can be implemented in order 
to reduce the problems currently besetting the implementation of policies on the 
ground in Afghanistan? One aspect heard in the German debate is that of a 
“multilateral trap” in German foreign and security policy: the struggle of German 
leaders to define a clear strategic policy regarding out-of-area operati ns may be 
hindered by the perceived need to continue to show Germany’s commitment to 
multilateralism, which in effect creates a situation whereby the government says yes 
to all requests for German troop participation and then tempers its decision by 
inserting restrictions that make the decision more palatable to the elite and public 
alike but create problems on the ground.423 What kind of a supplier of security will 
Germany be? Germany’s contributions will always remain within a multilateral 
context, and understanding the factors—and restrictions—that shape such decisions 
will remain relevant to any discussion of Germany’s role in international military 
operations, and to an understanding of the limits of international cooperation within 
the parameters of multilateral military operations. 
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Appendix A: ISAF and OEF-related Mandates 2001–2008 
ISAF 
2001 
• United Nations Security Council 
o Resolution 1378 (November 14, 2001) 
o Resolution 1381 (December 6, 2001 
o Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) 
• German Government Motion of December 21, 2001 (No. 14/7930) 
o December 2001–June 2002 (1,200 soldiers) 
2002 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1413 (May 23, 2002) 
• German Government Motion of June 5, 2002 (No. 14/9246) 
o June 2002 to December 2002 (1,200 +200 soldiers) 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1444 (November 27, 2003) 
• German Government Motion of December 3, 2003 (No. 15/128) 
o December 2002–October 2003 
2003 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510 (October 13, 2003) 
• German Government Motion of October 15, 2003 (No. 15/1700)  
o October 2003–October 2004 (2,250 soldiers) 
o Supplemental Amendment (Protokollnotiz) of Foreign Minister and 
Declaration of Defense Minister, October 22, 2003 (No. 15/1806) 
2004 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1563 (September 17, 2004) 
• German Government Motion of September 22, 2004 (No. 15/3710) 
o October 2004–September 2005  (2,250 soldiers) 
2005 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005) 
• German Government Motion of September 21, 2005 (No. 15/5996) 
o September 2005–September 2006 (3,000 soldiers) 
2006 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006 
• German Government Motion of September 13, 2006 (No. 16/2573) 
o September 2006–September 2007 (3,000 soldiers) 
2007 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1776 (September 19, 2007) 
• German Government Motion of February 8, 2007 (No. 16/4298) 
o March 2007–October 2007 (+500 soldiers, 6 Tornado aircraft) 
• German Government Motion of September 19, 2007  (No. 16/6460) 
 October 2007–October 2008 (3,500 soldiers) 
2008 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1833 (September 22, 2008) 
• German Government Motion of October 17, 2008  (No. 16/10473) 




                      
OEF 
2001 
• United Nations Security Council 
o Resolution 1368 (September 12, 2001) 
o Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001) 
• German Government Motion of November 7, 2001 (No. 14/7296) 
o November 2001–November 2002 (3,900 soldiers) 
o Supplemental Amendment (Protokollnotiz) of Foreign Minister of 
November 14, 2001  (No. 14/7447) 
2002 
• German Government Motion of November 6, 2002 (No. 15/37) 
o November 2002–November 2003 (3,900 soldiers) 
2003 
• German Government Motion of November 5, 2003 (No. 15/1880) 
o November 2003–November 2004 (3,100 soldiers)  
2004 
• German Government Motion of October 27, 2004 (No. 15/4032) 
o November 2004–November 2005 (3,100 soldiers) 
2005 
• German Government Motion of November 3, 2005 (No. 16/26) 
o November 2005–November 2006 (2,800 soldiers) 
2006 
• German Government Motion of October 25, 2006 (No. 16/3150) 
o November 2006–November 2007 (1,800 soldiers) 
2007 
• German Government Motion of November 7, 2007 (No. 16/6939) 
o November 2007–November 2008 (1,400 soldiers) 
2008 
• German Government Motion of October 29, 2008 (No. 16/10720)  

























September 11 Terrorist attacks in the United States 
September 12 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passes Resolution 1368 
condemning attacks 
September  12 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder gives a speech pledging German 
support in fighting terrorism 
September 28 UNSC passes Resolution 1373, which calls on member states to 
work together to suppress the threat of terrorism 
October 2 NATO’s invocation of Article 5 on September 12 is confirmed 
after an investigation proved that the terrorist actions in the United 
States had been conducted by Al-Qaeda, protected by the Taliban 
in Afghanistan   
October 7 U.S. attack against the Taliban in Afghanistan begins 
October  11 Chancellor Schröder in a speech before the German Bundestag 
assures the United States of Germany’s “active solidarity” in 
fighting terrorism and makes reference to possible German 
participation in military operations  
November 6 Bush administration sends request for assistance. Schröder meets 
with top party leadership, fraction leaders, and with the cabinet 
regarding the request. 
November 7 German government submits motion to Bundestag that outlines 
German intentions to contribute troops on basis of NATO Art. 5, 
UN charter Article 51, and UN resolutions 1368 and 1373. The 
following day, the motion is transferred to parliamentary 
committees for further discussion 
November 8 Release of government statement of unlimited solidarity with the 
United States along with declaration of intention to deploy 3900 
troops for OEF mission pursuant to government motion submitted 
on November 7, 2001. However, the German government 
continued to wait for the United Nations to pass a resolution 
mandating further action in order for the Bundestag to vote on the 
government’s motion 
November  13 Schröder, responding to growing dissent within his party and the 
coalition to sending German troops to Afghanistan, calls for  a 
motion of confidence in his government and ties it to a vote of 
support for the Afghanistan mission—thus forcing SPD and Green 
members to choose between the survival of their coalition or the 
rejection of the mission  
November 16 The vote of confidence in the German Bundestag passes with only 




ensuring the survival of the Red-Green coalition and endorsing 
German participation in the OEF mission 
November 24 The federal government announces that Germany will host the 
planned donor conference for Afghanistan 
November 27– 
December 5 
The Bonn Conference begins. The Bonn Agreement establishes an 
interim administration/government for Afghanistan. Annex 1, the 
“International Security Force,” states that the participants of “UN 
Talks on Afghanistan request the UNSC to consider authorizing 
the early deployment to Afghanistan of a UN mandated force.” 
December 6 UNSC passes Resolution 1383 accepting the Bonn Agreement and 
noting its intention to act on it 
December 6 Afghanistan Donor Conference begins, with questions raised as to 
how much Germany will commit and for what purposes 
December 20 UNSC passes Resolution 1386 authorizing deployment of a 
multinational force in Kabul and surrounding area to help stabilize 
the country and create conditions for lasting peace. ISAF 
command is given to Great Britain 
December 21 With UNSC Resolution 1386, providing the legal basis, the 
German government submits a motion to the Cabinet regarding 
proposing to send German armed forces to serve within the 
framework of ISAF. The mandate is set for a period of only six 
months (up to June 20). The motion carries in the Cabinet and is 
sent to the Bundestag 
December 22 The motion is deferred to the parliamentary committees, and take 
up by the Plenary. The motion passes with a vote of 538:35:8. 
Germany will now send 1,200 troops to Afghanistan. An 
extension must be voted on in June 2002 
2002 
 
January 13 German troops arrive in Afghanistan and will be stationed in the 
north and central Kabul. The German government resists repeated 
requests by Karzai government for Germany to assume command 
of ISAF forces after the British leave in March.  
March 6 First German casualties 
March 15 Germany and the Afghan administration sign an agreement that 
German will assume the lead in police training efforts  
March 16 German government outlines its reconstruction aid package 
May 23 UNSC passes Resolution 1413 extending the ISAF mandate to 
December 20, 2002 
June 5 German government submits motion to extend German 
participation in ISAF for another six months, until December 30, 
2002. The Cabinet passes the motion and the Bundestag receives 
and defers the motion to its committees 
June 14  Bundestag votes to extend ISAF mandate until December 30, 
2002 




troops in Kabul 
October 28 After much resistance, Germany agrees to take over as lead nation 
in ISAF as of February 2003. Defense Minister Peter Struck 
anticipates no resistance, but the UNSC must first extend the ISAF 
mandate before the Bundestag can vote on the motion 
November 7 German government submits motion to extend OEF for twelve 
months until November 15, 2003. The motion is forwarded to 
parliamentary committees 
November 15 Bundestag votes to extend OEF mandate another twelve months 
November 27 UNSC Resolution 1444 extends ISAF mandate for one year 
December 3 German government submits motion to extend German ISAF 
participation another year, until December 13, 2003. Because 
Germany will take over as lead nation (along with the 
Netherlands) February 2003, the motion includes a request to 
increase the German troop level to 2500 soldiers 
December 20 Bundestag votes to extend ISAF mandate another twelve months. 
However, parliamentarians reject Afghan leader Karzai’s request 
for Germany to expand its geographical reach, keeping restrictions 
on German troop movements 
2003 
 
Feb. 10 Germany and Netherlands assume command of ISAF in Kabul on 
the basis of UNSCR 1444 
Aug. 9 Summer finds the issue of extending the ISAF mandate beyond 
Kabul still simmering. The SPD now supports this, and the 
Ministry of Defense has sent a survey team to determine where 
Germany’s expanded presence might be. However, on August 9, 
the FDP party brings files a suit in the Federal Constitutional 
Court arguing that that the court must legally clarify whether or 
not such an extension of the mandate is permissible. The suit is 
later dismissed.  
Oct.  13 UNSC passes Resolution 1510 authorizing expansion of ISAF 
operations to include operations anywhere in Afghanistan 
Oct. 15 German government submits motion to extend ISAF mandate 
another year and to expand Germany’s geographical presence to 
Kunduz.  
Oct. 24  Bundestag votes to extend ISAF mandate and the armed forces’ 
geographical reach to Kunduz.  
Nov. 15  Bundestag votes to extend OEF mandate for another year 
2004 
 
Feb. 5 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Munich, where more support 
for stronger engagement in Afghanistan and more PRTs are 
discussed. The U.S. representatives argue for combining OEF and 
ISAF, which the German government opposes 




Feyzabad; since the German government views this as an 
extension of its presence in Kunduz mission, it argues that no new 
mandate is required.  
June 28 NATO summit reveals ongoing difficulties in getting more troops 
and materiel to do the job 
Sept. 17 UNSC passes resolution 1563 
Sept. 23 German government passes motion to extend ISAF for one year  
Sept. 30 German Bundestag votes to extend ISAF mandate for another year 
Oct. 9 First ever elections in Afghanistan; Karzai is elected president 
Oct. 27 German government votes to extend OEF mandate another year 
Nov. 12 Bundestag votes to extend OEF mandate by vote of  509–48–3 
2005 
 
Feb. 11 Results of NATO summit: Germany agrees to increase its 
contribution but not its troop level, which will remain at 2,250. 
Germany will take responsibility for all of northern Afghanistan. 
Germany also will establish an outpost in Mazar-i-Sharif but 
troops will be pulled out of Kabul to support this  
Sept. 21 German government votes to extend ISAF mandate for another 
year but requests a troop increase to 3,000.    
Sept. 28 German Bundestag votes in favor of extending ISAF mandate by 
vote of 535–14–4 
Nov. 3 German government votes to extend OEF mandate for another 
twelve months; motion is sent to Bundestag 
Nov. 8 German Bundestag votes to extend OEF but reduces troop level to 
2,800. Vote is 519–67–3. 
 2006 
 
Sept. 12 UNSC adopts resolution 1707 “on the situation in Afghanistan” 
Sept. 13 German government submits motion to extend ISAF mandate for 
twelve months 
Sept. 28 German Bundestag votes to extend ISAF mandate, though there is 
increasing unease regarding the safety of German troops in light of 
deteriorating security situation and concerns regarding mission 
“overstretch” in the Bundeswehr 
Nov. 28-29 NATO summit; Germany agrees to let its troops assist allied 
forces outside their zone in emergencies; Canada threatens to pull 




Feb. 8 German government submits request for deployment of six 
Tornados for air reconnaissance and surveillance/monitoring in 
Afghanistan. The motion is clear that the Tornados will support 
the ISAF mandate only—no information is to be exchanged with 




March 9 German Bundestag votes to accept government request to send six 
Tornados to Afghanistan, but the debate is heated. Opponents now 
charging that Germany is participating in a war and not just 
contributing to civilian reconstruction activities.  
May 22 The political debate on extending OEF shows declining support. 
Most parties want out of OEF but continue to support the ISAF 
mandate 
Sept. 19 UNSCR 1776 “on the situation in Afghanistan”  
Sept. 19 German government votes to extend ISAF mandate for another 
twelve months and forwards the motion to the Bundestag 
Oct. 12 German Bundestag votes in favor of extending ISAF mandate, but 
Chancellor Angela Merkel rejects NATO General Secretary’s 
request to send German troops to southern Afghanistan to 
participate in stabilization operations 
Nov. 7 German government submits motion to Bundestag to renew OEF 
mandate for twelve months 





April 2-4 NATO summit in Bucharest; Canadian government again 
threatens to withdraw its forces by 2009 if other allies do not 
pledge an additional 1,000 combat troops. Its NATO allies 
respond accordingly: the United States pledges 5,000 troops, 
France another 720, and Germany an additional 1,000 troops. 
June  Government says it will seek approval of Bundestag to increase 
troop levels by 1,000 
Sept. 22 UNSCR 1833 extending support for Afghanistan operation 
Oct. 7 German government votes to extend ISAF mandate (this time by 
fourteen months in order to prevent the debate on the extension 
from becoming mired in the federal election scheduled for 
September 2009) 
Oct. 16 German Bundestag passes motion to extend ISAF mandate by 
vote of 442–96–32 
Oct. 29 German government passes motion to renew OEF mandate, but 
the motion states that the Cabinet declines to renew German 
commitments to OEF in Afghanistan. Thus, while Germany 
retains troops in the OEF efforts on the Horn of Africa, it no 
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